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2 Abstract
In this thesis, I explore three main questions. How do resource windfalls affect leaders’ coup-
proofing strategies when facing coup risk? Second, what does determine the sub-national
allocation of post-conflict donors’ reconstruction aid? Third, under which conditions is aid
an effective tool to promote the redevelopment of the manufacturing sector of post-conflict
countries?
In the first two chapters, developing an opportunity-willingness framework, I investigate
how access to natural resources and unearmarked aid affects leaders’ decisions to undertake
institutional coup-proofing when facing coup risk. On the empirical side, I also present and
discuss a strategy to capture the relation between coup risk, discretionally allocable resources
and institutional coup-proofing taking into account the multidirectional dynamics between
these dimensions. Results from a cross-section time-series analysis suggest that leaders who
have access to funds they can discretionally allocate are less likely than others to undertake
institutional coup-proofing efforts when facing coup risk.
In the third chapter I co-authored with dr. Steinwand, we investigate how political sup-
port for the former warring factions affected the sub-national allocation of donors’ resources
across Nepal since the end of the civil war in 2006. Results suggest that the peace agreement
that concluded the decade-long conflict was unsuccessful to prevent partisan allocation of
aid.
Finally, in the last chapter, I study via a cross-section time series analysis if and to
what extent donors’ efforts to rebuild the energy infrastructures of post-conflict countries
contribute to promoting recipient countries’ manufacturing sector. I find that resources
targeting the restoration of facilities to produce and distribute energy have a significant and
positive impact in spurring the manufacturing sector of countries that experienced a conflict.
Presented findings increase our understanding of the factors affecting civil-military rela-
tions and state-budgeting in fragile countries. At the same time, they advance our under-
standing of how aid shapes post-conflict countries.
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3 Introduction
In this thesis, I aim to investigate how resource windfalls influence countries affected by socio-
economic instability. In particular, I aim to examine how such resources impact civil-military
relations, how they interact with power equilibria between former warring factions, how they
shape spoil politics in post-conflict settings and, finally, how they can contribute to making
post-conflict economies more resilient to exogenous economic shocks. Two main reasons
motivate this research agenda. First, civil-military relations are one of the determinants of
military effectiveness (Nielsen, 2002; Biddle and Long, 2004). Considering this, advancing
our understanding of what shapes them is consequently central to shed more light on what
affects military power and, therefore, gaining insights regarding the extent to which states
can dominate their adversaries (Brooks, 2007). Second, advancing our knowledge regarding
how resource windfalls interact with power-equilibria in post-conflict countries as well as how
they reshape post-conflict economies helps to explain what makes fragile countries more -
or less - stable, prone to a renew of conflict outbreaks and inclined to develop accountable
governments. In this sense, this thesis intends to contribute to the greater debate regarding
state-building in countries with fragile political institutions and economies.
In the first and the second chapters of the thesis, I address the first question looking at
how access to discretionally allocable resources shapes civil-military relations in coup-risk-
affected countries. Notably, first I investigate the role of discretionally allocable ”endogenous
resources” i.e natural resource rents. Then I investigate the role of discretionally allocable
”exogenous resources” i.e unearmarked foreign aid. In both cases, I focus in particular on
the role that discretionally allocable resources and coup risk have on the extent to which
rulers undertake institutional coup-proofing measures. In the third chapter, I investigate how
power equilibria between former warring factions and other groups shape the relation between
conflict, voting patterns, and sub-national allocation of foreign post-conflict reconstruction
aid. Notably, I focus on the case of early post-conflict Nepal looking at the Peace Agreement
that concluded the ten-years-long civil war that affected the country between 1996 and 2006.
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Finally, in the fourth chapter, I explore the conditions under which the allocation of foreign
aid to post-conflict countries contributes to redevelop their economies focusing on the impact
on the manufacturing sector.
Understanding how and when aid or natural resource revenues fund institutional coup-
proofing in coup-risk-affected countries is relevant for different reasons. First, institutional
coup-proofing is one of the most common and relevant coup-proofing strategies leaders re-
sort to when facing coup risk (De Bruin, 2018). In this sense, investigating what shapes
leaders’ decisions regarding the implementation of this strategy contributes to advance our
understanding of civil-military relations. Second, because donors’ resources are scarce it is
fundamentally relevant to understand if, when and to what extent aid flows fund additional
development spending and when they merely substitute institutional coup-proofing strate-
gies. Third, as natural resources represent one of the most important sources of revenue
for fragile countries1, understanding when, if and to what extent aid or natural resource
revenues contribute to funding institutional coup-proofing allows to better grasp the mech-
anisms behind state budgeting within these countries. Finally, as in the last 70 years, coup
plotters launched 478 coups ≈50% of which have been successful 2 understanding how state-
budgets affect coup-proofing strategies indirectly contributes to our understanding of the
determinants of regime transitions and leader survival.
At the same time, there are multiple reasons to further investigate what role foreign aid
plays in post-conflict countries. First, as on the one hand, foreign aid tends to be very pro-
ductive (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), on the other, the vulnerability of post-conflict countries
increases the risk of severe consequences in case of wrong policies. Second, understanding
how post-conflict power equilibria affect the sub-national allocation of foreign aid is crucial
to advance our understanding of how reconstruction programs might create new subnational
grievances. A better knowledge of these phenomena is essential to develop strategies that
1According to data from the World Bank natural resource revenues accounted for 17% of the GDP of
fragile and conflict-affected countries between 1970 and 2016.
2According to the Coup d’etat Dataset (2011).
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can prevent conflict recurrence. Third, as countries with limited economic diversification and
whose economy relies on natural resources are more at risk to suffer from negative economic
shocks (Gylfason, 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2008; Mavrotas et al., 2011), studying the ef-
fects of aid on the economy’s productive sectors contributes indirectly to understanding how
to promote and sustain peace in post-conflict fragile countries. Further, as the structure
of the economy affects the extent to which leaders have access to discretionally allocable
resources, then investigating how to encourage and strengthen productive rather than ex-
tractive sectors contributes to understanding how to promote more accountable post-conflict
governments.
Regarding the first two chapters, for centuries, the allocation of resources to strategic
actors played a crucial role for those willing to seize or retain power. An early interesting
example comes from the Roman Empire in 193 a.C. After the praetorian guards had dismissed
emperor Pertinax as a retaliation to his refusal to raise their salary, Sulpicianus and Julianus
competed against each other to gain the favour of the guards and, thus, conquer the throne.
In the words of Cassio Dio “[after the death of Pertinax] just as if it had been in some market
or auction-room, both the City and its entire empire were auctioned off. The sellers were the
ones who had slain their emperor, and the would-be buyers were Sulpicianus and Julianus,
who vied to outbid each other, one from the inside, the other from the outside [the praetorian
camp]. They gradually raised their bids up to twenty thousand sesterces per soldier. Some
of the soldiers would carry word to Julianus, ‘Sulpicianus offers so much; how much more
do you make it?’ And to Sulpicianus in turn, ‘Julianus promises so much; how much do
you raise him?’ ” (Cassius, C.D.D. and Cassius, D, 1914; vol. IX p. 143). Similarly, in
more recent times, Qaddafi relied intensely on oil revenues to buy the loyalty of tribal chiefs
who were threatening his rule in the aftermath of his coup in 1969 (Quinlivan, 1999) while
both the Venezuelan and the Algerian regimes resorted to such revenues to prevent regime
change, in 20173 and 2011 (Muradova, 2016). Likewise, during his rule, Ali Saleh kept the
3Ulmer, Alexandra and Buitrago, Deisy. “Maduro taps major general to lead Venezuela’s deterio-
rating oil industry”. Reuters, 26/11/2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-
9
support of crucial sheikhs and generals through direct payments to their tribal and military
constituencies4.
Yet, despite the army is an extremely relevant actor for leaders of fragile countries willing
to keep the office, the current literature dedicates little attention to explaining the role of
discretionally allocable resources in shaping the strategies that leaders resort to stay in office
when facing coup risk. For this reason, in the first two chapters of my thesis, I investigate
how access to natural resource revenues and unearmarked foreign aid affects leaders’ decision
to undertake institutional coup-proofing efforts when facing coup risk.
I pose that leaders who have access to resources that they can allocate as they prefer
are less likely to undertake institutional coup-proofing efforts when coup risk rises. This is
because when coup risk is relatively high, undertaking coup-proofing measures openly against
the military - as institutional coup-proofing - might trigger a preventive coup (Koga-Sudduth,
2017). Thus, leaders who have access to discretionally allocable resources prefer to fund other
strategies than institutional coup-proofing as they have the right financial resources to do so.
In turn, leaders who do not have access to discretionally allocable resources are more likely
to resort to this latter strategy as they lack the financial capacity to undertake alternative
coup-proofing strategies.
Here, I will refer to institutional coup-proofing as the set of strategies that include: the
creation of multiple rival forces inside the army and militias parallel to it, the rotation of
command positions, and the purging of rival military officers (Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and
Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). It is important to recall that while institutional coup-proofing
is one of the most common coup-proofing strategies (De Bruin, 2018), it is not the only one
that leaders who face the threat of a coup can resort to. Some examples of these alternative
strategies are: pleasing the selectorate with ad hoc fiscal reforms, increase stability, buy-off
politics-pdvsa/maduro-taps-major-general-to-lead-venezuelas-deteriorating-oil-industry-idUSKBN1DQ0R9,
accessed April 2019.
4US State Dept., ‘Will Saleh’s successor please stand up?’, 17 Sept. 2005. Downloaded from
Wikileaks and also available via The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/40815
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challengers or finance repression (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Quinlivan, 1999; Ross, 2001;
Morrison, 2009).
What motivates the focus on natural resource revenues and foreign aid is the consideration
that while rulers have used a great variety of strategies to gain access to discretionary
allocable resources5, more recently natural resource revenues and foreign aid have often
proved to be an exceptional source of discretionally allocable resources for rulers. What
makes leaders prone to use natural resource revenues to fund their coup-proofing strategies
to retain office are two main factors.
First, natural resource revenues provide a source of foreign hard currency that eases the
purchase of weapons to arm paramilitaries loyal to the leader and military expenditure to
please the military (Perlo-Freeman and Brauner, 2012). Second, they are generally in the
complete disposition of leaders and untied from taxpayers’ control6 (Quinlivan, 1999; Girod,
2015; Morrison, 2009; Caselli and Michaelis, 2009).
At the same time, for donors, it is difficult to control how aid-recipient leaders use the
funds they receive. This is because aid-recipient countries receive multiple aid flows from
multiple sources simultaneously and their domestic revenues – thus their budget - are likely
to be non-static and changing in the same period when aid is received (Pack and Pack,
1993; Feyzioglu et al., 1998). Moreover, Manning and Malbrough (2010), underline how in
most of the cases differences in the incentive structure, priorities and practices might further
decrease donors’ ability to coordinate effectively and supervise recipients’ expenditure. As
a result, it is not surprising that aid-recipient leaders can then often use at least a part of
donors’ resources to fund their strategies to retain power rather than investing in development
programs. For example, Mwenda and Tangri (2005) and Wright (2008) show how aid flows
often provided aid-recipient leaders with the opportunity to fund their patronage schemes
as well as increase personal wealth, repress and buy off potential opponents.
5Already in the XVIII century, Frederick II instituted a “Fund at disposal of the King” to bypass the
controls of the Prussian Court of Audit (Barbero, 2017).
6The experience of Cameroon’s offshore and extra-budgetary fund to manage oil rents is exemplary:
between 1977 and 2006 more than 50% of the revenues accrued disappeared (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2011).
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An interesting example of how access to natural resources shaped coup-proofing strategies
and civil-military relations over time comes from the regime of General Gawon in Nigeria.
When he seized power in 1966 the country had already experienced tense civil-military rela-
tions and a series of coups and counter-coups. As an attempt to increase his chances to stay
in office, Gawon rapidly reorganized the army fragmenting it and redeploying soldiers de-
pending on their ethnicity and region of origin (Barua, 2013). Despite this decision probably
contributed to facilitating eastern separatist insurgents (Obasanjo, 1980) fragmenting the
army probably contributed to breaking the chain of coups in the early phase of the Nigerian
post-colonial era. Yet, when nine years later the risk of a coup in the country rose again
as Gawon announced his willingness to not withdraw from power as promised, to increase
his chances to stay in office the General resorted to a strategy different from the one he had
implemented in 1966. Indeed, just after his announcement, he did not fragment the army but
rather implemented a series of generous fiscal reforms targeting crucial Nigerian elites and
increasing the salary of civil servants up to 130% while favouring urban communities with
ad hoc public investments (Gelb, 1988). What had changed since 1966 was that now Gawon
could take advantage of the conspicuous Nigerian oil revenues accrued abroad between 1973
and 1974.
To empirically test my first two hypotheses I resort to two two-stage cross-section time-
series analyses. In both the first and second chapter, to capture the number of ground-combat
compatible military organizations in a country in a given year I rely on the counterbalancing
index (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011). Higher levels of the index indicate the presence of several
equally strong military or paramilitary rival organizations. In this sense, higher levels of the
index suggest more intense institutional coup-proofing efforts. At the same time, to measure
the level of coup risk I estimate the probability for a country to experience at least one coup
attempt in a given year via a logit model of a coup attempt. Finally, to capture the amount
of discretionally allocable resources that leaders enjoy, in the first chapter I rely on data
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from the World Bank Open dataset7, while in the second chapter on data from the AidData
Core Research Release (Tierney et al., 2011).
With regard to the third and the fourth chapters discussed in this thesis, the effect
of resource windfalls in fragile post-conflict countries has long been debated by scholars
and practitioners. Indeed while in some cases the efforts of bilateral and multilateral aid
allocations led to success stories of post-conflict reconstruction, in others results have been
far below expectations. For example, in the decade following the peace onset in Sierra Leone,
donors provided the country with 69 US dollars per capita on average per year8. In 2012, ten
years after the breakout of peace, Sierra Leonean GDP per capita had risen by 30% but the
infant mortality rate was still 69% of its 2002 value and the country’s dependency on natural
resources had increased dramatically9. In neighboring Liberia, donors’ support in the decade
following the Accra Peace Agreement was even double than in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, in
2014 natural resources revenues still accounted for almost half of the country’s economy10.
At the same time, while after ten years from the peace onset Mozambican reliance on natural
resources had decreased by 6 percentage points and the GDP per capita rose by 47%, the
infant mortality was still 62% of its 1992 level in face of average support of 69 US dollars
per capita per year.
While various studies have explored what can explain this variation looking at how foreign
aid affects different social, economic, and political dimensions (Licht, 2010; Wright, 2009;
Asteriou, 2009; Irandoust et al., 2005; Heckelman and Knack, 2009; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007;
David et al. 2011; Demekas et al. 2002; Garriga and Phillips, 2014; Collier and Hoeffler,
2002 a; Collier et al. 2003; Suhrke et al., 2005; Nunnenkamp, 2016; Grossman, 1992; Collier
and Hoeffler, 2002 b; Nielsen et al., 2011), findings have been mixed. For example, while
some researchers point at the positive impact of aid (Hansen and Trap, 2000; Arndt et al.,
7Total natural resources rents (% of GDP); https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS
8Data from AidData (Tierney et al., 2011)
9According to the World Bank, while natural revenues constituted only 8% of the Sierra Leonean GDP
in 2002 this percentage rose to 23% in 2012.
10In 2013 natural resource revenues accounted for 49% of the GDP while in 2003 it was 37%.
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2010), Burnside and Dollar (2002) claim that this is conditional to the policies that recipient
countries implement while Rajan and Subramanian (2011) pose that aid decreases the growth
performances of the manufacturing sector.
To contribute to advance this debate and explore what determines the impact of foreign
aid allocations in fragile and post-conflict countries, in the second part of my thesis I in-
vestigate first, if and to what extent post-conflict power equilibria between former warring
factions affect the subnational allocation of donors’ resources. Second, I look at the effect of
foreign aid targeting energy infrastructures.
Notably, in the third chapter co-authored with dr. Steinwand, we look at the aid redis-
tribution effects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the Nepalese civil war
in 2006. We argue that while the agreement enfranchised groups that fought during the civil
war and supported the peace agreement, those groups that did not take a side were penalized
after the peace onset and received less developmental aid regardless of the socio-economic
needs. We pose that this is because groups that did not take side during the conflict were
under-represented during the negotiations and were not able to threaten future conflict. For
this reason, the groups who fought during the war had the opportunity to usurp political
and economic benefits that previously accrued to non-combatant parties, and add them to
the pie over which they bargained.
Finally, in the last chapter, I examine if and to what extent rebuilding energy infrastruc-
ture in post-conflict countries has a positive impact on restoring the manufacturing sector of
recipient countries - and, thus, decreasing their reliance on natural resource extraction. In
particular, I argue that when donors allocate resources to rebuild the energy infrastructure
of post-conflict countries they contribute to reduce the production costs and increase the
expected profits for the manufacturing sector thus supporting its growth.
To investigate aid allocation in post-conflict Nepal we bring together data on aid alloca-
tions (AidData. 2016), fighting activity (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu, Mihai and
Sundberg, 2017; Joshi Madhav, and Subodh, 2015) elections results (Election Commission
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of Nepal) and census data (Open Nepal data hub). At the same time, in the last chapter of
the thesis, the AidData Core Research Release is the backbone for my analysis on the impact
of aid flows targeting energy infrastructures in post-conflict countries. Indeed, the dataset
allows identifying different aid flows by their destination thanks to a detailed set of codes.
At the same time, to define post-conflict countries I rely on the UCDP Conflict Termination
Dataset (Kreutz, 2010) while, to capture changes in the relative relevance of the manufac-
turing sector in aid-recipient economies I look at the value-added from the manufacturing
sector as a percentage of the GDP using data from the World Bank Open dataset11.
As discussed, the thesis is divided into four chapters. Each of them starts with an intro-
duction and continues reviewing the most relevant literature, presenting the main hypothesis
and methods and closing with conclusions and appendixes. The first two chapters include
two short case studies on the relation between discretionally allocable resources and institu-
tional coup-proofing in Nigeria and Bangladesh. Finally, the conclusions of the thesis provide
a last overview of results summarizing the main findings, discussing their implications and
offering suggestions on avenues for future research.
11https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS
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4 Chapter 1 - Institutional coup-proofing and endoge-
nous resources: the case of natural resource revenues
4.1 Abstract
In this paper, I propose a new theory to explain when and to what extent leaders resort
to institutional coup-proofing. By developing an opportunity-willingness framework, I argue
that access to natural resources increases leaders’ willingness to undertake institutional coup-
proofing efforts when coup risk is low while it decreases the leader’s likelihood to undertake
such efforts when coup risk rises. This is because when coup risk is high - thus implementing
institutional coup-proofing might trigger a preventive coup - leaders who have access to
funds that they can allocate discretionally prefer to invest in other coup-proofing strategies
than institutional coup-proofing. In turn, when coup risk is low, leaders who can allocate
resources discretionally are likely to implement institutional coup-proofing as a preventive
strategy and rely on other strategies than institutional coup-proofing when coup risk rises.
On the empirical side, I resort to a cross-section time-series multivariate two-stage least
squares analysis covering 107 countries between 1970 and 2013 to disentangle the three-way
relationship between coup risk, natural resource revenues and coup risk. Findings support
my hypothesis and are robust to different model specifications contributing to shed more
light on the relation between coup risk, natural resources and institutional coup-proofing.
4.2 Introduction
Scholars have long investigated how natural resources contribute to funding leaders’ coup-
proofing strategies. Yet, current literature does not investigate when access to natural re-
sources provides leaders with valid alternatives to institutional coup-proofing. In this paper,
I develop an opportunity-willingness theoretical framework to investigate this aspect of civil-
military relations and pose that access to natural resource revenues has a positive impact
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on the extent to which leaders undertake institutional coup-proofing only when coup risk
is relatively low. In turn, as coup risk rises, leaders who have access to natural resource
revenues are less likely to resort to institutional coup-proofing than other leaders. On the
empirical side, I propose an instrumental variable approach to examine how access to natu-
ral resource revenues influences the implementation of institutional coup-proofing strategies
taking into account the feedback loop between coup risk, extraction of natural resources and
the undertaking of coup-proofing efforts.
Hereinafter I will refer to institutional coup-proofing as the set of strategies that include:
the creation of multiple rival forces inside the army and militias parallel to it, the rotation
of command positions and the purging of rival military officers (Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and
Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). Notably, despite this is one of the most common coup-proofing
strategies leaders resort to (De Bruin, 2018), there is a wide variation with regard to what
extent leaders resort to it.
For example, after surviving a coup-attempt in 2012, Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir reduced his efforts to counterbalance the army, while neither General Ibrahim Baré
Mäınassara nor his successor Daouda Malam Wanké undertook this move after the coups
that brought them to power in 1996 and 1999. In turn, during the three years following
the overthrowing of Chatichai Choonhavan, the number of Thai ground-combat compatible
military organizations rose by 0.7 units suggesting an intensification of institutional coup-
proofing efforts12.
So far, studies have explained this variation considering dimensions as the relative level
of coup risk or the political regime of countries (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2012; Koga-Sudduth,
2017). In this paper, I intend to advance our understanding of civil-military relations by
studying when leaders decide to face coup risk resorting to institutional coup-proofing and
when using natural resources to fund alternative strategies. In my framework, coup risk
affects leaders’ willingness to implement coup-proofing strategies and access to natural re-
12Data from the Counterbalancing / Coup-Proofing Data (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; 2012)
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sources provides them with the opportunity to implement coup-proofing strategies other
than institutional coup-proofing.
I assume that the goal of incumbent leaders is to retain power and that they chose their
survival strategies depending on the resources they have and the threat they face (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2002; 2017). To face coup risk, leaders can resort to natural resource revenues
to buy-off rivals in the military and strengthen their own legitimacy (Beblawi and Luciani,
1987; Albrecht and Eibl, 2018) or they can implement institutional coup-proofing. These
strategies have different costs and risks associated and I argue that the decision regarding
which strategy to undertake ultimately depends on leaders’ capacity and willingness to face
such costs.
As the military desire to preserve autonomy and safeguard corporate interests, they
might perceive leaders’ implementation of institutional coup-proofing measures as dangerous,
unwanted and disagreeable interference (Thompson, 1973; Finer, 2002). In this sense, the
implementation of such measures might increase the risk of a preventive coup. Some examples
come from Algeria and Ghana where leaders’ attempts to fragment the army contributed to
triggering the 1966 and 1965 coups (Zartman, 1970; Adekson, 1976). Moreover, fragmenting
the army into multiple units reduces its capacity to fight effectively interstate and intrastate
wars like the Libyan 1987 intervention in Chad and the Libyan 2011 counterinsurgency
campaign suggest (Pollack, 2004; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011; Gaub, 2013). Nonetheless,
buying-off rivals in the military and pleasing the selectorate to prevent coup-plotters from
increasing their support among it requires access to honeypots of resources that leaders can
allocate discretionally.
I pose that leaders who have access to natural resource revenues resort to institutional
coup-proofing only as a preventive measure when they believe they do not risk triggering
a preventive coup - i.e when coup risk is low. In turn, when coup risk rises these leaders
prefer to use natural resource revenues to secure their position buying-off rivals and pleasing
the selectorate or, in the most extreme cases, securing wealth abroad. This is because when
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coup risk is high, implementing a coup-proofing strategy that is openly against the interests
of the military - as institutional coup-proofing - might trigger a preventive coup. Contrarily,
leaders who do not enjoy access to such revenues have only institutional coup-proofing as a
measure to face coup-plotters when coup risk rises. In this sense, they are expected to react
to rising levels of coup risk increasing institutional coup-proofing efforts as they do not have
other options.
To test my hypothesis, I resort to a cross-section time-series two-stages least-squares
analysis including 107 countries over 43 years. Moreover, to corroborate my results, I propose
as a short case study an overview of coup-proofing strategies in Nigeria before and after the
oil-boom in the mid-1970s.
The paper develops as follows: first, I present the strategies leaders can resort to face
coup-plotters and the role of natural resource revenues in implementing them. Second, I
explain how access to natural resource revenues drives leaders’ decisions to implement or not
institutional coup-proofing when coup risk rises. Then I present methods, results and the
short case study on Nigeria. Conclusion and appendix conclude the chapter.
4.3 Coup-proofing strategies
To face coup risk, leaders can reduce the willingness of the military to intervene. To achieve
this goal they can increase the expected cost associated to stage a coup as well as the value
of maintaining the status quo (de Mesquita and Smith, 2017). To this end, leaders can
increase the provision of private goods to crucial supporters among the military or increase
the number of resources allocated to the military sector13 (Powell et al., 2018; Albrecht
and Eibl, 2018). At the same time, leaders can strengthen their legitimacy, and ensure
13For example, Girod (2015) recalls how during the 2001 elections Soloman Islander leaders targeted with
5.4 million of US dollars politicians, rebels and police members that had organized a coup attempt the
previous year. Likewiese, Chambers (2015) describes how the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen ensured
civilian control of the military and police driving the military into a managed dependence through a mixture
of fear and rewards. In the words of Prof. Pou Souvachana reported by Chambers, [the prime minister]
“takes good care of his military cronies, rewarding those who work with him. He rarely changes ministers
and other personnel while regularly increasing the number of stars for his generals. This is why Cambodia
has perhaps the most generals of any country in the world.” (Chambers, 2015; p.190)
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the support of the selectorate to decrease the military’s capacity to intervene. Indeed, the
armed forces’ chances to stage a successful coup and maintain a newly-established military
government are highly dependent on popular acquiescence and support14 (Roberts, 1975).
Alternatively, leaders can reduce the military’s capacity to strike. For this purpose they
can resort to institutional coup-proofing and create multiple rival forces inside the army
and militias parallel to it, rotating command positions and purging rival military officers
(Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). The creation of different security
forces with their chains of command and the rotation of command positions increase the
obstacles to the communication thus making for coup-plotters more difficult to coordinate
(Quinlivan, 1999). Coordination is vital for coup-plotters who, to launch a successful attack,
have to timely and rapidly take control of the centers of power and broadcast stations
(Luttwak, 2016). Coordination is essential as well when coup-plotters have to consolidate
their achievements and signal to any potential actor willing to react that the coup has already
succeeded. If coup-plotters fail to do so, actors willing to counter the coup may strike back
while some of the actors backing the coup may defect15 (Luttwak, 2016; De Bruin, 2018).
Moreover, the creation of different security forces parallel to the army increases the
number of armed actors willing to preserve the status quo (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015).
Indeed, when leaders threatened by coup risk create new security forces and appoint loyalist
officers as commanders (Horowitz, 1985; Harkness, 2016) they ensure that the goal of these
14The course of events of the Soviet 1991 coup-attempt remark how difficult is for coup-plotters to be
successful when they face a valid civil resistance. Between August 19th and 22nd large citizens’ demonstrations
successfully persuaded soldiers that their leaders were far from being in control of the country and convinced
them to defect. Taxi and truck divers organized patrols to obstruct armored units’ deployment and oppose
coup-plotters’ movements while civilians even managed to appropriate tanks for their purposes (Varney and
Martin, 2000). At the same time, neglecting and ignoring civilian relevant actors might well facilitate the
military’s intervention. For example, alienation and antagonization of Thai middle class and other elite
groups were relevant factors that drove the coup against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 (Prasirtsuk, 2007).
15In this regard, an important instance comes from the Soviet 1991 coup-attempt. During the days of
the coup, the junta was not able to firmly communicate to be in control of the Union. Printers refused to
publish junta-endorsed papers and journalists circumvented restrictions on television to broadcast Yeltsin’s
declarations. At the same time, Izvestia’s journalists and printing workers managed to publish the newspaper
including Yeltsin’s anti-coup statements while journalists from suspended radical newspapers organized un-
derground operations to print and distribute anti-Junta publications. In parallel, the radio station Moscow
Echo kept on broadcasting Yeltsin’s appeals to oppose the coup. As a result, fierce civil resistance rose and
many officers in the military refused to support the coup (Varney and Martin, 2000).
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units is to protect their leadership. The result is that in case of a coup, units loyal to the
leader will have strong incentives to fight coup-plotters as they are aware that the risk of
being dismantled by the new regime is very high (De Bruin, 2018).
Yet, as Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) point out, there is no linear relationship between
counterbalancing efforts and decreasing military capacity to stage a coup. In fact, the authors
show that counterbalancing efforts are most effective when in a country are present about
two equally strong military organizations and through Decaio (1990) recall how the excessive
fragmentation of Ugandan armed forces in 1971 obstructed the resistance to the coup.
Finally, if leaders believe they do not have enough resources to oppose coup-plotters, they
can send rents abroad and simply flee the country (Wright, 2008). In this sense, peculiar
but telling is the case of Robert Mugabe who in the last years of his regime used to travel
with a suitcase with ”coup money” in case he was ousted while abroad16.
4.4 Coup risk and coup-proofing: the role of natural resources
Natural resources play an important role in the relationship between institutional coup-
proofing and coup risk. Coup risk affects the extent to which such revenues constitute the
backbone of state finance and is likely to increase countries’ natural resource dependency.
This is because, first, the decline of socio-political stability is likely to hit less harshly the
resource extracting sector than others as this sector has limited linkages with the rest of the
economy and can not be relocated (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Mitchell and Thies,
2012). Second, instability encourages the incumbent faction in power to over-extract natural
resources to stock revenues before they could be lost because of regime change and to buy-off
opponents (Robinson et al. 2006; Fjelde, 2009; Collier, 2010). Yet, at the same time, natural
resource revenues that coup-plotters can loot if successful might increase the risk of a coup
(Acemoğlu et al., 2008).
On top of this, simultaneously, leaders often resort to natural resources revenues to coun-
16How to hide a billion dollars, The Economist, October 10th 2019 edition
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terbalance the army, please the selectorate, increase stability, buy-off political consensus and
finance repression (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Quinlivan, 1999; Ross, 2001; Morrison, 2009).
A recent instance comes from Venezuela where the appointment of a National Guard Major
General as leader of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA in November 2017 followed a
period of protest threatening Maduro’s regime17. Other instances come from Libya - where
Qaddafi resorted to oil revenues to buy the loyalty of tribal chiefs who were threatening
his rule18 and Algeria - where during the protests of 2011, the Algerian government used oil
revenues to finance interest-free loans and the creation of 70.000 workplaces for young people
(Muradova, 2016). Likewise, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s President Ngouabi - who had
taken the power in 1969 and faced a coup attempt in 1972 - and President Sassou-Nguesso
resorted to oil revenues to patronize relevant parts of the selectorate and fund the constitu-
tion of presidential guards and paramilitary forces loyal to them (Clark, 1997). Eventually,
Skocpol (1982), Quinlivan (1999), Sandbakken (2006) and Collier (2011) link the funding of
coup-proofing strategies, patronage schemes and security apparatus in Iraq, Iran, Algeria,
Nigeria and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf to their vast petrol revenues.
Two main reasons explain the link between natural resources and coup-proofing strate-
gies. First, they are generally in the complete disposition of leaders since, unlike foreign
aid or taxes, natural revenues are usually untied from donors’ or taxpayers’ control19 (Quin-
livan, 1999; Girod, 2015; Morrison, 2009; Caselli and Michaelis, 2009). Second, natural
resources revenues provide a source of foreign hard currency that eases military expenditure
(Perlo-Freeman and Brauner, 2012).
17Ulmer, Alexandra and Buitrago, Deisy. “Maduro taps major general to lead Venezuela’s deterio-
rating oil industry”. Reuters, 26/11/2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-
politics-pdvsa/maduro-taps-major-general-to-lead-venezuelas-deteriorating-oil-industry-idUSKBN1DQ0R9,
accessed April 2019.
18Ross, M.L., 2011. Will oil drown the Arab Spring: Democracy and the resource curse. Foreign Aff., 90,
p.4.
19In this sense, the case of Cameroon’s offshore and extra-budgetary fund to manage oil rents is exemplar
as between 1977 and 2006 more than 50% of the oil revenues accrued by the government disappeared from
the fund (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2011). Similarly, “under Saddam, more than half of Iraq’s national budget
was funneled through the Iraq National Oil Company, the finances of which were never disclosed.” (Ross,
M.L., 2011. Will oil drown the Arab Spring: Democracy and the resource curse. Foreign Aff., 90, p.4.)
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4.5 Facing coup risk: institutional coup-proofing or not?
To develop my theoretical framework, first, I assume that leaders are rational, survival
seeking and that they chose their survival strategies depending on the resources they have
and the threat they face (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002; 2017). Notably, to retain power
when facing coup risk leaders can decide to implement institutional coup-proofing or rely
on the other strategies above presented. Second, I assume that when coup risk is low,
leaders find the benefits of implementing institutional coup-proofing greater than the risk of
triggering a preventive coup (Koga-Sudduth, 2017).
I pose that, when coup risk is low leaders might decide to implement institutional coup-
proofing strategies as a preventive measure taking advantage of the low risk of triggering a
preventive coup. Notably, leaders who have access to natural resource revenues, are more
likely than other leaders to do so. This is because for leaders who face strict budget con-
straints, the cost of diverting national resources to fund preventive institutional coup-proofing
efforts might not offset the benefits of implementing such a measure. In other words, when
coup risk is not alarming, implementing preventive institutional coup-proofing might simply
not be a priority for leaders who do not have access to large honeypots of resources that they
can allocate as they desire. In turn, the more leaders enjoy access to discretionally allocable
resources, the less it is - politically and financially - relatively costly for them diverting funds
to undertake preventive institutional coup-proofing.
Yet, rising coup risk binds leaders to take action. In this scenario, leaders who enjoy
access to discretionally allocable resources, are likely to prefer to implement other coup-
proofing strategies than institutional coup-proofing as they have to discount the utility of
institutional coup-proofing by the risk of triggering a preventive coup. In turn, leaders who
lack access to natural resource revenues that they can allocate discretionally are likely to
face rising coup risk implementing institutional coup-proofing because of lack of alternatives.
In sum, and more formally:
Hypothesis 1: Access to natural resources revenues decreases (increases) leaders’ likelihood
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to undertake institutional coup-proofing activities when coup risk rises (decreases).
4.6 Methods
To disentangle the relationship between coup risk, natural resource revenues and coup-
proofing I resort to a two-step strategy. First, I predict the risk for a country to experience
a coup estimating with an instrumental variable approach a logistic model of coup-attempt.
Second, I estimate the effect of coup risk and natural resource revenues on institutional
coup-proofing through a multivariate time-series cross-section two-stage least squares anal-
ysis covering 107 countries between 1970 and 2013. Table 1A in the appendix presents
descriptive statistics of the dataset.
The independent variable for my logit model of coup-attempt assumes value 1 if in a
given year a country experienced at least one coup-attempt and 0 otherwise according to
the Coup d’etat Dataset (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Resorting to an instrumental variable
approach is fundamental to avoid biased predicted probabilities due to fitting the model
without considering the endogeneity of relevant regressors as GDP or military expenditure.
For this reason, using a control function approach I fit my probit model using a set of histor-
ical, meteorological and geographical variables as excluded instruments for the endogenous
regressors GDP growth, foreign direct investments, military expenditure and its inter-year
chance. At the same time, I add as exogenous regressors and included instruments year fixed
effects, two dummy variables accounting for the country being an autocracy or a military
regime, the number of coup-attempts that occurred in the last five years and its squared
term. I discuss in detail the full model in the appendix where Table 2A presents model
estimates.
To capture the impact of natural revenues, coup risk and their interaction on institutional
coup-proofing efforts, it is fundamental resorting to a two-stage least-squares analysis. Failing
to account for the feedback loop between institutional coup-proofing, coup risk and natural
resources would result in biased estimates. As discussed, coup risk affects leaders’ incentives
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to implement institutional coup-proofing and, simultaneously, institutional coup-proofing
influences coup-plotters’ willingness and capacity to stage a coup. On top of this, coup risk
affects the extent to which natural resources constitute the backbone of state finances, as well
as this affects leaders’ decisions regarding if and to what extent implementing institutional
coup-proofing. Finally, natural resource abundance influences coup risk.
The following equation describes the second stage of my two-stages least-squares analysis:
CBIt,j = β0+β1CoupRiskt,j+β2Nat.Rev.t,j+β3Nat.Rev.t,j∗CoupRiskt,j+β4X t,j+εt,j (1)
My independent variable is the counterbalancing index (from now on CBI ) from the
Counterbalancing/Coup-Proofing Dataset20 (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; 2012). This variable
captures the number of ground-combat compatible military organizations in a country in a
given year. Thus, for instance, when the index equals 2 it indicates the presence of two
equally strong rival military units.







where Ss,i,t is the personnel share of the ground-combat compatible military or paramili-
tary organizations in the year t for the country j (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011).
As main independent variables, the model includes Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and
their interaction Coup Risk*Natural Revenues. Coup Risk is the logarithm of 1 plus the
predicted probability of coup-attempt calculated through the logit model discussed above
while Natural Revenues is the logarithm of 1 plus the percentage of natural resource revenues
as a share of the GDP. The data source is the World Bank Open Dataset21. I use the




As excluded instruments for Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and their interaction I use
the variables Equator*Oil, Equator2*Oil, Oil Revenues, Metal Revenues, Duration and Oil
Revenues*Duration. Equator measures the distance from the equator22 while Oil accounts
for the yearly price index of petroleum. Data sources for oil prices is Jacks (2019) 23. Notably,
Equator*Oil and Equator2*Oil are present in the first stage equation as excluded instruments
but not the main effects of these interactions. This is because I run my analysis using country
and year fixed effects as included instruments. Oil Revenues and Metal Revenues are a proxy
for the amount of natural resource rents that leaders enjoy. I estimate the former multiplying
the oil reserves per square kilometer in 1970 times Oil. I estimate the latter multiplying the
yearly price index of iron ore24 times the metal minerals production per capita in 197025.
Duration is equal to the number of years since the last coup-attempt occurred.
X is a vector of variables serving as included instruments for the first-stage equations
and control variables for the second stage equation. As controls for state capacity and size
of the military, X includes the logarithm of the population, GDP per capita and number
of military personnel. To reduce endogeneity concerns, I look at the lagged value of the
inter-year change of these variables. Data sources for these variables are the V-Dem dataset
and the National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer, 1998).
To control for regime type, X includes two dummy variables accounting for the country
being a democracy or a military regime. The former dummy assumes value 1 if the polity2
index score26 for the country is equal or greater than 5. The source for the index is the
PoiltyIV project database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015). The latter dummy assumes value
1 if in a given year the regime type is coded as “indirect military”, “military”, “military-
personal”, “party-military” or “party-military-personal” in the V-Dem dataset. This is to
22Following Hall and Jones (1999) I calculate the distance as the absolute value of the latitude divided
by 90. The latitude is measured at the geographical centroid of the country.
23https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/commodity-price-index-of-cereal-crops-and-petroleum-1850-2015
24Data source available at https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/real-commodity-price-index-metals
25The V-dem Dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019) provides data for oil reserves and metal minerals production
per capita.
26The index measures the political regime authority and approximates the level of democratization ranging
from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy)
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take into account for the centrality of the military and for the fact that democratic leaders
are less likely than others to undertake institutional coup-proofing (Jenkins and Kposowa,
1992; Pilster, and Böhmelt; 2012).
To control for the impact of ongoing conflict X includes a dummy variable assuming
value 1 if the country is experiencing an inter or intrastate conflict or not. As counterbal-
ancing efforts decrease military fighting effectiveness and wars affect coup risk (Böhmelt and
Pilster, 2015; Piplani and Talmadge, 2016; Bell and Koga-Sudduth, 2017), ongoing conflict
might affect leaders willingness to implement institutional coup-proofing efforts. Moreover,
X includes the ethnic fractionalization index from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fraction-
alization (HIEF) dataset (Drazanova, 2019) as ethnically diverse societies provide leaders
willing to implement institutional coup-proofing with the capacity to set up counterweights
to the army leveraging over ethnic differences (Quinlivan, 1999). Finally, to soak up un-
observed time-invariant characteristics and time trends X includes country and year fixed
effects and a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the year is prior to 1991.
4.7 Results
Table 1 presents the estimates for the first and second stages of my main model reporting
clustered standard errors on the country level robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster
correlation. Model 1, 2 and 3 report estimates for the first stage equations and Model 4
for the second stage. Reported values for the GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity,
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM, Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F and Hansen’s j statistics suggest
that Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and their interaction are indeed endogenous, that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and - not only weakly - correlated with the
endogenous regressors (Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al., 2007; Staiger and Stock, 1994; Stock and
Yogo, 2005). Finally, it is worth to recall that in IV analysis R2 has no natural interpretation
as SSR for IV can be larger than SST (Wooldridge, 2006).
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Table 1: The impact of coup risk on institutional coup-proofing. CBI as independent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
First Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage





Coup Risk*Natural Revenues -0.197*
(0.115)
Duration -0.011*** 0.001 -0.022***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Duration*Oil Production -0.004** 0.003* -0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Oil Revenues 0.243*** -0.015 1.543***
(0.065) (0.074) (0.204)
Metal Revenues -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Equator*Oil 0.001 0.006*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Equator2*Oil -0.001 -0.008*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
∆ GDP -0.172 0.195 -0.452 -0.032
(0.147) (0.157) (0.522) (0.165)
HIEF index 1.682*** -0.104 3.720*** -0.966
(0.455) (0.618) (1.062) (0.642)
Population -0.263* 0.469** -0.813** -0.086
(0.143) (0.194) (0.397) (0.228)
∆ Military Personnel -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Conflict 0.043 0.073 0.087 0.069
(0.050) (0.046) (0.154) (0.080)
Democracy -0.125** -0.037 -0.098 0.102
(0.060) (0.064) (0.163) (0.099)
Military 0.886*** -0.060 1.283*** -0.664**
(0.078) (0.074) (0.309) (0.262)
Cold war 0.632*** 0.220 1.049*** -0.541**
(0.127) (0.182) (0.354) (0.227)
Observations 2,983 2,983 2,983 2,983
Number of ID 107 107 107 107
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared -0.429
R-squared by hand -0.354
F statistic 2.151
p-value of F-statistic 0.000540
F-stat for weak identification 20.94
F-stat for underidentification 16.25
p-value of underidentification 0.00616
Hansen J statistic 4.510
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.341
GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity 8.327
p-value of GMM distance test statistic 0.0397
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Looking at estimates for Model 4, Coup Risk, is significant at 1% level, Natural Revenues
at 5% and their interaction at 10%. All of them have the expected signs. Notably, increasing
by one standard deviation the variable Coup Risk raises the number of rival military organi-
zations in the country by 0.8 units. Likewise, when Natural Revenues rises by one standard
deviation, the number of rival military organizations grows by 0.67 units. This is in line
with the idea that, ceteris paribus, leaders who face higher levels of coup risk or have access
to larger amounts of natural resource revenues are more likely to implement institutional
coup-proofing efforts than others.
To investigate the effects of the interaction Coup Risk*Natural Revenues, I calculate the
marginal effect of Coup Risk over Natural Revenues and, symmetrically, the marginal effect
of Natural Revenues over Coup Risk. Table 2 shows the value of the marginal effects of Coup
Risk at the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and 99th percentile of Natural Revenues. In parallel, Table 3
reports the values of the marginal effect of Natural Revenues at the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th and
99th percentile of Coup Risk.
Looking at Table 2, the marginal effect of Coup Risk decreases over rising levels of Natural
Revenues from .964 to .198. Notably, while it significantly different from 0 at 1% level at
the 1st percentile of Natural Revenues, it is no longer different from 0 at the 99th percentile
of the same variable. Likewise, looking at Table 3, the marginal effect of Natural Revenues
decreases over rising levels of Coup Risk. At the 1st percentile of Coup Risk it is equal to
0.62 and significant at 5%. At the 99th percentile it is equal to -0.667 and not statistically
different from 0. These results are in line with the idea that leaders who have access to
natural resources are less likely to implement institutional coup-proofing than leaders who
do not have access to these revenues when facing coup risk. Figure 1 plots the point estimates
and their 95% confidence intervals for the variables Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and their
interaction. At the same time, Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot, respecively, the average marginal
effect of Coup Risk over rising values of Natural Revenues and the average marginal effect
of Natural Revenues over rising values of Coup Risk and their 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1: β coefficients of Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and Coup Risk*Natural Revenues.
CBI as dependent variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
Figure 2: Average marginal effect of Coup Risk on CBI over Natural Revenues.
The dark line represents the average marginal effect estimates while the gray area its 95%
confidence interval. The dashed horizontal line is set on 0.
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Figure 3: Average marginal effect of Natural Revenues on CBI over Coup Risk.
The dark line represents the average marginal effect estimates while the gray area its 95%
confidence interval. The dashed horizontal line is set on 0.
Figure 4: β coefficients of Coup Risk CBI as dependent variable. Additional forwards
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
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Figure 5: β coefficients of Natural Revenues CBI as dependent variable. Additional forwards
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
Figure 6: β coefficients of Coup Risk*Natural Revenues CBI as dependent variable. Addi-
tional forwards
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
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Table 2: Marginal effect of Coup Risk on CBI over rising levels of Natural Revenues.
Natural Revenues δCBI δCoup Risk 95% Lower CI Upper 95% CI
1st percentile .962 .310 1.613
25th percentile .867 .270 1.464
50th percentile .709 .168 1.249
75th percentile .530 -.017 1.076
99th percentile .195 -.537 .927
Table 3: Marginal effect of Natural Revenues on CBI over rising levels of Coup Risk.
Coup Risk δCBI δNatural Revenues 95% Lower CI Upper 95% CI
1st percentile .628 .074 1.182
25th percentile .553 .049 1.057
50th percentile .462 .003 .921
75th percentile .337 -.093 .768
99th percentile -.049 .653 .555
To corroborate these results taking into account temporal lags of the effects of coup risk,
I run my model five more times forwarding my dependent variable from 1 to 5 periods.
Results from these additional specifications, show that as soon as coup risk rises, leaders
who do not have access to natural resource revenues begin to undertake institutional coup-
proofing strategies. The effect of coup risk on institutional coup-proofing efforts lasts for
roughly four years and then decreases. In turn, leaders who have access to unearmarked
resources tend to decrease institutional coup-proofing efforts only after roughly three years
since coup risk peaks. Table 3A in the appendix displays full estimates for these additional
models and Figures 4,5 and 6 display point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for
the variables Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and their interaction.
Finally, to further my analysis, I estimate the impact of coup risk and natural revenues
on institutional coup-proofing using as dependent variable the dummy Coup-proofing. This
is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if in the country there are more than 1.5 and less than
2.5 military rival units. Indeed, as Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) note, counterbalancing efforts
are most effective in opposing coups when in a country are present about two equally strong
military organizations. Results are in line with those above presented. Figure 7 plots point
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Figure 7: β coefficients of Coup Risk*Natural Revenues Coup-proofing as dependent variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for the variables Coup Risk, Natural Revenues
and their interaction. Table 4A in the appendix displays full results from this additional
model.
4.8 The Nigerian case
The development of civil-military relations in Nigeria between 1966 and 1976 is an inter-
esting instance of the theoretical framework presented. Indeed, the coup-proofing strategies
implemented in the country changed markedly after the oil shock Nigeria experienced in
the early 1970s when the oil crisis in combination with an increase of Nigerian production
capacity, greater public ownership of oil companies, and higher taxes and royalties provided
the government with a consistent amount of financial resources (Gelb, 1988).
In January 1966, the country experienced its first coup. Notably, - the suspect of -
political interference in the appointment and promotions of officers by the Minister of Defence
at the expense of southern Ibo officers was one of the main causes (Luckham, 1974). After
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taking the power, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi began a substantive centralization
process of the civil and the military sectors assigning most of the senior positions in the
army to Ibo officers. Such a move rose dissatisfaction both among the civilian bureaucrats
and military personnel triggering the second Nigerian coup in July (Luckham, 1974; Fanso,
1979). The successor of Aguiyi-Ironsi, General Gowon, did not repeat the same mistakes of
his predecessors. Indeed, besides restoring Nigeria as a federation, he rapidly reorganized
the army fragmenting it and redeploying soldiers depending on their ethnicity and region of
origin (Barua, 2013). This decision probably contributed to facilitating eastern separatist
insurgents (Obasanjo, 1980). Nonetheless, General Gowon had managed to break the chain
of coups in the early phase of Nigerian post-colonial era.
General Gowon’s coup-proofing strategy was different in 1975. What had changed was
that now he could take advantage of the conspicuous Nigerian oil revenues accrued abroad be-
tween 1973 and 1974. To reduce the risk of being deposed by a coup after the announcement
of his decision to not withdraw from power as promised, he implemented a series of generous
fiscal reforms targeting crucial Nigerian elites. With the so called Udoji accords the average
salary of civil servants rose by an average of 100% with peaks of 130% and urban commu-
nities become the target of a campaign of public investment relying on oil revenues27(Gelb,
1988). At the same time, the leader did not undertake any effort to counterbalance the
Nigerian army.
4.9 Conclusions
In 88 B.C. the Senate of Rome revoked the command of the Mithridian War from Silla
shortly after giving it to him. Persuaded to be in the good graces of Minerva, Silla thought
it appropriate to express his disappointment by marching on Rome with six legions. For
the first time, a Roman army headed towards the city siding with its general against the
Senate. Silla defeated his political enemies and probably appreciated the effectiveness of this
27In the words of Gelb (1988, p.243) the government ”was in hurry to use its oil revenues [...] to avoid
being accused of not spending when Nigeria was so poor”
36
approach to dealing with the Senate as just six years later he resorted to the same mean to
oppose a government considered illegitimate28 (Langhorne et al., 1854). Since then, and not
only in Lazio, the rapports between country leaders and the army proved to be tenser than
both parties wished in many more occasions as recent developments in Myanmar show. Far
from being torpid, leaders developed various strategies to face the risk of being removed by
a coup. In this paper, I investigated if, how and to what extent access to natural resources
revenues shapes leaders’ decision to undertake institutional coup-proofing efforts to keep the
office.
By providing an opportunity-willingness theoretical framework, I argue that leaders resort
to institutional coup-proofing to face coup risk only when they do not have access to natural
resources revenues. Indeed, leaders who enjoy access to discretionally allocable resources
prefer to invest in other coup-proofing strategies than institutional coup-proofing as buying
off coup-plotters and pleasing the selectorate when coup risk rises. This is because when
coup risk is high, undertaking measures that are openly against the interests of the military
- as institutional coup-proofing - might trigger a preventive coup. In turn, leaders who do
not have access to natural resources revenues are likely to react to rising coup risk resorting
to institutional coup-proofing as they do not have enough discretionally allocable resources
to buy off coup-plotters and please the selectorate.
To test my theory and disentangle the three-directional relationship between coup risk,
institutional coup-proofing and natural resource revenues, I resort to a cross-section time-
series multivariate two-stage least-squares analysis covering 107 countries between 1970 and
2013. Empirical findings support the theory and contribute to increasing our understand-
ing of the key factors determining civil-military relations and, to a certain extent, leaders’
decisions regarding the allocation of domestic resources.
28In this sense, if we consider the government of Marius and Cinna illegal, and Silla’s intervention le-




Table 1A presents the descriptive statistics of the dataset and Table 2A the estimates for
the logit model of coup-attempt.
A first way to understand factors affecting coup risk is differentiating between structural
factors and more contingent ones. The former tend to change slowly over time, while the
latter are more prone to shift in the short term. The number of past coups and their
frequency in the history of the country, the concentration of centres of power, poor long-
term economic performances fit the former set of factors while economic shocks, foreign
powers with an interest to block or support the coup, and individual officers’ grievances
fit the latter (Fossum, 1967; Jonson et Al., 1984; Londregan and Poole, 1990; Belkin and
Schofer 2003; Powell, 2012; Luttwak 2016; Kim, 2016).
Indeed, coup-plotters justified their intervention mentioning the previous governments’
economic mismanagement both in the aftermath of the 1983 Nigerian and the 1982 Bangladeshi
coups (Bertocci, 1982; Othman, 1984). At the same time, the British military interventions
in East Africa in the late 1960s and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 serve as an
example of foreign forces interventions to prevent or defeat a coup (Roberts, 1975).
A second way to understand coup risk is to identify factors affecting the military’s ca-
pacity and willingness to intervene (Finer, 2002; Powell, 2012). Reductions in the military
budget threatening the capacity of military elites to maintain their patronage networks or
political liberalization are factors influencing military’s disposition to intervene (Albrecht
and Eibl, 2018). Recent regime change, regime legitimacy and strength of the civil soci-
ety are factors affecting the military’s capacity to launch a coup (Belkin and Schofer 2003;
Gassebner et al., 2016).
For example, we can consider the 1971 coup in Uganda as a military’s reaction to a
government threatening its economic interests and privileges (Lofchie, 1972). At the same
time, the loyalty of civil servants and syndicates for the incumbent government played a
determining role in the failure of the 1920 German coup (Goodspeed, 1967). This had been
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the case as well three years before in Russia when the Soviet Railway Bureau sabotaged the
communication, supply provision and movements of Kornilov’s units (Chernov, 1936).
For this reason, to model factors affecting military’s willingness and opportunity to stage
a coup I include as regressors the GDP growth, military expenditure and its inter-year
change, the level of foreign direct investments (FDI), a dummy variable accounting for the
country being an autocracy29, a dummy variable accounting for the country being ruled
by a military regime, the number of coup-attempts occurred in the last five years and its
squared term. In fact, low economic performances and reduced military expenditure might
reduce leaders’ capacity to face coup-plotters, increase military’s willingness to protect their
corporate interest and provide them with the legitimacy to intervene. At the same time,
accounting for a country’s political regime and history of coups works as proxy for the
strength of civil society and regime legitimacy.
As the latent variable coup risk is likely to affect both the dependent variable and the
independent variables GDP growth, military expenditure and FDI, it is necessary to resort
to an instrumental variable approach. Failing to do so would lead to biased model estimates
and, thus, biased predicted probability of coup-attempt. For this reason, to estimate my
logit model of coup-attempt I resort to a control function estimator. In this sense, first, I
estimate the model of endogenous regressors as a function of a set of instruments. Second, I
use the errors from this model as an additional regressor in a probit model. As set of excluded
instruments I use the percentages of ice-free coast within 100 km, land with tropical climates,
desertic surface, fertile soil, an index of terrain ruggedness,30, the proportional inter-year
change of a weighted measure of countries’ average monthly precipitation31 and its lagged
value, the lagged value of surface temperature anomaly and its inter-year change32, and two
dummy variables accounting for the country being a former colony and the year being prior
29This dummy assumes value 1 if in the given year the country’s polity2 score is equal or minor than -5
and 0 otherwise
30I code these variables following Nunn and Puga (2012).
31Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/average-monthly-precipitation?tab=chart
32Data is based on the HadCRUT analysis from the Climatic Research Unit (University of East Anglia),
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/hadcrut-surface-temperature-anomaly
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to 1991. In fact, these variables are proxies for the chances of a country to have access to
trade routes, develop its economy, strengthen state capacity and experience conflict (Fearon
and Latin, 1999; Gallup et al., 1999; Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Miguel et al. 2004; Buhaug
and Lujala, 2005; Disdier and Head, 2008; Feyrer. 2009; Hendrix, 2011; Dell et al., 2012).
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Table 1A: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
CBI 1.67 0.65 1.00 4.58 2983
Coup Proofing 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 2983
Coup Risk 1.07 0.83 0.00 4.04 2983
Natural Revenues 1.44 1.06 0.00 4.43 2983
Coup Risk*Natural Revenues 1.78 2.05 0.00 12.53 2983
∆ GDP 0.02 0.07 -0.58 0.85 2983
HIEF index 0.43 0.28 0.00 0.89 2983
Population 16.29 1.31 12.43 21.03 2983
∆ Military Personnel -0.79 30.74 -1100.00 410.00 2983
Conflict 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 2983
Democracy 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 2983
Military 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 2983
Cold war 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 2983
Duration 26.14 18.32 0.00 64.00 2983
Duration*Oil Production 0.54 5.90 0.00 130.31 2983
Oil Revenues 0.02 0.16 0.00 2.57 2983
Metal Revenues 7461.59 18886.31 0.00 245525.55 2983
Equator*Oil 97.65 81.87 0.34 410.58 2983
Equator2*Oil 40.21 49.03 0.00 274.33 2983
Precipitation 8.45 6.00 0.04 35.22 2983
Coup 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 2983
Autocracy 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 2983
Military 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 2983
Past coups 0.24 0.73 0.00 9.00 2983
GDP growth 0.02 0.07 -0.44 1.34 2983
Military Expenditure 3.01 4.07 0.00 117.35 2983
FDI 2.40 6.33 -43.46 198.07 2983
Year 1993.26 11.93 1970.00 2013.00 2983
Coast 40.91 37.80 0.00 100.00 2983
Soil 36.37 21.39 0.00 88.65 2983
Tropical 34.18 41.69 0.00 100.00 2983
Ruggedness 1.25 1.09 0.04 6.20 2983
Desert 4.12 11.06 0.00 77.28 2983
Colonized 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 2983
∆ Precipitation 0.03 0.27 -0.86 4.11 2983
∆ Precipitation 0.03 0.27 -0.86 4.11 2983
Cold war 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 2983
∆ Temperature 0.02 0.53 -2.74 2.42 2983
Temperature 0.31 0.54 -1.83 2.99 2983
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Table 2A: Logit model of coup attempt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A
Second Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage
VARIABLES Coup GDP growth Military Expenditure ∆ Military Expenditure FDI
Autocracy -0.026 -0.003 1.543*** -0.026 -0.250
(0.094) (0.004) (0.597) (0.107) (0.489)
Military 0.139** 0.007* -0.620 -0.063 -0.436
(0.069) (0.004) (0.497) (0.054) (0.322)
Past coups 0.049 -0.005 -0.026 0.045 0.216
(0.085) (0.004) (0.246) (0.050) (0.373)
Past coups2 -0.008 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.040
(0.013) (0.001) (0.041) (0.009) (0.057)
Coast 0.000 0.014** 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Soil 0.000 -0.039*** -0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012)
Tropical -0.000 -0.019*** 0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
Ruggedness -0.000 0.007 0.013 -0.186
(0.001) (0.119) (0.022) (0.196)
Desert -0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.027
(0.000) (0.026) (0.002) (0.024)
Colonized -0.004* -0.093 0.018 0.720
(0.002) (0.779) (0.041) (0.537)
∆ Precipitation 0.003 1.765* 0.751 0.709
(0.011) (0.977) (0.593) (0.574)
∆ Precipitation 0.002 1.242** -0.406 0.504
(0.008) (0.609) (0.310) (0.745)
Continued on next page
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Table 2A – continued from previous page
Cold war 0.008 0.529 0.115 -2.644***
(0.011) (0.716) (0.229) (0.721)
∆ Temperature 0.001 -0.265** 0.088 0.166
(0.002) (0.135) (0.113) (0.310)
Temperature 0.001 -0.572** 0.072 0.024
























Continued on next page
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Constant 0.032 0.024*** 4.029*** -0.106 4.025***
(0.302) (0.007) (0.941) (0.138) (0.989)
Observations 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES
AUROC 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3A presents results from my additional specifications. In particular, Model 2A,
3A, 4A, 5A and 6A presents, respectively, estimates from my model when I forward my
independent variable from 1 to 5 periods. Finally, Model 7A in Table 4A presents results
from my supplementary analysis where I use as dependent variable Coup-proofing. To take
into account for the reverse causality effects described in the method section, to estimate
the effect of Coup Risk, Natural Revenues and their interaction I resort to a control function
estimator. The excluded instruments used in the first stage are the same employed for the
main analysis.
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Table 3A: The impact of coup risk on institutional coup-proofing. CBI as independent variable. Additional time lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 5A Model 6A
Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage
VARIABLES CBI F.1 CBI F.2 CBI F.3 CBI F.4 CBI F.5
Coup Risk 0.930*** 0.902*** 1.021*** 0.896*** 0.700*
(0.325) (0.299) (0.298) (0.319) (0.400)
Natural Revenues 0.595** 0.584** 0.692** 0.525* 0.262
(0.275) (0.274) (0.275) (0.277) (0.321)
Coup Risk*Natural Revenues -0.196* -0.224* -0.321** -0.294* -0.196
(0.113) (0.123) (0.144) (0.161) (0.220)
∆ GDP -0.030 0.040 -0.047 0.005 0.079
(0.154) (0.167) (0.185) (0.160) (0.173)
HIEF index -0.951 -0.675 -0.389 -0.023 0.154
(0.669) (0.704) (0.710) (0.670) (0.700)
Population -0.051 -0.005 -0.081 -0.025 0.112
(0.224) (0.231) (0.237) (0.227) (0.233)
∆ Military Personnel 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conflict 0.098 0.080 0.062 0.063 0.083
(0.081) (0.079) (0.085) (0.083) (0.086)
Democracy 0.066 0.060 0.056 0.046 0.017
(0.101) (0.096) (0.092) (0.089) (0.095)
Military -0.669*** -0.613** -0.585** -0.517** -0.479**
(0.256) (0.245) (0.234) (0.223) (0.227)
Cold war -0.519** -0.403* -0.363 -0.278 -0.117
(0.241) (0.242) (0.231) (0.215) (0.142)
Observations 2,999 3,017 3,031 3,042 2,951
Number of ID 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R-squared -0.368 -0.280 -0.363 -0.263 -0.177
Continued on next page
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Table 3A – continued from previous page
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared by hand -0.297 -0.214 -0.293 -0.198 -0.116
F statistic 2.469 2.244 2.952 2.261 2.986
p-value of F-statistic 5.49e-05 0.000277 1.70e-06 0.000244 1.49e-06
F-stat for weak identification 21.43 26.04 25.16 29.49 16.69
F-stat for underidentification 15.70 15.92 14.28 15.92 23.37
p-value of underidentification 0.00776 0.00708 0.0139 0.00708 0.000287
Hansen J statistic 3.002 3.146 3.484 3.757 4.794
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.557 0.534 0.480 0.440 0.309
GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity 8.821 6.473 4.748 3.817 1.882
p-value of GMM distance test statistic 0.0318 0.0907 0.191 0.282 0.597
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4A: The impact of coup risk on institutional coup-proofing. Coup-proofing as independent variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 7A Model 7A Model 7A Model 7A
Second Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage
VARIABLES Coup-proofing Coup Risk Natural Revenues Coup Risk*Natural Revenues
∆ GDP -0.244 -0.536*** 0.113 -1.486**
(0.473) (0.175) (0.251) (0.631)
HIEF index 0.244 0.305*** 0.657** 1.317***
(0.375) (0.112) (0.258) (0.443)
Population 0.044 0.015 -0.010 0.021
(0.063) (0.020) (0.052) (0.079)
∆ Military Personnel 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Conflict -0.081 -0.064 -0.096 -0.260
(0.165) (0.053) (0.119) (0.214)
Democracy -0.297 -0.194*** -0.859*** -0.989***
(0.257) (0.065) (0.144) (0.176)
Military -0.311 0.897*** -0.007 1.548***
(0.350) (0.085) (0.186) (0.387)
Cold war -1.238*** 0.056 -2.084*** -2.506***
(0.435) (0.136) (0.279) (0.469)
Duration -0.014*** -0.001 -0.023***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Duration*Oil Production -0.000 -0.009 -0.030***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Oil Revenues -0.138 1.323*** 1.122***
(0.144) (0.340) (0.345)
Metal Revenues 0.000 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Equator*Oil -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.025***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Continued on next page
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Table 4A – continued from previous page
Equator2*Oil 0.005** 0.013** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007)


























Constant -1.742 1.157*** 3.515*** 4.044***
(1.181) (0.373) (0.887) (1.355)
Continued on next page
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Table 4A – continued from previous page
Observations 2,983 2,983 2,983 2,983 2,983
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES
AUROC 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688 0.688
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5 Chapter 2 - Institutional coup-proofing and exoge-
nous resources: the case of discretionally allocable
foreign aid
5.1 Abstract
Coup risk presents a fierce threat to incumbent leaders. To face it, they can implement
policies to please the selectorate, buy-off rivals in the military, ensuring personal wealth or
resort to institutional coup-proofing. I claim that to understand when leaders decide to
undertake the latter rather than other coup-proofing strategies it is necessary to consider
the costs associated with the various coup-proofing strategies, the relative level of coup risk
leaders face and the resources to which they have access to. In particular, I pose that leaders
of aid-recipient countries who do not have access to unearmarked resources are more likely
than others to undertake institutional coup-proofing and forgo other strategies to oppose
coup-plotters. This is because, despite the costs of institutional coup-proofing in terms of
preventive-coup risk and military effectiveness on the battlefield, they do not have the means
to implement other coup-proofing strategies that require access to discretionally allocable
funds. To test my hypothesis, I resort to a cross-section time-series multivariate two-stage
least squares analysis covering 122 countries between 1970 and 2013. Findings support the
hypothesis and are robust to different model specifications contributing to shed more light
on the relation between coup risk, resources and institutional coup-proofing.
5.2 Introduction
Following the arrest of his predecessor Francisco Madero on 19th February 1913, Pedro
Lascuráin Paredes assumed office as President of Mexico. He kept the office for 28 minutes,
then General Huerta seized power completing the coup culminated the day before (Braddy,
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1969). The experience of Paredes is probably borderline. Yet, it is a striking example of the
threat that coups pose to incumbent leaders.
In the last 70 years, coup plotters launched 478 coups ≈50% of which have been successful
33. To contrast them, leaders developed different strategies. Institutional coup-proofing -
the creation of multiple rival forces inside the army and militias parallel to it, rotation
of command positions and the purging of rival military officers (Belkin and Schofer, 2003;
Powell, 2012) - is one of the most common (De Bruin, 2018). Nevertheless, there is a wide
variation in the extent to which leaders resort to it. In 2006, after surviving the fourth coup
attempt in his career as president of Chad, Idriss Déby re-organized the army decreasing its
strength vis-à-vis the pro-government paramilitary groups (ISS, 2008). This was not the case
in Guatemala where, after the coups attempts of 1988 and 1989, President Vinicio Cerezo
decreased the number of paramilitary units by 125.000 men while increasing the number of
army reservist by 30.000 units (Paxton, 1989; 1990).
So far, political regime and level of coup risk have been considered major factors influ-
encing the implementation of institutional coup-proofing (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2012; Koga-
Sudduth, 2017). Yet, despite Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) show that leaders develop
their survival strategies depending both on the challenges they face and the resources they
have, to date no studies have empirically examined the nexus between the type of revenues
leaders enjoy and institutional coup-proofing. This paper addresses this gap examining if
and to what extent the allocation of unearmarked aid affects the implementation of insti-
tutional coup-proofing. I pose that leaders who lack access to unearmarked resources that
they can allocate discretionally - namely financial support to the general budget of the state
- are more likely than others to face coup risk resorting to institutional coup-proofing.
Despite its effectiveness to deter and obstruct coup plotters, institutional coup-proofing
has some drawbacks. First, creating ex-novo counterweights to the army may be time-
consuming and unsuited for a leader whose grip on the military is deteriorating. Second,
33According to the Coup d’etat Dataset (2011).
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institutional coup-proofing decreases the military’s capacity to face external security threats
(Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011). Third, implementing institutional coup-proofing when coup
risk is relatively high may trigger a preventive coup (Koga-Sudduth, 2017).
For these reasons, leaders may prefer resorting to other strategies to face coup risk. For
example, they might provide private goods to rivals to increase their value of the status
quo, implement policies favourable to the selectorate, ensure personal wealth and so forth
(Wright, 2008; Gilli and Li, 2015; de Mesquita and Smith, 2017). Yet, these strategies are
not cost-free neither. All of them require the availability of funds that leaders can allocate
discretionally.
In this sense, I pose that the allocation of unearmarked resources to aid-recipient leaders
shapes their decisions regarding to what extent to face coup risk resorting to institutional
coup-proofing or other strategies. Indeed, if donors provide leaders with unearmarked and
discretionally allocable funds, they might provide recipient leaders with the right resources
to face coup risk funding strategies other than institutional coup-proofing and less openly
against the interests of the military. In turn, leaders who do not enjoy these resources are
more likely to resort to institutional coup-proofing when needed as they have fewer resources
to allocate discretionally.
Bringing together literature on foreign aid, leader survival and coup-proofing, this paper
contributes to the existing literature in different ways. First, on the theoretical side, it
presents a model that takes into account leaders’ incentives - coup risk - and opportunities
- available resources - to advance our understanding of the conditions under which leaders
implement institutional coup-proofing. Second, it contributes to explain how and to what
extent foreign aid and donors’ practices contribute to the survival of aid-recipient leaders.
Third, on the empirical side, it enhances Koga-Sudduth’s (2017) seminal work on coup-
proofing and coup risk examining this nexus with an instrumental variable approach to
control for the bidirectional relationship between these dimensions. Additionally, it suggests
a set of geographical, meteorological and historical variables to estimate the probability for
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a country to experience a coup avoiding endogenous regressors as the level of trade or the
GDP.
To test my theory, I resort to a time-series cross-section two-stage least squares multivari-
ate analysis focusing on 122 countries between 1970 and 2013. In the following sections, first,
I describe the determinants of coup risk and the strategies leaders can resort to coping with
it. Second, I describe the trade-offs that these strategies pose and how the access to donors’
unearmarked resources influences leaders’ decisions regarding which strategy to implement.
Third, I present methods and results from my empirical analysis. The exemplifying case of
Bangladesh, conclusions and appendix conclude the chapter.
5.3 Coup risk determinants and coup-proofing strategies
At first, it is possible to identify two categories of factors determining coup risk: those
affecting the military’s capacity to stage a coup and those driving the military’s willingness
to intervene (Finner, 2002; Powell, 2012). Reductions in the military budget threatening
the capacity of military elites to maintain their patronage networks, political liberalization,
or the presence of resources that coup-plotters can loot if they are successful are factors
influencing the disposition of the military to intervene (Acemoğlu et al., 2008; Albrecht and
Eibl, 2018). At the same time, recent regime change, the strength of the civil society and the
implementation of institutional coup-proofing activities are factors influencing the military’s
capacity to launch a coup (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Gassebner
et al., 2016). A second way is to differentiate between structural factors and more contingent
ones. The former tend to change slowly over time, the latter are more prone to change in
the short term. The legitimacy of the regime, the number of years since the last coup and
the frequency of military’s interventions in the history of the country, the concentration
of centres of power and poor long-term economic performances are structural factors while
economic shocks, the absence of a foreign power with interest to block a coup, and individual
officers’ grievances are contingent ones (Fossum, 1967; Jonson et Al., 1984; Londregan and
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Poole, 1990; Finer, 2002; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell, 2012; Luttwak 2016; Kim, 2016;
Albrecht and Eibl, 2018).
To face coup risk leaders have different opportunities. If they believe they are in the
last period of their regime, they can send rents abroad and flee the country (Wright, 2008).
Otherwise, then they can undertake strategies targeting the coup-plotters willingness and
capacity to stage a coup. To decrease the military’s willingness to intervene, leaders can
increase the expected cost associated to stage a coup and the value of maintaining the status
quo (de Mesquita and Smith, 2017). To achieve this, they can buy-off potential threats to the
regime and expand the provision of private goods to crucial supporters among the military34
(Wintrobe, 1998, de Mesquita and Smith, 2017). Additionally, they can raise the amount of
resources allocated to the military sector to please the corporative interests of the military
(Powell et al., 2018). For example, Hosni Mubarak resorted consistently to pecuniary and
career rewards to keep loyal the higher ranks of the Egyptian military (Bou Nassif, 2013).
Likewise, during his rule, Ali Saleh kept the support of crucial sheikhs and generals through
direct payments to their tribal and military constituencies35. At the same time, leaders can
implement policies to please the selectorate and gain legitimacy36. Doing so they discourage
coup-plotters from staging a coup - as the Spanish generals’ decisions to stand down in 1931
and intervene in 1936 suggest -, and decrease coup-plotters’ chances of being successful as
the coup attempts of 2016 in Turkey and 1936 in Japan demonstrate (Roberts, 1975; Gilli
adn Li, 2015; Gilli and Li, 2013; Esen and Gumuscu, 2017; Rozenas and Zeigler, 2019).
An alternative common coup-roofing strategy is institutional coup-proofing. This strat-
egy includes activities aiming at counterbalancing the power of the army and reducing its
coordination ability (Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012; Quinlivan, 1999). In partic-
34In the words of Girod (2015, p.155) “Handouts can alleviate grievances of potential rivals and allow
them to benefit from the status quo, thereby reducing their incentive to initiate a coup.”
35US State Dept., ‘Will Saleh’s successor please stand up?’, 17 Sept. 2005. Downloaded from
Wikileaks and also available via The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/40815
36As Kono and Montiola (2009) note, leaders of aid-recipient countries can mitigate crises distributing
accrued state resources to rivals and supporters via non-state institutions under their control.
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ular, I refer to institutional coup-proofing as the set of activities that include the creation
and the strengthening of security forces parallel to the army as civilian militias, milita-
rized police, presidential and republican guards, the rotation of command positions and the
purging of rival military officers. Institutional coup-proofing obstacles coup-plotters via two
different mechanisms. First, the creation of different security forces hinders infra-military
communication thus making coordination more difficult for coup-plotters (Quinlivan, 1999).
Coordination is vital for coup-plotters who, to be successful, need to rapidly take control of
the centres of power and broadcast stations and signal that the coup has already succeeded
(Luttwak, 2016). If coup-plotters fail to show that they are in full control of the state ap-
paratus, actors willing to counter the coup may strike back while some of those backing the
coup may defect (Luttwak, 2016; De Bruin, 2018). Second, the creation of different security
forces parallel to the army increases the number of armed actors with incentives different
from those of the army (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). Notably, when leaders facing coup
risk create new security forces and appoint loyalist officers as commanders they ensure that
that the goal of these units is to protect their leadership (Horowitz, 1985; Harkness, 2016).
Moreover, assigning different tasks to different security forces and setting different payment
rates contributes to making the interests of the new units diverge from those of the army
(Kabir, 2004; De Bruin, 2018). The result is that units loyal to the leader will have strong
incentives to fight the coup-plotters since they are aware that the risk of being dismantled
by the new regime is very high (De Bruin, 2018). Notably, Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) show
that institutional coup-proofing is most effective when about two equally strong military
organizations are present in the country.
Yet, institutional coup-proofing has relevant drawbacks. Attempts to counterbalance
the army may trigger preventive coups. In fact, the military’s willingness to preserve its
autonomy and corporate interests is one of the most widespread and powerful motives of
intervention (Thompson, 1973; Finer, 2002). For example, in 1999 the Pakistani army
deposed in a coup the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif a few hours after he tried to dismiss
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the powerful General Pervaiz Musharraf (Koga-Sudduth, 2017). Moreover, institutional
coup-proofing decreases the military’s capacity to fight interstate and intrastate wars like
the Libyan inadequacy to oppose Chadian troops in the 1980s and Libyan insurgents in
2011 shows (Pollack, 2004; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011; Gaub, 2013). Further, purges of the
officer corps and rewarding soldiers on loyalty and ethnic criteria dissuade the acquisition
and development of disinterested technical expertise37 (Biddle and Long, 2004). At the
same time, dividing the army into multiple parallel units, rotating senior commanders and
preventing different units from training together hampers the army to develop the ability to
coordinate effectively on the battlefield (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2011).
5.4 Unearmarked aid and coup-proofing
As discussed, leaders have various strategies to face coup risk. While institutional coup-
proofing is the most common, it is not cost-free. First, leaders must discount the benefits
from institutional coup-proofing by the risk of triggering a preventive coup. Second, they
face a trade-off between obstructing coup-plotters and keep the army effective. In turn, the
other strategies discussed - ensuring personal wealth, implementing policies targeting the
selectorate, providing private goods to rivals in the military etc. - are less likely to trigger a
preventive coup and decrease military effectiveness. Yet, they require leaders to have access
to resources that they can allocate discretionally. This latter condition may not be satisfied
in aid-recipient developing countries where state revenues are meagre and especially when
leaders might not have access to natural resources.
In this sense, donors play a role in determining if and to what extent leaders resort
to institutional coup-proofing. If they provide leaders with unearmarked resources, then
recipients can allocate such funds discretionally to implement coup-proofing strategies other
37The trade-off between effective and loyal officers is undoubtedly a long-standing acknowledged issue.
Already in 1560, the Venetian bailo urged the Serenissima senate to appoint officers depending on their merit
rather than on their prominence to strengthen the dominions of the republic (Albèri, 1831). One decade
later, de Granvelle vocally marked the need to assign the command of the Liga Sancta’s galleys not to loyal
but rather capable officers to face the Ottoman fleet (Barbero, 2010).
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than institutional coup-proofing. In turn, if they do not provide such resources, they decrease
leaders’ capacity to rely on side-payments to rivals (Wintrobe, 1998; Nielsen et al., 2011)
and buying the consensus of the selectorate, thus increasing leaders’ willingness to resort to
institutional coup-proofing when needed.
To develop my theoretical model, first, I assume that leaders are rational, survival seeking
and that they chose their survival strategies depending on the resources they have and
the threat they face (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2002; 2017). Second, that the benefits of
institutional coup-proofing offset the risk of triggering a preventive coup. This is because the
average leader is likely to react to coup risk implementing institutional coup-proofing before
the risk of triggering a preventive coup is too high38. Finally, I assume that leaders do not
risk to lose future aid flows if they use donors’ resources to fund coup-proofing strategies.
In other words, the risk of losing future aid flows does not affect leaders’ decision to divert
aid to fund coup-proofing strategies. This assumption lies on two considerations. First,
if donors’ interest is the survival of the aid-recipient leader, it is unlikely that they might
threat to stop aid allocation if it is redirected to fund coup-proofing39. Second, even if
donors aid allocation is development-driven, they have an exiguous capacity to monitor how
aid-recipient leaders allocate unearmarked resources40. The reasons are mainly two: first,
recipient countries receive multiple aid flows from multiple sources simultaneously; second,
domestic revenues of the recipient country – thus its budget - are likely to be non-static
and changing in the same period when aid is received (Pack and Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu et
al., 1998). On top of this, Manning and Malbrough (2010), underline how differences in
the incentive structure, priorities and practices decrease donors’ ability to coordinate and
supervise recipients’ expenditure. Moreover, in some cases the bureaucratic apparatus of aid-
38This reasoning is in line with the theoretical argument proposed by Koga-Sudduth (2017) but in contrast
with her empirical findings.
39As Girod (2015, p.156) poses, “recipient leaders may siphon aid from development projects to coup-
proofing with impunity if the donors are more interested in achieving strategic objectives than in fostering
development”.
40In this sense, differencing between strategic and non-strategic aid is superfluous as it is unlikely that
donors can detect and punish reallocations of resources.
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recipient countries might simply not disclose any reliable information on budget allocations.
For example, in the 1980s Mobutu’s bureau made no distinction between state funds and
personal expenditure of the president (Askin and Collin, 1993).
In fact, different studies examine how aid-recipient leaders strategically use aid to ensure
personal wealth, gain the support of the selectorate and please the winning coalition41. For
example, Ahmed (2012) presents evidence of leaders from Muslim autocracies who increase
their survival chances funding patronage with aid while Masaki (2018), Jablonski (2011)
and Hodler and Raschky (2010) find that leaders’ concerns regarding population support
shape aid sub-national allocation more than developmental needs. For instance, during
the presidential mandate of Frederick Chiluba (1991 - 2001), Zambia received on average
31 US dollars per capita as unearmarked aid42. During his presidency, Chiluba managed
to appropriate more than 40 million US dollars of public money to accrue slush funds for
private use and fund favored or politically useful actors (Yambayamba, 2007; Transparency
International, 2008)43.
It follows that leaders with no access to donors’ unearmarked resources have few options
to choose from when facing coup risk. As the provision of private goods to buy-off rivals is
expensive, immediate and ongoing (Quinlivan, 1999) and they do not have access to resources
they can use discretionally to gain the support of the selectorate, they can only resort
to institutional coup-proofing to increase their survival chances. For example, when Nur
Muhammad Taraki took power in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the self proclaimed “Saur
Revolution” in 1978, he did not have access to any unearmarked resources from donors44.
Not surprisingly thus, in the following two years he decreased the army by 10.000 units
and strengthened the Ministry of the Interior-led gendarmerie by 9.000 units (Paxton, 1977;
41In this sense, Asongu’s (2012) findings on the positive relationship between aid flows and corruption
are not surprising.
42According to the AidData dataset (Tierney et al., 2011).
43In light of this, it is not shocking that Rosenstein-Rodan affirmed that “when the World Bank thinks
it is financing an electric power station, it is really financing a brothel” (Jones, 2005, p. 168).
44On top of this, according to World Bank estimates, natural resource revenues in Afghanistan accounted
for circa only 1% of the GDP and the GDP per capita was 7.7 US dollars.
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1980).
In turn, if leaders have access to unearmarked resources that they can allocate discretion-
ally to buy-off rivals and strengthen their legitimacy, then they might substitute institutional
coup-proofing efforts with these latter strategies. In this scenario, when leaders face coup
risk they do not undertake institutional coup-proofing efforts that can increase the risk of
preventive coups and reduce military effectiveness to fight interstate and intrastate conflicts.
In turn, they use unearmarked aid resources to increase the value of keeping the status quo
for the winning coalition and the selectorate. An example comes from the Solomon Islands
that between 2000 and 2001 received on average 63 US dollars per capita for a total of ≈53
million US dollars. Before the 2001 elections, the incumbent leader with the support of the
Australian Government provided 5.4 million of US dollars to politicians, rebels and police
that had organized a coup attempt the previous year (Girod, 2015).
More formally:
Hypothesis 2: Limited access to donors’ unearmarked resources increases leaders’ likeli-
hood to undertake institutional coup-proofing activities when coup risk rises.
5.5 Methods
To test my hypothesis, I resort to the following strategy: first, I estimate the probability for
a country to experience a coup through a logit model of coup attempt. Second, I estimate
the effect of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing with a two-stage least squares
analysis. To do so, I collect data from 122 countries that according to the AidData dataset
received financial and in kind donors’ support between 1970 and 2013. The country-year is
the unit of analysis and Table 5A in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the
dataset. The following equation describes the second stage equation of my main model:
CBIt,j = β0 + β1Coup Riskt,j + β2Aidt,j + β3Aidt,j ∗ Coup Riskt,j + β4X t,j + εt,j (3)
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To capture the process of creating, strengthening and disbanding counterweights to the
army I use the counterbalancing index (from now on CBI ) from the Counterbalancing/Coup-
Proofing Dataset45 (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; 2012). As counterweights the index includes
all the ground-combat compatible military organizations relying on the “Military Balance”
statistics from the International Institute for Strategic Studies and additional secondary








where Ss,i,t is the personnel share of the ground-combat compatible military or paramili-
tary organizations in the year t for the country j (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011). This means,
for example, that a value of the index equal to 2 indicates two equally strong military orga-
nizations present in a country.
As main independent variables, the model includes Coup Risk, Aid and their interaction
Coup Risk*Aid. Coup Risk proxies the level of coup risk. I calculate this variable as the
logarithm of one plus the probability of coup attempt in the year t for the country j in
percentage terms46.
To predict the probability for a coup to occur I resort to a maximum likelihood estimation
of a logistic model for the binary variable Coup. This variable assumes value 1 if in a given
year the country experienced at least one coup attempt and 0 otherwise as coded in the Coup
d’etat Dataset (Powell and Thyne, 2011). As regressors accounting for the willingness and
the capacity of coup-plotters to stage a coup, I use a set of geographical, meteorological and
historical variables. This is important to avoid biased estimates due to using endogenous
regressors such as the level of trade or the GDP per capita. I present the model in the
45https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/JCVR1H
46Using the logarithm of coup risk estimates reduces the volatility of the measure and the impact of
outliers.
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appendix where Table 6A displays its estimates47.
Aid is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if in a given year the four-year moving average
of donors’ unearmarked commitments per capita is greater than 0.1 US dollars48. To identify
the amount of unearmarked aid that leaders receive I look at aid flows coded in the AidData
Core Release dataset as “General Budget Support”. Figure 14 in the appendix shows the
distribution of Coup Risk over the values of the variable Aid. It is worth noting that Coup
Risk is equally distributed between the two values of the variable.
To capture the effect of Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid on institutional coup-proofing
efforts, it is necessary resorting to a two-stage least squares analysis. Indeed as coup risk
influences leaders’ decisions regarding if and to what extent to undertake institutional coup-
proofing, these efforts affect the willingness and capacity of coup plotters to stage a coup,
thus coup risk itself. In this sense, directly plugging in the main model the variable Coup
Risk and its interaction with Aid would not take into account the feedback loop between the
dependent and independent variable. As excluded instrument for the endogenous regressors
Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid, I use the variable Duration, its interaction with Aid and
the meteorological variable Temperature (∆) to account for external shocks49. Duration is
equal to the number of years since the last coup attempt. ∆ Temperature is the inter-year
change of the lagged value of surface temperature anomalies measured in Celsius degrees.
For this variable, the data source is the HadCRUT analysis from the Climatic Research Unit
(University of East Anglia)50.
X is a vector of variables serving as included instruments for the first-stage equations
and control variables for the second-stage equation. X includes the ratio between total
commitments per capita and GDP per capita, the logarithm of the population, the lagged
inter-year change of the share of natural resources rents over the GDP, the lagged inter-year
47The value of the area under the ROC curve greater than 0.8 suggests that the model performs well in
measuring the probability of coup attempt (Hosmer, et al., 2013).
48Resorting to the four-years moving average is needed as data on donors’ commitments are likely to be
lumpy and their record on national budgets might not reflect the actual progress of disbursements.
49For a brief discussion on the impact of temperatures on economic activity Dell et al. (2012)
50https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/hadcrut-surface-temperature-anomaly
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change of GDP per capita and number of military personnel. 51
To control for regime type, X includes two dummy variables accounting for the country
being a democracy or a military regime. The former dummy assumes value 1 if the polity2
index score52 for the country is equal or greater than 5. The source for the index is the
PoiltyIV project database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2015). The latter dummy assumes value
1 if in a given year the regime type is coded as “indirect military”, “military”, “military-
personal”, “party-military” or “party-military-personal” in the V-Dem dataset. Democracy
takes into account that institutional coup-proofing is both relatively less attractive and
necessary in a democratic country (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012) while Military controls for
the relevance of the army in the politics (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1992).
To control for the impact of ongoing conflict, X includes a dummy variable assuming
value 1 if the country is experiencing an inter or intrastate conflict or not. As counterbal-
ancing efforts decrease military fighting effectiveness and wars affect coup risk (Böhmelt and
Pilster, 2015; Piplani and Talmadge, 2016; Bell and Koga-Sudduth, 2017), ongoing conflict
might affect leaders willingness to implement institutional coup-proofing efforts. Moreover,
X includes the ethnic fractionalization index from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fraction-
alization (HIEF) dataset (Drazanova, 2019) as ethnically diverse societies provide leaders
willing to implement institutional coup-proofing with the capacity to set up counterweights
to the army leveraging over ethnic differences (Quinlivan, 1999). Finally, I include a dummy
variable assuming value 1 if the year is prior to 1991 -Cold War - and country-year fixed
effects to soak up time trends and unobserved invariant effects.
5.6 Results
Table 4 presents the estimates for the first and second stages of my main model and a baseline
model reporting clustered standard errors on the country level robust to heteroskedasticity
51Data sources are, the AidData Dataset (Tierney et al., 2011), the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2019), the World Bank Open Dataset and the National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer, 1998).
52The index measures the political regime authority and approximates the level of democratization ranging
from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy)
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and intra-cluster correlation. Looking at the estimates of the second stage of my main
model under Model 5, the GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity suggests that Coup
Risk and Coup Risk*Aid are indeed endogenous, while the values of the Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM, Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F and Hansen’s j statistics hint that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and - not only weakly - correlated with the endogenous
regressors (Hayashi, 2000; Baum et al., 2007; Staiger and Stock, 1994; Stock and Yogo,
2005). Finally, it is worth recalling that in IV analysis R2 has no natural interpretation as
SSR for IV can be larger than SST (Wooldridge, 2006).
Model 1 and Model 2 report, respectively, estimates from the first and the second stage of
a baseline model including Coup Risk and Aid but not Coup Risk*Aid. Looking at Model 2,
Coup Risk has positive sign and is statistically different from 0 only at 10% level while the co-
efficient of Aid has negative sign and is not statistically different from 0. Model 3 and Model
4 report the first stage estimates from my main model, while Model 5 displays the estimates
for the second stage equation. Looking at Model 5, Coup Risk*Aid has a negative sign, but
is significant only at 10% level. In turn, Aid changes sign and is still not significant, while
Coup Risk remains positive and is now significant at 5% level. This suggests that leaders
who do not have access to unearmarked aid are likely to react to coup risk increasing institu-
tional coup-proofing efforts. When Coup Risk rises by one standard deviation, leaders who
do not have access to unearmarked resources increase the number of effective ground-combat
military organizations by ≈0.39 units. In turn, leaders who have access to unearmarked aid
seem to react to coup risk decreasing institutional coup-proofing efforts. Indeed, when Coup
Risk rises by one standard deviation, leaders who enjoy discretionally allocable aid decrease
the number of effective ground-combat military organizations by ≈0.11 units. This suggests
that leaders might prefer facing coup risk replacing institutional coup-proofing with other
strategies when they have financially chances to do so. These findings are in line with the
hypothesis i.e that leaders who do not have access to unearmarked aid are more likely to face
coup risk implementing institutional coup-proofing strategies than leaders who have access
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to such revenues. Figure 8 displays the point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals
for the variables Coup Risk, and Coup Risk*Aid.
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Table 4: The impact of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing. CBI as independent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage
Baseline Model Baseline Model Main Model Main Model Main Model
VARIABLES Coup Risk CBI Coup Risk Coup Risk*Aid CBI
Coup Risk 0.369* 0.475**
(0.206) (0.217)
Aid -0.048 -0.031 -0.056 1.772*** 0.135
(0.031) (0.039) (0.061) (0.106) (0.086)
Coup Risk*Aid -0.138*
(0.073)




∆ Temperature -0.086*** -0.086***
(0.011) (0.011)
Aid over GDP -1.524* 0.543 -1.518* -0.208 0.738
(0.793) (0.929) (0.790) (0.742) (0.932)
∆ GDP -0.302* 0.083 -0.302* -0.035 0.109
(0.162) (0.146) (0.162) (0.145) (0.150)
HIEF index 2.111*** -0.954 2.119*** 0.173 -1.070
(0.543) (0.664) (0.547) (0.477) (0.669)
Population -0.094 0.160 -0.096 -0.273*** 0.111
(0.150) (0.177) (0.148) (0.104) (0.182)
∆ Military Personnel -0.001** 0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conflict 0.068 0.114* 0.068 0.090** 0.119*
(0.049) (0.066) (0.049) (0.043) (0.068)
Democracy -0.098* -0.040 -0.098* -0.075 -0.045
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
(0.058) (0.074) (0.058) (0.048) (0.075)
Military 0.854*** -0.440** 0.853*** 0.482*** -0.470**
(0.080) (0.201) (0.080) (0.075) (0.205)
Cold war 0.690*** -0.389* 0.689*** 0.344*** -0.420**
(0.090) (0.202) (0.090) (0.090) (0.209)
∆ Natural Revenues 0.037 -0.037 0.037 0.070** -0.031
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
Observations 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Number of ID 122 122 122 122 122
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared -0.077 -0.110
R-squared by hand -0.00989 -0.0405
F statistic 2.695 2.632
p-value of F-statistic 6.50e-06 9.46e-06
F-stat for weak identification 39.74 25.76
F-stat for underidentification 35.46 35.04
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 1.99e-08 2.46e-08
Hansen J statistic 2.019 2.447
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.155 0.118
GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity 1.718 11.81
p-value of GMM distance test statistic of endogeneity 0.190 0.00273
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 8: β coefficients of Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid. CBI as dependent variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
To corroborate these findings, I investigate how changing the threshold of the amount
of unearmarked aid used to code the variable Aid affects model estimates. In this sense,
I code the variable Aid six more times using as thresholds 0, 0.05, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3
US dollars per capita. Figure 9 and 10 display, respectively, the point estimates and their
95% confidence intervals for the variables Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid. Notably, changing
the threshold does not affect the model results. Table 7A in the appendix displays model
estimates for these additional specifications.
Moreover, to further the analysis taking into account temporal lags of the effects of
coup risk, I run my model two more times forwarding my dependent variable by 1 and 2
periods. Table 8A in the appendix fully presents the results. While in both these additional
specifications the main independent variables do not change the sign of their coefficients,
yet, in both specifications statistical significance decreases.
Finally, as additional robustness checks I test my hypothesis using as dependent variable
two alternative dummy variables. The first dummy is Coup-proofing and assumes value 1 if in
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Figure 9: β coefficients of Coup Risk. Alternative Aid thresholds. CBI as dependent
variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
Figure 10: β coefficients of Coup Risk*Aid. Alternative Aid thresholds. CBI as dependent
variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
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Figure 11: β coefficient of Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid. Coup-proofing as dependent
variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
the country there are more than 1.5 and less than 2.5 military rival units. I code this variable
using data from the CBI. Indeed, as Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) note, counterbalancing
efforts are most effective in opposing coups when in a country are present about two equally
strong military organizations. Results are in line with those above presented. Figure 11 plots
point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for the variables Coup Risk, Aid and their
interaction. Table 9A in the appendix displays full results from this additional model.
The second dummy variable is Coup-proofing (SSFD) and assumes value 1 if in the
country is present one or more counterweights to the army and 0 otherwise according to the
State Security Forces Dataset (De Bruin, 2019). As in the main analysis, both Coup Risk
and Coup Risk*Aid have the expected sign. Figure 12 plots point estimates and their 95%
confidence intervals for the variables Coup Risk, Aid and their interaction. Table 10A in the
appendix displays full results from this additional model.
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Figure 12: β coefficients of Coup Risk and Coup Risk*Aid. Coup-proofing (SSFD) as depen-
dent variable.
Points represent coefficient estimates while lines their 95% confidence interval. The dashed
horizontal line is set on 0.
5.7 The Bangladeshi case
Bangladesh well exemplifies the proposed relation between unearmarked aid, coup risk and
institutional coup-proofing. Figure 13 plots the amount of donors’ commitments as general
budget support and the value of the counterbalancing index over time. Between 1975 and
1991, the year in which the parliamentary republic was restored, Bangladesh suffered a
period of tense civil-military relations. Only in 1975, the country experienced a bloody
military coup in August, an abortive counter-coup on November 3rd and merely four days
later a “sepoy mutiny” through which General Ziaur Rahman consolidated his power (Islam,
1984). Between 1977 - the year in which Ziaur took over the presidency formally - and 1981,
there were nineteen coup attempts (Islam, 1984). The assassination of Ziaur in a failed
coup that year pushed the country further into instability. In fact, just one year after Lt.
General Ershad seized power justifying its intervention affirming that Bangladeshi political
indiscipline, corruption, devastated economy, administrative stalemate, and food crises were
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threatening national security (Bertocci, 1982).
Notably, the relative strength of the counterweights to the Bangladeshi army changed
over time oppositely to the relative amount of unearmarked resources donors provided. Dur-
ing the rule of Ziaur, donors allocated very little or no unearmarked resources. Between
1977 and 1981 Bangladesh received an average of 0.11 US dollars per capita for a total of
≈48.4 millions US dollars. In the same period, Ziaur undertook substantive institutional
coup-proofing efforts increasing the strength of Bangladeshi paramilitary units. In 1977 the
Bangladeshi army counted 59.000 men, the five infantry brigades were divided into 17 bat-
talions, and there were 20.000 paramilitary militia volunteers (Paxton, 1977). Five years
later, the infantry brigades were divided into 27 battalions, and the paramilitary volunteers
had outnumbered the soldiers in the army (Paxton, 1981). In turn, when three years af-
ter Ershad’s successful coup donors increased progressively the allocation of unearmarked
contributions, the new Bangladeshi leader followed a different coup-proofing strategy. Be-
tween 1985 and 1990 donors committed an average of 1.5 US dollars per capita for a total of
≈1.38 billion US dollars. In the same period, the regime of Ershad’s reached record levels of
venality (Blair, et al., 1992) while restoring the strength of the army vis-à-vis the paramili-
tary formations. Notably, the number of soldiers rose by 20.000 units, while the number of
paramilitary volunteers decreased by 11.000 units (Paxton, 1983; 1990).
5.8 Conclusions
As discussed and as recent developments in Mali showed, coup-plotters pose a real threat
to incumbent leaders. To face the risk of being ousted by the military, leaders can resort
to different strategies. In this paper, I investigate if and to what extent access to unear-
marked international aid affects leaders’ strategies to face coup-risk. I argue that access to
unearmarked aid decreases leaders’ willingness to face coup risk resorting to institutional
coup-proofing activities. In fact, as institutional coup-proofing increases the risk of pre-
ventive coups (Finer, 2002) and reduces military fighting effectiveness(Böhmelt and Pilster,
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Figure 13: Unearmarked commitments and institutional coup-proofing in Bangladesh.
The dashed line illustrates the four-year moving average of donors’ resources committed
as general budget support to Bangladesh. The continuous line represents the number of
effective ground-combat military organizations in the country.
2011), when leaders enjoy access to discretionally allocable resources, then they prefer im-
plementing other coup-proofing strategies than institutional coup-proofing as, for example,
buying-off potential rivals allocating private goods. In turn, lack of access to such resources
binds leaders to face coup risk implementing institutional coup-proofing.
On the empirical side, first, this paper proposes an instrumental variable approach to
examine the impact of coup risk on institutional coup-proofing. Second, it suggests a set
of historical, geographical and meteorological variables to estimate coup risk. I find that
leaders who do not have access to unearmarked aid are indeed more likely to face coup risk
implementing institutional coup-proofing strategies than leaders who enjoy such resources.
Results are robust to a series of different model specifications.
These results contribute to increase our understanding of when, to what extent and
under which circumstances, leaders implement institutional coup-proofing as a strategy to
face coup risk. At the same time, these findings advance our knowledge regarding how and
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when leaders use aid as a tool to increase their survival chances.
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5.9 Appendix
In the next pages, Table 5A presents the descriptive statistics of the dataset while Table
6A shows the estimate of the model of coup attempt used to predict coup risk. To model
coup attempts I follow a two-stage approach resorting to a logit model via a control function
estimator. This is to take into account for the latent variable coup risk affecting both the
dependent variable and some of the regressors as as GDP and the level of foreign direct
investments (FDI). As discussed, my independent variable is a dummy that assumes value
1 if a country experienced at least one coup attempt in a given year according to the Coup
d’etat Dataset (Powell and Thyne, 2011) and 0 otherwise. As regressors, I include the GDP
growth, military expenditure and its inter-year change, FDI, a dummy variable accounting
for the country being an autocracy53, a dummy variable accounting for the country being
ruled by a military regime, the number of coup-attempts occurred in the last five years
and its squared term. The set of excluded instruments for the endogenous regressors GDP,
FDI, military expenditure and its inter-year change includes the percentages of ice-free coast
within 100 km, land with tropical climates, desertic surface, fertile soil, an index of terrain
ruggedness,54, the proportional inter-year change of a weighted measure of countries’ average
monthly precipitation55 and its lagged value, the lagged value of surface temperature anomaly
and its inter-year change56, and two dummy variables accounting for the country being a
former colony and the year being prior to 1991. These variables are proxies for the chances
of a country to have access to trade routes, develop its economy, strengthen state capacity
and experience conflict (Fearon and Latin, 1999; Gallup et al., 1999; Buhaug and Gates,
2002; Miguel et al. 2004; Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Disdier and Head, 2008; Feyrer. 2009;
Hendrix, 2011; Dell et al., 2012).
53This dummy assumes value 1 if in the given year the country’s polity2 score is equal or minor than -5
and 0 otherwise
54I code these variables following Nunn and Puga (2012).
55Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/average-monthly-precipitation?tab=chart
56Data is based on the HadCRUT analysis from the Climatic Research Unit (University of East Anglia),
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/hadcrut-surface-temperature-anomaly
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Figure 14: Distribution of Coup Risk over values of Aid
Figure 14 shows the distribution of the variable Coup Risk over the values of the variable
Aid. At the same time, Table 7A, 8A, 9A and 10A shows model estimations for the additional
specifications discussed previously. In particular, Table 7A and Table 7A show, respectively,
how changing the threshold to define the variable Aid and how forwarding the dependent
variable of one and two periods affects results. Finally Table 9A and Table 10A show results
from the two logit models estimated via a control function estimator and having as dependent
variables, respectively, Coup-proofing and Coup-proofing (SSFD).
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Table 5A: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
CBI 1.72 0.65 1.00 4.58 2733
Coup-proofing (SSFD) 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.00 1688
Coast 36.94 36.54 0.00 100.00 2733
Soil 37.23 21.59 0.00 88.65 2733
Tropical 37.08 42.26 0.00 100.00 2733
Ruggedness 1.24 1.07 0.04 6.20 2733
Desert 4.49 11.48 0.00 77.28 2733
Colonized 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 2733
∆ Precipitation 0.03 0.26 -0.86 3.41 2733
Cold war 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 2733
∆ Temperature 0.03 0.54 -3.88 2.42 2733
Temperature 0.34 0.55 -1.83 4.66 2733
GDP growth 0.02 0.08 -0.44 1.34 2733
Military Expenditure 3.01 4.13 0.00 117.35 2733
FDI 2.54 5.21 -28.62 103.34 2733
Autocracy 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 2733
Military 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 2733
Past coups 0.26 0.74 0.00 9.00 2733
Duration 23.98 17.79 0.00 64.00 2733
Duration*Aid 13.47 17.45 0.00 64.00 2733
Coup Risk 1.11 0.83 0.00 4.04 2733
Coup Risk*Aid 0.72 0.85 0.00 3.93 2733
Aid 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 2733
Aid over GDP 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.32 2733
∆ Natural Revenues 0.01 0.27 -1.52 3.27 2733
∆ GDP 0.02 0.07 -0.58 0.85 2733
HIEF index 0.45 0.27 0.01 0.89 2733
Population 16.27 1.34 12.97 21.03 2733
∆ Military Personnel -0.82 31.87 -1100.00 410.00 2733
Conflict 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 2733
Democracy 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 2733
Military 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 2733
Cold war 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 2733
Year 1994.57 11.32 1972.00 2013.00 2733
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Table 6A: Logit model of coup attempt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A Model 1A
Second Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage
VARIABLES Coup GDP growth Military Expenditure ∆ Military Expenditure FDI
Autocracy -0.026 -0.003 1.543*** -0.026 -0.250
(0.094) (0.004) (0.597) (0.107) (0.489)
Military 0.139** 0.007* -0.620 -0.063 -0.436
(0.069) (0.004) (0.497) (0.054) (0.322)
Past coups 0.049 -0.005 -0.026 0.045 0.216
(0.085) (0.004) (0.246) (0.050) (0.373)
Past coups2 -0.008 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.040
(0.013) (0.001) (0.041) (0.009) (0.057)
Coast 0.000 0.014** 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Soil 0.000 -0.039*** -0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012)
Tropical -0.000 -0.019*** 0.001 -0.007
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
Ruggedness -0.000 0.007 0.013 -0.186
(0.001) (0.119) (0.022) (0.196)
Desert -0.000 0.005 -0.000 -0.027
(0.000) (0.026) (0.002) (0.024)
Colonized -0.004* -0.093 0.018 0.720
(0.002) (0.779) (0.041) (0.537)
∆ Precipitation 0.003 1.765* 0.751 0.709
(0.011) (0.977) (0.593) (0.574)
∆ Precipitation 0.002 1.242** -0.406 0.504
(0.008) (0.609) (0.310) (0.745)
Continued on next page
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Table 6A – continued from previous page
Cold war 0.008 0.529 0.115 -2.644***
(0.011) (0.716) (0.229) (0.721)
∆ Temperature 0.001 -0.265** 0.088 0.166
(0.002) (0.135) (0.113) (0.310)
Temperature 0.001 -0.572** 0.072 0.024
























Continued on next page
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Constant 0.032 0.024*** 4.029*** -0.106 4.025***
(0.302) (0.007) (0.941) (0.138) (0.989)
Observations 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747 3,747
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES
AUROC 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7A: The impact of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing. CBI as independent variable. Additional thresholds
for the variable Aid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 5A Model 6A Model 7A
0 US Dollars 0.05 US Dollars 0.15 US Dollars 0.2 US Dollars 0.25 US Dollars 0.3 US Dollars
VARIABLES CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI CBI
Coup Risk 0.399** 0.478** 0.475** 0.485** 0.471** 0.483**
(0.196) (0.213) (0.208) (0.209) (0.210) (0.212)
Aid -0.027 0.125 0.138* 0.152** 0.144* 0.160**
(0.153) (0.094) (0.081) (0.077) (0.075) (0.078)
Coup Risk*Aid -0.039 -0.138* -0.133* -0.142** -0.123* -0.137**
(0.101) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.068) (0.070)
Observations 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Number of ID 122 122 122 122 122 122
Adjusted R-squared -0.078 -0.108 -0.113 -0.118 -0.114 -0.120
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared by hand -0.0108 -0.0387 -0.0431 -0.0480 -0.0445 -0.0498
F statistic 2.790 2.760 2.701 2.698 2.688 2.678
p-value of F-statistic 2.80e-06 3.52e-06 5.55e-06 5.69e-06 6.15e-06 6.62e-06
F-stat for weak identification 24.67 25.54 25.77 25.51 25.47 25.07
F-stat for underidentification 34.52 34.87 35.05 34.83 34.80 34.57
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 3.19e-08 2.69e-08 2.45e-08 2.73e-08 2.77e-08 3.12e-08
Hansen J statistic 2.150 2.469 2.593 2.727 2.625 2.761
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.143 0.116 0.107 0.0987 0.105 0.0966
GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity 4.897 10.43 13.08 12.62 11.85 11.83
p-value of GMM distance test statistic of endogeneity 0.0864 0.00542 0.00144 0.00182 0.00268 0.00270
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8A: The impact of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing. CBI as independent variable. Dependant variable
forwarded.
(1) (2)
Model 8A Model 9A
Second Stage Second Stage
Main Model Main Model
VARIABLES CBI 1-years forward CBI 2-years forward




Coup Risk*Aid -0.109 -0.089
(0.072) (0.073)
Aid over GDP 1.436* 1.165
(0.741) (0.761)
∆ GDP 0.102 0.163
(0.151) (0.151)












Cold war -0.371* -0.278
(0.223) (0.239)
Continued on next page
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Table 8A – continued from previous page
∆ Natural Revenues -0.036 -0.004
(0.022) (0.022)
Observations 2,750 2,764
Number of ID 122 122
Adjusted R-squared -0.068 -0.055
Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES
R-squared by hand -0.00150 0.00998
F statistic 2.994 2.466
p-value of F-statistic 5.82e-07 3.41e-05
F-stat for weak identification 25 25.86
F-stat for underidentification 34.50 35.64
p-value of underidentification LM statistic 3.22e-08 1.82e-08
Hansen J statistic 1.535 1.984
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.215 0.159
GMM distance test statistic of exogeneity 12.40 8.260
p-value of GMM distance test statistic of endogeneity 0.00203 0.0161
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9A: The impact of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing. Coup-proofing as independent variable.
(1) (2) (3)
Model 10A Model 11A Model 12A
VARIABLES Coup-proofing Coup Risk Coup Risk*Aid
Coup Risk 0.711*
(0.366)








Aid over GDP -3.573 2.719** 1.755*
(2.376) (1.107) (0.971)
∆ Natural Revenues -0.064 0.003 0.058*
(0.082) (0.034) (0.032)
∆ GDP 0.918** -0.543*** -0.223
(0.401) (0.194) (0.163)
HIEF index -0.514 0.510*** 0.298***
(0.345) (0.113) (0.083)
Population 0.019 0.047* 0.006
(0.059) (0.025) (0.018)
∆ Military Personnel 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Conflict 0.032 -0.010 0.026
(0.152) (0.068) (0.061)
Democracy -0.283* -0.114* -0.099**
(0.168) (0.062) (0.046)
Military -0.731** 0.913*** 0.516***
Continued on next page
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Table 9A – continued from previous page
(0.342) (0.091) (0.075)
Cold war -0.611 0.360** 0.203***
(0.387) (0.150) (0.066)












Constant -0.125 -0.094 -0.702**
(1.004) (0.421) (0.291)
Observations 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733
Country FE NO NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES
AUROC 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.639
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10A: The impact of coup risk and aid on institutional coup-proofing. Coup-proofing (SSFD) as independent variable.
(1) (2) (3)
Model 13A Model 14A Model 15A
VARIABLES Coup-proofing (SSFD) Coup Risk Coup Risk*Aid
Coup Risk 0.914*
(0.499)








∆ Temperature -0.094*** -0.054***
(0.019) (0.018)
Aid over GDP 2.089 1.511 0.576
(3.415) (1.168) (0.954)
∆ Natural Revenues 0.143 -0.033 0.038
(0.100) (0.042) (0.038)
∆ GDP -0.143 -0.817*** -0.402
(0.751) (0.303) (0.256)
HIEF index -0.677 0.613*** 0.299***
(0.609) (0.153) (0.106)
Population 0.008 -0.000 -0.025
(0.100) (0.034) (0.025)
∆ Military Personnel -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Conflict 0.123 -0.028 0.022
(0.269) (0.081) (0.072)
Democracy -0.630** -0.172** -0.114*
Continued on next page
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(0.317) (0.072) (0.061)
Military -0.962** 0.819*** 0.492***
(0.466) (0.102) (0.082)












Constant 0.349 1.331** 0.156
(1.860) (0.553) (0.392)
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718 1,718
Country FE NO NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster SE YES YES YES YES
AUROC 0.721 0.721 0.721 0.721
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6 Chapter 3 - Assessing sub-national foreign aid allo-
cation in post-conflict countries: the case of Nepal
6.1 Abstract
International aid plays an important role in the reconstruction of war-torn societies after
the end of civil war, but its effectiveness depends on whether aid reaches the neediest recip-
ients. We study how power sharing in Nepal’s post-conflict transition affected the political
capture of aid. We argue that despite the explicit inclusion of disadvantaged groups in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2006 and the 2007 Interim Constitution, districts
that neither aligned with the Maoist insurgents nor the government during the civil war
remained politically disadvantaged. A possible causal mechanism is the low threat potential
of non-combatant groups, which results in under-representation during peace negotiations
and in post-conflict institutions. We present statistical evidence that districts that did not
support any of the two former warring factions receive systematically less aid during the
post-conflict period, regardless of economic need or damage caused by fighting. However,
the main parties do not appear to actively target their own supporters with higher aid alloca-
tions. We conclude that the political settlement after the Nepali Civil War was successful in
enfranchising supporters of the Maoist insurgents, but other marginalized groups still suffer
distributional disadvantages.
6.2 Introduction
International aid plays an important role in the reconstruction of war-torn societies after
the end of civil war. Political goals promoted by the international community include rec-
onciliation, political stability and economic development. However, promoting any of these
goals crucially depends on whether reconstruction programs address the underlying causes
of conflict and whether aid reaches the intended recipients. Outside of post-conflict settings,
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aid frequently is at risk of being captured by powerful political interests (e.g. Bueno de
Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Winters, 2014). Post-conflict environments have the potential to
differ if a civil war ended with a peace agreement. First, the political settlement raises the
hope that previously disenfranchised groups achieve better distributional outcomes. And
second, the international donor community is often heavily invested in underwriting the new
political order and should actively seek to avoid aid capture. To investigate this dynamic,
we study the role of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the Nepalese Civil
War in 2006 and the Interim Constitution of 2007 for ensuring power sharing and avoiding
political capture of aid. In this article, we explore whether the agreement was successful
in suppressing the partisan allocation of aid flows to supporters of the party in power, and
whether the agreement’s stated goal of enfranchising a wide array of previously marginal
groups was achieved.
A key policy tool in the reconstruction of post-civil war societies is development finance.
Aid flows typically are largest in the immediate aftermath of a conflict and coincide with an
uptick in economic activity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Aid ideally helps to rebuild destroyed
infrastructure and replenish physical capital (Kang & Meernik, 2005) and has at least the
potential to play an important role in addressing grievances that have fueled the conflict
(Savun & Tirone, 2012). Though experimental work has generated important insights about
the effectiveness of local interventions (e.g. Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Fearon et.al., 2009),
studies that consider the overall outcomes of aid programming in post-conflict societies are
few and tend to pay no attention to which population groups actually benefit from aid flows
(Findley, 2018). An important reason for this are data limitations, in combination with a
lack of theoretical work characterizing the political economy of aid allocations in post-conflict
societies.
This project innovates on both counts. We draw on literatures that connect political
patronage to political stability and that highlight the role of aid for patronage, to develop
arguments about the role of peace agreements for aid flows in post-conflict societies. On the
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data side, existing works are limited by a lack of information about which groups benefit
from aid flows and a dearth of disaggregated measures of economic outcomes. We overcome
these challenges by leveraging geographic information on a host of key variables. This allows
us to bring together data on aid allocations (AidData, 2017) , and information on politically
relevant groups based on casualty data (Joshi & Subodh, 2015) and elections results (Election
Commission of Nepal; Kollman et al., 2011), as well as census data (Open Nepal data hub).
Going beyond data availability, Nepal presents an ideal case to study how a peace agreement
affects aid flows and thus the prospects of political stability. The country has experienced
a major civil war (1996 – 2006) and relatively successful peace process. The reconstruction
period is well defined as beginning with the 2006 Peace Agreement and the 2007 Interim
Constitution, and ending with the devastating earthquake in 2015. The earthquake reshaped
reconstruction needs and international aid flows and also broke an inter-party stalemate
about the final political settlement, ushering into the adaptation of the 2015 Constitution.
Nepal is heavily aid dependent, with roughly one third of government expenditure accounted
for by Official Development Aid (World Bank, 2016). Nepalese society is characterized by
strong inequalities between the center (Kathmandu) and the periphery. These differences
also run along ethnic, class and geographic lines. The Maoist insurgency that fueled the civil
war drew on grievances associated with these cleavages. The different social dimensions of the
conflict do not map perfectly into each other, making the country a fertile testing ground for
exploring how different population groups fared in receiving aid transfers during the country’s
reconstruction period. There is also useful variation in the governing arrangements since the
end of the civil war. Between the first post-war elections in 2008 and the second round in
2013, changing governing coalitions have included the insurgent Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) (hereafter CPN(M) or Maoists), and the main parties of government during the
conflict, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist
Leninist) (hereafter UML).
To study the effect of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Interim Constitution, we
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focus on variation in support for the former warring factions across different regions of Nepal.
The conventional logic of clientelism in aid allocations suggests that areas that provided the
Maoists with most support during the civil war should stand to receive more aid when the
Maoist are in power, and likewise for government supporting areas and the NC and UML.
However, the Peace Agreement recognized wider social justice issues and promised a more
equitable treatment of groups. From this perspective, civil war allegiance should be no
important determinant of post-conflict support, at least not once objective reconstruction
and other measures of need are taken into account.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also promised to enfranchise population groups
who did not openly align with the warring faction during the civil war, and these promises
also feature prominently in the Interim Constitution of 2007. While peace agreements often
focus on the concrete mechanisms of power sharing, appeals to wider social justice are not
as common. This makes the Nepalese peace process stand out, but also raises the important
question whether marginalized population groups in Nepal in fact benefited from the recon-
struction process, regardless of their participation in the conflict and representation during
peace negotiations. Non-belligerents can’t credibly threaten future violence, and therefore
are not part of the process that seeks to commit belligerents to lay down their arms. As
a result, the risk increases that such groups fall by the wayside during the reconstruction
phase and have their needs not addressed. This in turn carries with it the seeds for future
grievances and renewed conflict.
The implication of these considerations for Nepal are twofold. First, if the political pro-
cess was successful in achieving the social goals laid out in the Peace Agreement and the
Interim Constitution, aid allocations should have not shown marked signs of benefiting the
party in power. In addition, they should have reflected the economic needs of different re-
gions, regardless of whether people in these regions participated in fighting. Alternatively,
if the process was unsuccessful in reaching these aims, aid allocations would have followed
detectable patronage patterns, benefiting supporters of the party in power. Areas that sided
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with either of the factions that negotiated the Comprehensive Peace Agreement should have
been better served with aid projects in the reconstruction phase than areas in which the pop-
ulation did not side with either the government or the Maoist insurgents. Such an outcome
would mean that the Nepalese peace process has created a framework which perpetuates
inequalities and allows new grievances to grow, seeding the conditions for renewed conflict,
albeit between new opposing factions.
To preview results, we find that there are no overt patterns of aid allocations benefiting
either the supporters of the CPN(M) nor the UML, when these parties were in control of the
crucial Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. The peace process therefore seems to have
successfully avoided clientelism among the former warring factions. However, marginalized
areas which support neither of the main parties systematically receive lower aid allocations.
This article makes a number of contributions. First, previous works find that peace
agreements can be successful in producing sustainable peace if they pay attention to distri-
butional justice (Druckman & Albin, 2011). In contrast, our findings highlight that even if
an agreement succeeds in drafting former combatants into the political process, groups that
did not participate in the armed struggle are at risk of continued marginalization. Second,
foreign aid constitutes an important source of income in post-conflict countries, and allocat-
ing aid to where it is needed most is a precondition for successful economic recovery. Our
results show that allocative efficiency is not easy to achieve, even if a peace agreement and
new constitution formally acknowledge the need for greater equality. In this sense, as the
resources donors are willing to allocate are likely to decrease if the economic consequences
of the unfolding COVID-19 crisis will be as severe as expected, it is important to further our
understanding of the drivers of aid allocation to limit resource wasting. Finally, the study
identifies political misallocation of reconstruction aid as a potentially important source of
the often observed gap between the stated policy goals of western donor governments and
realized development outcomes.
In the following, we first present the case for our thesis in the context of the Nepalese
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civil war. We then turn to the existing academic literature on post-conflict development
aid and articulate our central argument more fully. In the succeeding section we discuss
data and methodological choices for the statistical analysis, followed by a presentation of the
empirical results. We conclude with a summary of our findings.
6.3 Fighting patterns and aid allocations in Nepal
The central argument of this paper is that social goals enshrined in a peace agreement are
at risk of failure if a) the political settlement enables the allocation of reconstruction aid to
follow a spoils politics logic, and b) non-combatant groups systematically benefit less from
post-conflict distributional settlements than those groups who sided with the insurgents or
the government. It is important to highlight that these two sources of failure can operate
independently. For example, former combatant groups can be equally well served with
reconstruction aid, irrespective of who holds political power, thus breaking the spoils logic.
Yet, previously marginalized groups that did not take up arms may continue to be short-
changed. Likewise, in principle it is possible that non-combatant groups themselves can
engage in spoils politics, though in reality it is less likely that such groups accede to the
levers of power. Before developing these arguments in more detail below, we illustrate how
they apply to the case of Nepal’s civil war and post-conflict politics.
Nepalese society at the beginning of the Maoist uprising in 1996 was characterized by
strong social and economic divisions along a large number of cleavages. These included a
geographic dimension, with Kathmandu as center of economic and political activity, and
less advantaged regions, in particular the Mid- and Far West. There were strong inequal-
ities along caste and ethnic lines, as well as concentrated land holdings and leftovers of
a feudal system that rewarded civil servants with the right to exploit large tracts of land
(Deraniyagala, 2005; Joshi Mason, 2007; Lawoti 2010, 2012; Sharma et Al., 2014). In ad-
dition there existed strong gender disparities. At the same time, the country was set on a
path to modernization, with the first multi-party elections held only in 1991, after a his-
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tory of monarchical rule. The elections had raised expectations about social improvements,
which in turn went unfulfilled (Shakya, 2012). The relative contribution of these pervasive
inequalities in Nepalese society to the outbreak of the civil war is contested. Commenta-
tors using qualitative narratives tend to highlight them as driving force of the conflict (e.g.
Deraniyagala, 2005). In contrast, more systematic statistical studies come to contradicting
results, attributing fighting activity variously to poverty and geographic remoteness though
not inequality (Do & Iyver, 2010), geography and inequality (Murshed & Gates, 2005), and
road density but not poverty or inequality (Acharya, 2009). Despite this mixed picture, it
is a fact that the Maoist insurgency broke out in one of the most economically and socially
deprived regions of the country, and quickly found strong support there. In addition, the pro-
grammatic demands of the CPN(M) insurgents centered on overcoming historic inequalities
(Huang 2016).
Prior to the civil war, spoils politics in Nepal was not based on membership in a majority
ethnic group, but manifested itself in a number of ways. The rewards from holding power
disproportionally went to privileged landowners, who benefited from a skewed distribution of
land holding together with weak enforcement of tenant rights (Sharma et al., 2014), civil ser-
vants, and elites located in the politically and economic dominant Kathmandu valley. These
varied sources of division are reflected in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2006
and the 2007 Interim Constitution, which explicitly promised to address injustices towards
“women, Dalit, indigenous people, Madhesi, oppressed, excluded and minority communities
and backward regions”, as well as ending discrimination based on “class, caste, language,
gender, culture, religion and region”. (Para 33 (d)). Power sharing was written into the
Interim Constitution with a minimum 1/3 quota for women in the Constituent Assembly,
and provisions for parties to “ensure proportional representation of women, Dalit, oppressed
communities/ indigenous peoples, backward regions, Madhesi and other Classes, as provided
in law.” (Para 63(4)57)
57The 2015 Constitution which replaced the Interim Constitution retained these provisions.
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In the empirical analysis, we leverage some of these cleavages to create a statistical
baseline model under the assumption that post-conflict aid allocations in Nepal were in
fact driven by economic needs and social justice concerns. We then enrich this model with
variables that capture spoils politics and the combatant status of different population groups.
Given the non-ethnic nature of cleavages in the Nepalese civil war (or rather acknowl-
edging the absence of a majority ethnic cleavage), we conceptualize spoils politics as being
centered around the degree of support for the Maoist insurgency on the one hand and the
government forces on the other hand. It is well documented by the literature that sup-
port for the CPN(M) strongly correlated with a sense of grievances towards elites and the
government in the Kathmandu valley. For example, although the Maoists used strategic
violence to intimidate local populations into supporting them, removing local elites by force
and granting ownership rights to peasants who worked the land was highly popular among
local populations (Lawoti, 2010). In fact, Maoist indoctrination directly sought to appeal to
social rights, arguably playing an instrumental role in creating long-lasting political activism
among disadvantaged groups. The resulting political activism has outlasted the end of the
conflict (Huang, 2016).
Given this context, we focus on aid allocations channeled towards geographic regions
that were ideologically aligned with either the Maoist insurgency or the main government
parties as evidence of spoils politics in the immediate post-conflict years in Nepal. The main
parties in power during the conflict were the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party
of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). The CPN(M) enjoyed surprising electoral success in
the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections, and in the following years shifted in and out of
government responsibility. We focus on the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction as key
resort for influencing the flow of reconstruction aid and investigate whether regions aligned
with the CPN(M) or the UML received higher aid commitments during the years that the
respective party was in power (the NC ended up politically sidelined).
While fighting eventually encompassed most of Nepal, support for the CPN(M) and the
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government side was not evenly distributed. For example, the Maoists struggled to find
support in the low lying Terai, a region which historically also has harbored mistrust against
the Kathmandu elites (Kantha, 2010). A lack of partisan attachments meant a lack of voice
during the peace negotiations. Tellingly, violent protests erupted among Madhesi groups
in the region in the intermediate aftermath of the signing of the Interim Constitution in
2007. The protests succeeded in ensuring greater legislative presentation of the region in
the upcoming elections that year58. However, this well publicized incident illustrates the
challenges faced by groups that were non-aligned during the civil war. To evaluate how
being on the political sidelines affected access to reconstruction aid, we compare aid flows
between regions that provided major electoral support to the main parties involved in the
civil war, and those regions that remained outside the political mainstream. If the Interim
Constitution did not succeed in lessening social inequalities, despite nominal guarantees for
all marginalized groups, areas that did not support the Maoists or the Government during the
conflict should end up receiving less aid, irrespective of objective needs, and spoils politics.
6.4 Theoretical framework and literature
The following section puts the arguments developed in this paper in the context of the
existing literature. The theoretical starting point is the stylized insight that governments in
poor countries frequently rely on spoils politics and anticipate potential threats of violent
resistance to their rule (e.g. Padró I Miquel, 2007; Dal Bó & Powell, 2009). Existing works
have highlighted various aspects that foreign aid plays for spoils politics, and these take on
particular salience in post-conflict situations.
From a political economy perspective, aid generally allows rulers to buy off would-be
opponents or increase suppressive tactics (Bueno de Mesquita Smith, 2009; Morrison 2009).
However, reliance on aid is not cost-free. With increasing dependence on aid flows for
government expenditure, the risk of unforeseen shocks to government revenue increases,
58New York Times Feb 1, 2007. Accessed on 10.5.2020 at
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/world/asia/01nepal.html
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potentially undermining fragile political equilibria (Nielsen et al., 2011)59. Spoils politics in
combination with aid dependence therefore introduces an element of risk in a post-conflict
context. This represents a direct mechanism through which reconstruction aid in post-
conflict environments can contribute to political destabilization. Evidence for the role of
aid in spoils politics comes from numerous studies. Briggs (2014) shows that project aid in
Kenya in the 1990s overwhelmingly favored members of the president’s ethnic base. Hodler
and Raschky (2010) show that in countries with weak institutions, the birth region of the
incumbent ruler tends to receive more aid than other regions. Further examples for political
aid allocation come from pre-electoral 2005 Zimbabwe60, post-flooding 2010 Pakistan61 and
the Philippines (Atkinson, Hicken, Ravanilla, 2011). Finally, Jablonski (2014) establishes
that even multilateral aid allocations are not immune from domestic political pressures.
Going beyond the direct allocation of aid, as part of spoils politics, local public goods
tend to benefit well defined groups that are aligned with the ruler (e.g. Franck & Rainer,
2012; Ejdemyr et al., 2017). To the extent that aid flows free up government resources, aid
dependency should increase the ability of a ruler to reward supporters, even if aid allocation
decisions themselves are unaffected by spoils considerations. However, to our knowledge there
are no studies that explore the role of reconstruction aid for spoils politics in post-conflict
environments62. Local public good provision is of particular importance in post-conflict
59This risk can’t be fully eliminated even if donors are willing to counteract it (Steinwand, 2015).
60McGreal, Chris. “Mugabe accused of using food as a political weapon in Zimbabwe,” The Guardian,
June 4, 2008, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/04/unitednations.zimbabwe,
accessed on February 2019. Tweedie, Neil. “A hungry future for poor vot-
ers who oppose Mugabe,” Daily Telegraph (London), March 26, 2005, available at
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/1486512/A-hungry-future-
for-poor-voters-who-oppose-Mugabe.html, accessed on February 2019.
61Rashid, Ahmed, “Pakistani flood relief must start with fighting corruption,” Wash-
ington Post, September 6, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/05/AR2010090502816.html, accessed February 2019. Crilly,
Rob and McElroy, Damien, “Pakistan in Political Crisis Amid Allegations of Flood-
ing Aid Corruption,” The Daily Telegraph (London), August 23, 2010, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7960923/Pakistan-in-political-crisis-amid-
allegations-of-floodingaid-corruption.html, accessed on February 2019. Kheshgi , Khalid and Hashash,
Sara, “Pakistan Relief Effort Hampered By Corruption,” The Sunday Times, August 15, 2010, available at
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/worldnews/Asia/article370642.eceaccessedonFebruary2019.
62Some works look at the effects of aid in post-conflict societies in general, but don’t account for variation
in institutions or aid allocation patterns. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) make the case that foreign aid can help
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societies, because fighting results in damages to local infrastructure and the health and
employment prospects of local populations, which in turn require greater public resources
(Collier et al., 2003).
A second causal link connecting spoils politics and political instability runs through the
structural features that render disadvantaged groups dissatisfied with the status quo. The
literature on civil war has identified exclusion from power sources and distributional benefits
as major driving force of conflict (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Dal Bó Powell, 2009),
especially where cleavages run across ethnic lines (the so-called ‘grievance’ explanation of
politics, e.g. Buhaug et al., 2008). Obviously, in post-conflict environments dissatisfaction
with distributional outcomes will be a particularly sensitive issue if the conflict was driven
by such grievances in the first place.
Civil wars that end with a negotiated settlement or a peace agreement are particularly
well suited to test whether the logic of spoils politics can be overcome. The literature shows
that compared with other outcomes (such as war being fought to a stalemate, or one-sided
victory), peace settlements tend to improve the balance of political power between former
contestants, as former rebel groups gain political recognition. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)
show that of 38 negotiated civil war settlements between 1945 and 1998, all except eight
included political power sharing terms63. Clearly, peace agreements shape post-war political
institutions, thus creating venues to “mitigate and channel societal competition”, where “no
single set of antagonists is capable of imposing its will” (Hatzell & Hoodie 2007, p.11).
From these observations follow three possible scenarios for the relationship between recon-
struction aid and spoils politics in post-conflict societies. The first is the most normatively
positive. Political settlements create venues through which the economic and political needs
of previously disenfranchised groups can find expression and therefore promise to reduce
inequalities and address grievances. From this perspective, peace agreements are a politi-
foster growth in the aftermath of conflict by helping to restore infrastructure. Donaubauer et al. (2016)
show that aid is more effective in restoring social infrastructure than economic infrastructure.
63Six out of those eight at least featured territorial power sharing terms.
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cal tool to overcome spoils politics, and success is equated with ex-post greater equality in
distributional outcomes.
However, a second scenario is that a settlement does create political mechanisms that
can achieve more distributional equality, but these mechanisms depend on ongoing patron-
age and consequently are only open to powerful and well-organized groups. D’Arcy and
Cornell (2016) provide an example of this dynamic. They illustrate how constitutional re-
forms in Kenya in 2010 devolved powers to the regions and succeeded in creating patronage
opportunities for a large number of population groups. However, those groups that did not
gain effective political representation because of their geographic settlement patterns lost
out from redistribution.
In the context of a post-conflict environment, it is reasonable to assume that non-
belligerent groups are politically marginal whereas former combatants are active negotiation
partners in crafting a peace agreement. Distributional gains for under-represented non-
combatant groups are therefore not guaranteed during reconstruction. Former rebel groups
might be perfectly content with ensuring access to resources for their own supporters only.
Such an outcome would constitute a failure to build lasting peace, since legitimate grievances
will go unaddressed, with the potential to undermine long-term reconstruction and peace
building goals.
In the following empirical section, we explore in detail which of these visions took hold
in the aftermath of Nepal’s civil war. We test the following hypotheses that summarize the
case for a successful suppression of spoils politics and foreign aid in post-conflict settings:
Hypothesis 3: Aid allocations during the reconstruction phase were not influenced by po-
litical parties rewarding their supporters.
Hypothesis 4: Population groups that were not actively participating in the civil war re-
ceived aid in line with their economic and social needs.
As discussed above, we expect that either of these two hypotheses could fail, but it is not
necessary for both of them to fail simultaneously.
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6.5 Empirical Analysis
To address the hypotheses presented above we use cross-section time series analysis on ge-
ographically disaggregated data. The unit of analysis are administrative districts per year,
and the data cover 2008 to 2013. The choice of time period has pragmatic and conceptual
reasons. Geographically disaggregated data on aid allocations is currently only available until
2013. Importantly though, the data almost completely cover the immediate reconstruction
period, beginning with the 2008 Constituent Assembly election and ending with the great
earthquake of 2015. This catastrophe not only caused tremendous damage and reshaped
redevelopment priorities. It also prompted a final political settlement that had previously
eluded the country’s parties.
Our dependent variable is aid commitments measured as dollars per capita. We rely on
the Nepal AIMS Geocoded Research Release that geocodes all projects from the Government
of Nepal’s Aid Information Management System (AIMS)64. Geocoding allows for matching
projects to Nepal’s 75 pre-2015 districts. We focus on commitments instead of disburse-
ments, because political influence on allocation decisions is more readily expressed at the
commitment stage. In addition, the data coverage for commitments is more comprehensive.
To detect the influence of spoils politics, we concentrate on which party held the influen-
tial office of the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction. Control of the ministry repeatedly
changed hands between the CPN(M) and CPN(UML). The Nepali Congress, as Nepal’s his-
toric main party and the Maoists’ main antagonist during the war, only held power for a
few months at the beginning of the time under consideration, and therefore is excluded from
this part of the analysis. We encode the years during which the CPN(M) was in charge of
the reconstruction ministry as 1, and assign 0 otherwise, and do the same for the UML. The
resulting dummy variables are called Maoist PR and UML PR. There were a few instances
in which the ministry position was vacant, but the CPN(M) provided the Minister for Lo-
64AidData. 2016. NepalAIMS GeocodedResearchRelease Level1 v1.4.1 geocoded dataset. Williamsburg,
VA and Washington, DC: AidData.
100
cal Development. We attribute these instances to Maoist PR. As a result, we identify the
CPN(M) as holding power in 2008, 2011, and 2012 and the UML in 2009 and 201065. To
measure political support, we rely on the results of the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections.
The connection between voting behavior and politicians rewarding its supporters by steering
aid towards them should be straightforward. We concentrate on three parties, the Nepali
Congress and CPN (UML), as largest parties that were part of multi-party politics prior to
the civil war and held government power during the war, and the CPN(M), as instigator of
the civil war. The data are based on published election results by the Election Commission
of Nepal66 and the Constituency-level elections archive (Kollman et al. 2011). Since each
district did send several representatives to the Constituent Assembly, we encode the share
of representatives a party was able to capture per district. In the statistical analysis, evi-
dence of spoils politics is captured by an interaction between the vote share variables and
the dummies for holding political power.
To test the second hypothesis, we need to capture which population groups neither sup-
ported the Maoists nor were aligned with the government during the conflict. If the peace
agreement was successful in enfranchising all parts of society, we would expect those pop-
ulation groups to be not systematically disadvantaged when receiving reconstruction aid.
One possibility to identify population groups that abstained from taking sides in the conflict
would be to rely on data of fighting activity and identify which districts contributed least to
overall casualties, the reasoning being that such districts did not provide much support to
either the Maoists or the central government.
Unfortunately, while this is a feasible way to identify support for the Maoists, a similar
logic does not hold for the government side. Joining the armed forces is likely a poor signal
of ideological alignment with the government, since the country is very poor and the state
with its security forces represents an important source of income. In addition, the location
65In case the ministry was occupied by officials from both parties in the same year, the coding attributes
power to the party that held the position for at least 7 months during this year.
66http://election.gov.np/election/np
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of fighting activity is not necessarily a good reflection of ideological support either. While
in the early years the conflict was located in areas that constituted the home base of the
Maoists, fighting eventually spread throughout much of the country. The presence of Maoists
insurgents in a region invited government reactions, but the rebel’s presence by itself is not
necessarily indicative of support by the local populations.
To avoid these pitfalls, we rely on the same voting data as before to identify the population
groups that were least aligned with either the Maoists or the government during the conflict.
Specifically, we assume that low voting shares for both the CPN(M) and the major parties
NC and UML are indicative for a stance against both the Maoists and the major government
parties. This measurement strategy relies on the assumption that voting behavior in 2008
is a good proxy for political alignments during the conflict which ended in 2006. The main
challenge to this approach is that voters who did not support either the main parties or
the Maoists during fighting may have cast their vote for them after the end of the conflict
anyways, perhaps anticipating that sending a UML or CPN(M) representative to parliament
might be the most effective way to ensure economic benefits are brought home to their
districts. The unexpected electoral success for the CPN(M) and its reversal in the subsequent
election suggest that something like this was at work. However, casting this overly broad
net is working in favor of our research question, since we seek to identify districts that
did not support either party during the conflict. Overestimating the support basis of the
major parties is a conservative measurement strategy, as those areas that did not follow the
national electoral trend in 2008 are more likely to be in durable opposition to the UML,
NC and CPN(M). We call the variable for aggregate electoral support for the three main
parties Main parties share and the complement Other parties share. Again, these variables
are coded in terms of shares of representatives each party captures in a district.
For control variables, we turn to the Open Nepal hub67 and the UCDP Georeferenced





Figure 15: Geographical distribution of main variables
graphics, geography and the share of insurgent, civilian and army fatalities as percent of
the population per district. The rationale is to control for the intensity of fighting and the
resulting need for reconstruction aid. Human development constitutes another significant
source of need for aid funding. We capture this using a battery of variables including the
adult illiteracy rate, the percentage of children under age five who are malnourished, and
the poverty incidence rate defined as the proportion of individuals living in that area who
are in households with an average per capita expenditure below the national poverty line68.
We also control for the level of infrastructure in a district using as proxies the percentage of
the population with access to safe water and the road density69.
To tap into regional differences, we include a set of categorical variables indicating what
is known in Nepal as development region (Central, Eastern, Far-Western, Mid-Western or
Western), and also a proxy for the Kathmandu valley. Another proxy captures the districts
where the Maoists formally announced a Jan Sarkar, or ‘people’s government’. These districts
68According to the Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics, the official monetary poverty line in local prices
was NRs 19,261 in 2011 (Pokharel 2015). As of 2011 average transaction rate, this corresponded to 0.7 US$
per day.
69All of these variables are available for 2011 only.
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Table 5: Summary statistics
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Aid Per Capita 26.31 69.47 0.00 879.17 375
Maoist PR 1.20 0.75 0.00 2.00 375
UML electoral share 0.20 0.28 0.00 1.00 375
NC electoral share 0.20 0.30 0.00 1.00 375
Maoist electoral share 0.49 0.42 0.00 1.00 375
Main parties share 0.89 0.25 0.00 1.00 375
Other parties share 0.11 0.25 0.00 1.00 375
Terai 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 375
Civilian casualties 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 375
Total casualties 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.41 375
Adult illiteracy rate 42.52 11.32 15.96 66.11 375
Infant malnutrition 42.81 10.91 16.20 65.70 375
Poverty Incidence 27.66 13.34 4.00 64.10 375
Road density 575.68 924.70 0.00 3541.00 375
Percentage without safe water 19.83 12.21 2.14 48.12 375
Kathmandu 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 375
Jan Sarkar 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 375
Development Region 2.91 1.51 1.00 5.00 375
Population (1,000s) 349.16 277.08 5.83 1688.13 375
Year 2011.00 1.42 2009.00 2013.00 375
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stand out because they were the only ones in which the Maoists created their own village-
and district-level governments during the conflict. This approach follows Hachhethu (2006),
Hutt (2004), Kiyoko (2008a, 2008b), Sudheer (2004) and Shneiderman and Turin (2004).
6.6 Results
We begin the analysis with descriptive statistics of the key variables. Figure 15 shows the
geographic distribution of, respectively, total aid per capita (a), political support for the
main parties (b), and political support for the Maoists both electorally (c) and in terms of
the number of people killed by the state during fights (d). A few patterns emerge. First,
the CPN(M), UML, and NC dominated the 2008 elections throughout much of the country.
In 61 of the 75 districts, more than 80 percent of representatives were provided by one of
the three parties. The 14 districts in which the vote share for the main parties remained
below 80 percent almost all were located in the country’s southern low lands, i.e. the Terai.
The political stronghold of the CPN(M) lies in Nepal’s Midwest region. This is where the
insurgency originated, and here the party dominated in the 2008 election. However, the
Maoists also garnered support in the Hill and Mountain areas of the Central region around
Kathmandu. These areas account for much of the unexpected overall electoral success of the
CPN(M). The comparison with our second measure of Maoist core support is instructive.
People dying in fights with the central government mainly were at home in the Midwestern
stronghold of the CPN(M), but also in the Mountain areas and Hill lands in the East.
Turning to aid allocations, per capita spending is highest in the high Mountain regions of
the Midwest and West, with some Hill and Mountain areas east of Kathmandu also receiving
much aid. Aid spending is somewhat lower in the Hill lands of the Midwest region, which
constitute the heartland of the Maoist insurgency, and clearly lowest throughout the Terai.
Visually inspecting these patterns provides a first indication that post-conflict aid al-
locations were targeting the very poorest areas of Nepal in the mountainous north-west,
suggesting a needs-based approach. However, there is some overlap with areas of political
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support for the CPN(M), and a clear lack of political support for the three main parties in
the Terai, accompanied by very low aid allocations to these lowland areas. This suggests
that not all of the distributive goals set out in the Interim Constitution were met during the
reconstruction.
Before drawing any firm conclusion, we need to rule out spurious correlations and there-
fore turn to multivariate analysis. All models were estimated using OLS and report panel-
corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz 1995). They all include a lagged dependent variable
to deal with serial correlation and year-dummies to soak up variation in overall aid com-
mitments. We start with a baseline specification that links a district’s reconstruction needs,
socio-economic conditions and geography to aid allocations (Table 6). If the political set-
tlement was successful in enfranchising disadvantaged population groups, we should expect
this model to do the main work in explaining aid allocations. To test this notion further, in
Tables 7 and 8 we add the variables that capture patronage involving the main parties and
their supporters, by including the electoral share variables for UML, NC, and CPN(M) and
their respective interactions. A successful end to spoils politics would mean that both voting
behavior per se and the interactions hold little explanatory power, and also don’t much affect
the associations revealed in the baseline model. Finally, in Table 9 we do the same with the
variable Other parties share, to explore how districts fare that provide little political support
for either side of the former warring factions. Again, if the peace process was successful in
enfranchising population groups beyond those aligned with the warring parties, this variable
should have little effect on aid allocations while leaving the baseline model intact.
Beginning with the baseline specification in Table 6, we first separately enter the vari-
ables meant to capture (1) reconstruction needs, (2) socio-economic needs, and (3) regional
effects. Somewhat surprisingly, model (1) provides no evidence that reconstruction needs as
measured by casualty numbers are related to aid allocations. Perhaps this lack of associa-
tion is owed to the nature of fighting in remote and underdeveloped areas, which did not
result in large-scale infrastructure damage. Of the socio-economic variables, we find infant
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malnutrition and poverty incidence are significant predictors of aid allocations. Likewise,
infrastructure needs as measured by a lower road density are associated with higher aid
allocations. Of the region dummies, the Kathmandu valley receives substantively more aid
than other districts, more than 1.6 standard deviations, despite controlling for population
size, and with the full set of controls in model (4). Likewise, districts that were hosts to
self-governing Maoist Jan Sarkar entities robustly receive less per capita aid. A weak neg-
ative effect for the Eastern Development Region disappears with all controls. Finally, more
populous districts receive less aid per capita than more sparsely settled districts. This sug-
gests a bias in aid allocations towards low density and potentially politically overrepresented
districts.
In equation (4) all variables are entered simultaneously. Socio-economic needs continue
as important drivers of aid allocations. However, effect sizes are somewhat attenuated,
and infant malnutrition loses statistical significance.70 In addition, there is now a negative
relationship between the total casualties from the civil war and aid allocation. Still, equation
(4) paints a carefully optimistic picture of aid allocations driven by objective social and
economic needs. Except for Kathmandu there appears to be no preferences for specific
regions or districts that were particularly hard hit by fighting. Substantive effects of socio-
economic variables are considerable. For example, for the share of people in a district living
below the poverty line, moving from the mean (27.7 percent) up one standard-deviation
(plus 13.3 percent), aid per capita allocations increase on average by 20 US Dollars. This
increase represents 76 percent of the average per capita aid allocations for each district (26.30
Dollars).
70There appears to be a negative relationship between lacking access to safe water and aid allocations,
but this is only weakly statistically significant.
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Table 6: OLS – Aid Allocation as function of reconstruction needs and socioeconomic needs, 2008-2013 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita
Adult illiteracy rate -1.217 -0.526
(0.892) (0.779)
Infant malnutrition 1.321** 0.684
(0.596) (0.514)
Poverty Incidence 2.092*** 1.502**
(0.783) (0.712)
Road density -0.015** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006)
Percentage without safe water -0.450 -0.815*
(0.595) (0.473)
Civilian casualties 437.745 41.610
(358.697) (114.053)




Jan Sarkar -26.340** -11.024**
(11.383) (4.532)
Eastern Development Region -8.939* -6.579
(5.239) (10.675)
Far Western Development Region 0.286 -4.987
(11.038) (30.929)
Mid Western Development Region 14.997 25.970
(14.601) (23.952)
Western Development Region 8.032 5.189**
(11.597) (2.112)
Population (1,000s) -0.095*** -0.078***
(0.036) (0.026)
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Constant 17.297 -16.233 65.781** 37.258
(14.946) (28.023) (27.076) (28.969)
Observations 375 375 375 375
R-squared 0.070 0.174 0.158 0.214
Number of ID 75 75 75 75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Next we look at the evidence for spoils politics. Table 7 adds the electoral share variables
for the Maoists, UML and NC to the previous specification, as well as the dummy for whether
the Maoists controlled the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (PR), Table 8 repeats this
exercise for UML control of the PR ministry. All models continue to have year intercepts
and the regional dummy variables. Coefficients are not reported for space reasons. In the
different models we interact the Maoist PR variable with the vote shares of the different
parties, to identify whether aid allocations were sensitive to variations in political support
for the CPN(M). If spoils politics did not play a role, we would expect that adding these
partisan variables to the base model does not reveal much additional information, as voting
patterns and office holding should have no great influence on aid allocations.
Beginning with model (1) we see that this is not the case and voting patterns matter.
Districts that voted more heavily for the Maoists received on average more aid than other
districts. There are also positive relationships for the UML and NC electoral shares, but
both are estimated with more uncertainty. To disentangle which party reacted to electoral
incentives and how, we first interact the Maoist PR variable separately with the vote shares
of the three main parties (models 2-4). Model 2 reveals a surprising pattern. More voting
for the Maoists is associated with higher aid allocations, but only if the CPN(M) itself is
not in control of the Peace and Reconstruction ministry. With the CPN(M) in power, the
marginal effect of adding to the Maoist electoral share can’t be distinguished from zero71.
Checking for the other parties, aid allocations are not sensitive to the UML electoral share
when the Maoists hold power (model 3). Model 4 shows a negative relationship between aid
allocations and voting for the Nepali Congress when the Maoists do not hold power. But
as in model 2, with the Maoists in charge this negative effect washes out72. Together, these
three models provide solid evidence that aid allocations under CPN(M) leadership of the
Peace and Reconstruction ministry did not favor the voters of any of the three main parties.




the exercise from the previous three models, with the same outcome. Main parties share is
only associated with higher aid allocations when the Maoists do not hold power.
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Table 7: OLS – Aid Allocation as function of voter support for main parties, Maoist PR, 2008-2013 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita
Maoist PR 7.173 -12.634** -17.265*** 27.557***
(6.442) (5.881) (4.185) (3.364)
Maoist electoral share 29.624** 36.489***
(11.735) (7.864)
Maoist PR*Maoist share -33.366***
(11.947)
Civilian casualties 65.428 47.278 50.913 51.721 48.612
(121.956) (113.510) (132.733) (114.975) (111.010)
Total casualties -139.257*** -132.636** -104.446** -118.736*** -117.042**
(52.755) (55.676) (40.694) (45.089) (46.330)
Adult illiteracy rate -0.364 -0.452 -0.518 -0.521 -0.346
(0.743) (0.762) (0.764) (0.775) (0.748)
Infant malnutrition 0.808 0.866 0.664 0.738 0.700
(0.562) (0.584) (0.507) (0.531) (0.519)
Poverty Incidence 1.472** 1.467** 1.504** 1.461** 1.509**
(0.693) (0.687) (0.710) (0.692) (0.711)
Road density -0.009 -0.010 -0.011* -0.010* -0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Percentage without safe water -0.829* -0.757* -0.828* -0.807* -0.845*
(0.466) (0.449) (0.483) (0.468) (0.483)
Population (1,000s) -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.068***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022)
UML electoral share 23.481* 2.721
(14.058) (20.233)
NC electoral share 7.815 -39.672***
(7.495) (10.559)
Maoist PR*UML share 1.325
(24.210)
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Maoist PR*NC share 33.142*
(18.172)
Main parties share 49.103***
(5.848)
Maoist PR*ALL share -45.558***
(5.686)
Constant 4.810 16.943 49.985* 54.591* -2.353
(27.773) (25.978) (26.212) (27.861) (23.291)
Observations 375 375 375 375 375
R-squared 0.224 0.229 0.214 0.222 0.225
Number of ID 75 75 75 75 75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Despite these encouraging findings, the results in Table 7 also reveal that electoral shares
do matter for aid allocations in the three years in which the Ministry for Peace and Re-
construction was not in Maoist hands. To confirm this notion, Table 8 repeats the exercise
with the UML in charge of the ministry. Interestingly, like the CPN(M), the UML does
not privilege its own supporters when holding power (model 1). But under its leadership
aid allocations are higher in districts that voted Maoist (model 2), and they increase even
more when looking at the vote share for the three main parties combined (model 4). To
get some sense of the size of this effect, for a one standard deviation increase in the main
parties electoral share (a plus of 24.5 percentage points), per capita aid allocations increase
by 11.20 dollars (relative to a mean of 36.30 dollars). At the same time, under UML lead-
ership, districts supporting the Nepali Congress see lower aid allocations (model 3), though
the substantive effect is modest (a drop of 4.80 dollars for a one standard deviation or 30
percentage point increase in electoral share).
Overall the models in Tables 7 and 8 provide mixed evidence for the role of partisanship
in post-conflict aid allocations. Neither the Maoists nor the UML appear to privilege their
own voters when holding the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. This is a strong indica-
tor that spoils politics did not have an influence on reconstruction aid after the 2008 election.
However, aid allocations appear to be sensitive to voting with the UML in charge of the min-
istry, but not in the sense usually associated with spoils politics. Instead, the UML appears
to positively support CPN(M) voting areas. It is possible that this constituted a reaction to
the unexpected electoral success of the Maoists, in an attempt to win back support, though
we find little evidence of this in contemporary published records. Overall, it appears that
the peace settlement was relatively successful in helping to overcome conventional forms
of spoils politics where parties directly cater to their own supporters (hypothesis 1). We
next turn to the issue of marginalized groups that were not party to the conflict. In line
with hypothesis 2, if the peace agreement was successful, we should not observe systematic
discrimination against these groups, with aid being allocated according to socio-economic
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need. As discussed above, we use the electoral share for parties other than the major three
(CPN(M), UML, NC) as indicative of lacking alignment with either the Maoist cause or the
government during the civil war, as marginalized areas closely track with poor voting results
for these parties. As a result, the empirical approach is complementary to the analysis of
partisan patterns above.
115
Table 8: OLS – Aid Allocation as a function of voter support for main parties, UML PR, 2008-2013 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita
UML PR 12.634** -7.173 17.265*** -27.557***
(5.881) (6.442) (4.185) (3.364)
UML electoral share 4.045
(17.381)
UML PR*UML share -1.325
(24.210)
Civilian casualties 50.913 47.278 51.721 48.612
(132.733) (113.510) (114.975) (111.010)
Total casualties -104.446** -132.636** -118.736*** -117.042**
(40.694) (55.676) (45.089) (46.330)
Adult illiteracy rate -0.518 -0.452 -0.521 -0.346
(0.764) (0.762) (0.775) (0.748)
Infant malnutrition 0.664 0.866 0.738 0.700
(0.507) (0.584) (0.531) (0.519)
Poverty Incidence 1.504** 1.467** 1.461** 1.509**
(0.710) (0.687) (0.692) (0.711)
Road density -0.011* -0.010 -0.010* -0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Percentage without safe water -0.828* -0.757* -0.807* -0.845*
(0.483) (0.449) (0.468) (0.483)
Population (1,000s) -0.078*** -0.070*** -0.080*** -0.068***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022)
Maoist electoral share 3.123
(11.171)
UML PR*Maoist share 33.366***
(11.947)
NC electoral share -6.530
(17.182)
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – continued from previous page
UML PR*NC share -33.142*
(18.172)
Main parties share 3.545
(9.585)
UML PR*ALL share 45.558***
(5.686)
Constant 37.351 24.116 37.325 25.203
(29.877) (24.791) (29.791) (22.775)
Observations 375 375 375 375
R-squared 0.214 0.229 0.222 0.225
Number of ID 75 75 75 75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Table 9 we present some of the previous models, recoded in a way that emphasizes the
effect of lower electoral support for the main parties. Model 1 shows that voting for other parties
is strongly associated with lower aid allocations. Models 2 and 3 report substantively the same
information as model 5, Table 7 and model 4, Table 8, but with the Main parties share variable
recoded as Other parties share. We can see that under the Maoists aid allocations do not differ in
districts that support other parties (model 2), while under UML leadership voting for other parties is
associated with lower aid allocations (model 3). These patterns raise the question about the source
of the UML’s animosity towards areas that did not vote for major parties. One of the contentious
issues in post-conflict Nepal is how the new federal system, which was introduced as part of the
peace agreement, maps onto population cleavages. While the Maoists supported drawing district
boundaries along ethnic lines, both NC and UML opposed such districts on grounds of promoting
particularism (Strasheim Bogati 2016). The most prominent dispute in concrete terms concerns
the relative autonomy awarded to majority Hindu population groups in the Terai, which continue
to be deemed by some Nepalese elites to be too closely aligned to India73.
73According to Nayak (2011) and Miklian (2009) the Pahadis – people from the hill region – and political
elites in Kathmandu believe that India has been supporting the ‘One Madhes One Pradesh’ demand and
that it aims to balkanise Nepal leveraging on the Madhesi.
118
Table 9: Aid Allocation as function of support for main parties involved in peace agreement, only 2008-2013 observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita Aid Per Capita
UML PR 18.001*** 20.092***
(4.274) (4.555)
Other parties share -25.147*** -49.103*** -3.545 -7.486
(9.295) (5.848) (9.585) (26.946)






Terai*Other parties share 3.298
(35.634)
Maoist PR*Terai*Other parties share 28.409**
(13.842)
Civilian casualties 48.612 48.612 140.667
(111.010) (111.010) (90.562)
Total casualties -112.614** -117.042** -117.042** -133.805**
(54.393) (46.330) (46.330) (51.972)
Adult illiteracy rate -0.354 -0.346 -0.346 -0.259
(0.751) (0.748) (0.748) (1.060)
Infant malnutrition 0.710 0.700 0.700 0.711
(0.516) (0.519) (0.519) (0.512)
Poverty Incidence 1.518** 1.509** 1.509** 1.486**
(0.696) (0.711) (0.711) (0.723)
Road density -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Percentage without safe water -0.842* -0.845* -0.845* -1.068**
(0.490) (0.483) (0.483) (0.478)
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
Population (1,000s) -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.058**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Peace Reconstruction Ministry = 1, -18.001***
(4.274)
Maoist PR*Other parties share 45.558***
(5.686)
Constant 31.503 46.750* 28.749 27.945
(28.313) (26.502) (28.910) (42.690)
Observations 375 375 375 375
R-squared 0.218 0.225 0.225 0.228
Number of ID 75 75 75 75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As we have seen in the descriptive statistics, non-support for the main parties geographically
maps well onto the Terai region. This raises the important question whether aid allocations under
the UML are influenced primarily by electoral considerations or are driven by more fundamental
ethnic antagonism. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain reliable data on ethnic composition
broken down by district. Instead, in model 4 we include an indicator variable for all districts that
geographically belong to the lower Terai region. To parse the source of lower aid allocations, we add
interactions of the Terai variable with the UML PR dummy, and the other parties electoral share
variable, as well as a three-way interaction of the Terai variable, the UML PR dummy, and the
electoral share variable. This allows us to evaluate whether aid allocations under UML control of
the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction are a function of voting behavior or reflect discrimination
against the Terai region. Model 4 in Table 9 reports the results. To help with interpretation we
consider the following quantities of interest (Table 10): The marginal effect of having the UML
in power a) with no support for other parties & outside the Terai region; b) with full support
for other parties, outside the Terai region; c) with no support for other parties, in the Terai, d)
with full support for other parties, in the Terai. We are interested in comparing the influence that
voting behavior has on aid allocations under UML leadership inside and outside the Terai, i.e. the
difference in marginal effects between scenarios a) and b), and c) and d). Both inside and outside
the Terai aid allocations drop when the UML holds power in reaction to voting for other parties.
However, this drop is considerably smaller inside the Terai. Whereas outside the Terai moving from
zero to 100 percent electoral share incurs a penalty of 47.62 dollars per capita, inside the Terai
this decrease is only 19.21 dollars. Clearly, electoral behavior plays a larger role for aid allocations
under UML leadership outside the Terai.
How does the effect of voting behavior compare to any animus displayed towards the Terai region
when setting voting aside? The answer is not straightforward. If the major parties have full electoral
support (scenarios a) and c)), districts in the Terai are worse off under the UML, with on average
19.93 dollars per capita less in aid. However, when fully supporting other parties (scenarios b) and
d)), districts in the Terai come out ahead, with 8.48 dollars more in aid per capita than districts
outside. Overall then, there is evidence that with the UML in charge of the Ministry of Peace and
Reconstruction there is a penalty for voting for other parties, and likewise for districts in the Terai,
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Table 10: Comparison of marginal effects of UML PR.
x1 = voteshareotherparties;x2 = Terai
Scenario Effect of UML PR Differences
a) x1 = 0;x2 = 0 20.09***
b) x1 = 1;x2 = 0 20.09-47.62= -27.53*** b)-a)=-47.62
c) x1 = 0;x2 = 1 20.09-19.93=0.16 c)-a)=-19.93
d) x1 = 1;x2 = 1 20.09-47.62-19.93+28.41= -19.05***
d)-c)=-19.21
d)-b)=8.48
*** p≤ 0.01, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗p ≤ 0.1
but the later heavily depends on voting behavior. This is because the two conditioning factors
move in opposite directions. Where other parties are strong in the Terai there is less disadvantage
in aid allocations than where they are weak. In fact, aid allocations to a district in the Terai that
elects 100 percent representatives from other parties are statistically indistinguishable under the
UML and the CNP(M) (scenario c). To sum up, there is a clear association between a lack of major
party support and lower aid allocations during the reconstruction phase, contradicting hypothesis
2. Before interpreting this as unequivocal failing of the peace agreement, it is important to point
out that the substantive shortfalls in aid to marginalized districts is only occurring in the two
years under which the UML held the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. This is in line with
the UML as a party that supports a Kathmandu-centered view of the Nepalese polity. Even then,
when looking at the Terai as region that hosts the most visible ethnic cleavage in Nepali politics,
aid shortfalls occur under the UML, but only in districts that provide relatively high support to
the major parties. Where other parties are strong, there is no aid penalty under UML leadership.
As the political gains of parties supporting the Madhesi in the Terai came at the expense of the
UML, NC and CPN(M) (Miklian 2009), this suggests that the UML is sensitive to grievances in
the region when they find open political expression, and a more neglectful approach is taken where
political support for the main parties is taken for granted. On balance though, we have to reject
hypothesis 2. The political settlement after the civil war was precisely meant to take politics out
of the question of distributional fairness in Nepali politics. The role of the UML in skewing aid
allocations during the reconstruction period suggests that this was not achieved. This squares
with the political discussions about the future shape of the Nepalese federalism, which were only
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resolved after the 2015 earthquake in the Second Constituent Assembly. Future work will need to
show whether this final settlement was more successful in bridging the social divides that were still
visible during the reconstruction period.
6.7 Conclusions
This paper explores the important role of political capture of foreign aid for successful reconstruction
in post-conflict societies. We focus on Nepal to explore to what extent power sharing enshrined
in the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2007 Interim Constitution insulated aid
allocations from partisan influence. We theorize that areas that supported the former warring
factions were rewarded with more aid than areas where people did not join the fight, and we find
statistical evidence to this effect. Importantly, we are able to show that with the UML in control
of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, districts that support neither of the main parties in
the 2008 elections received substantially less foreign aid, after controlling for human development
indicators and other factors associated with the need for aid funding. While this only indirectly
maps onto past conflict behavior, the possibility that active conflict participation is a prerequisite for
adequate political presentation and leverage during peace negotiations has troubling implications
for the incentives of nonaligned groups in multi-group or multi-ethnic conflicts. If staying on the
side lines does not pay, escalation might be difficult to prevent. Outside mediators need to take
lessons about the role of nonaligned groups seriously. More research is needed to establish the
relevance of this link in different conflict scenarios.
On the positive side, we could not find evidence of traditional spoils politics, where the party
in power channels aid towards its own supporters. This has encouraging implications for the ef-
fectiveness of powersharing in Nepal. Political capture of aid flows in post-conflict situations has
the potential to undermine the donor community’s policy response, and entrench distributional
inequalities that can feed into political unrest in the future. Developing a better theoretical un-
derstanding of the political economy of aid allocation processes in post-conflict environments is an
important first step. Also needed is more fine-grained empirical analysis of sub-national processes.
The increasing availability of geo-coded data of aid flows, political entities, and political alignments




7 Chapter 4 - Rebuilding energy infrastructures in post-
conflict countries: assessing the impact on the man-
ufacturing sector
7.1 Abstract
Conflicts severely depress the manufacturing sector of affected countries and jeopardize its recov-
ery once peace is re-established. Yet, I claim that donors’ commitment to restore and develop
infrastructures to generate, distribute, store and manage energy may boost an upswing of the
manufacturing sector in post-conflict settings. This is because, first, as opposed to conventional
developmental aid, post-conflict aid is proven to be unusually productive and unlikely to trigger the
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Second, because restoring and enhancing energy infrastruc-
tures is expected to increase the return on investments in the manufacturing sector. In this sense,
I expect donors’ commitments targeting energy infrastructures to encourage investments in the
manufacturing sector and thus support its growth in the post-conflict period. To test my hypoth-
esis, I resort to a cross-section time-series two stages least squares multivariate analysis covering
45 post-conflict countries between 1970 and 2013. I find that donors’ commitment to rebuild and
enhance energy infrastructures in post-conflict countries has positive effects on the manufacturing
sector of recipient countries both in the short and in the medium term. Results are robust to
different specifications of the model and do not depend on the chosen length of the post-conflict
period. These findings contribute both to shed more light on the impact of foreign aid in fragile and
post-conflict countries, and to the literature investigating the impact of electrification in developing
economies.
7.2 Introduction
In 1988 Haughton stated that “current knowledge about how to approach the redevelopment of
war-torn economies is a mile wide and an inch deep” (Haughton, 1988, p.5). Since then, scholars
and practitioners furthered our knowledge regarding how to sustain post-conflict economies. In
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this paper, I investigate if and to what extent post-conflict foreign aid targeting infrastructures to
generate, distribute, store and manage energy – from now on energy infrastructures - contributes
to restoring the manufacturing sector of recipient economies. So far, literature investigating the
impact of post-conflict aid focused mostly on aggregate economic performances such as GDP growth
rather than on the effects on specific sectors. This paper addresses this shortcoming to provide
donors and policymakers with information to plan, understand and assess effective interventions to
restore post-conflict economies.
The literature agrees on the negative impact of instability and conflicts on affected countries
as they damage the human, social, financial and physical capital and weaken the central state
(Collier, 1999; Maxwell and Reuveny, 2000; Teodosijevic, 2003; Robinson et al. 2006; Anand, 2009;
Collier 2010; Mitchell and Thies, 2012; Collier and Duponchel, 2013). Notably, conflicts are likely
to increase countries’ dependency on natural resources revenues as they severely affect the output
of the manufacturing and cropping sectors while they intensify the exploitation of natural resources
(Chauvin and Rohner, 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). Warring factions do not have the
incentive to completely destroy the natural resources extraction plants present in the country as
such plants increase the expected value of victory and represent a valuable source of revenues
to fund the fights74. In turn, the collapse of social and political stability has a strong negative
impact on labour-intensive, institutional/transaction-intensive and export-dependent sectors - as
the manufacturing one (Chauvin and Rohner, 2009). What is worst is that exactly those sectors
most affected by the conflict may be unable to recover to pre-war levels and restart to grow once
that peace is recovered. Indeed, countries with torn societies and unstable leaders – as post-conflict
ones - are likely to experience over-extraction of natural resources that in turn can trigger the so-
called Dutch disease and further depress the production of tradable goods (Corden and Neary,1982;
Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986; Javaid and Riazuddin 2009; Collier, 2010).
Yet, donors’ commitment to rebuild energy infrastructures may reverse this scenario. Indeed,
despite aid flows may lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate further depressing the
manufacturing sector of recipient countries (Michaely, 1981; Van Wijnbergen, 1986; Rajan and
74In the words of Lujala (2010, p.23) “for the rebels, the effort and investment in fighting may be justified
by the chance of winning control over resources located in the area the rebels originate from.”
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Subramanian, 2011), I claim that foreign aid targeting energy infrastructures in post-conflict coun-
tries positively affects the manufacturing sector. This is because, first, post-conflict aid tends to
be unusually productive and does not lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2002; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). Second, as rebuilding power plants and energy supply
networks increases manufacturing firms’ productivity and expected profits, donors’ commitment to
restoring energy infrastructures encourages investments in the manufacturing sector. For example,
lower production costs due to electrification may incentivize entrepreneurs to reinvest in their activ-
ity as better technology becomes affordable and overcoming financial constraints to access the vital
export market becomes possible (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2011; Askenazy et al. 2015; Krasniqi
and Mustafa, 2016).
There are several reasons to focus on the impact of aid on the manufacturing sector of post-
conflict countries. First, economies with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector and relying on
the extraction of natural resources tend to suffer from reduced economic growth, limited political
liberties and meagre domestic as well as foreign investments (Gylfason, 2006; Collier and Goderis,
2008; Mavrotas et al., 2011). Moreover, the development process is more at risk when economic
diversification is limited (OECD and WTO, 2019). It follows that, as negative economic shocks and
economic grievances increase the risk of conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004),
studying the effects of aid on the economy’s productive sectors contributes indirectly to under-
standing how to promote and sustain peace. At the same time, as the structure of the economy
influences the extent to which governments can extract and allocate resources discretionally, in-
vestigating how to encourage and strengthen productive rather than extractive sectors contributes
to understanding how to promote more accountable post-conflict governments. Second, as donors’
resources are limited, it is important to know how they affect recipient countries to best allocate
them. This latter issue may become more relevant in the narrow future if the economic conse-
quences of the unfolding COVID-19 crisis are as severe as expected. Finally, it is relevant to focus
on post-conflict countries as post-conflict development differs substantially from development in
more traditional environments. If on one hand foreign aid tends to be very productive (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2002), on the other hand, the vulnerability of post-conflict countries increases the risk of
severe consequences in case of wrong policies.
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To test my hypothesis, I resort to a cross-section time-series two stages least squares multivariate
analysis covering 45 post-conflict countries between 1970 and 2013. I find that aid targeting energy
infrastructures increases the value added of the manufacturing sector as a share of the recipient
country’s GDP in the short and the medium term. Results are robust to different specifications of
the model and do not depend on the chosen length of the post-conflict period.
These findings make different contributions to existing literature. First, they suggest that
donors’ decisions regarding what type of aid to allocate do affect the structure of post-conflict
economies. This implies that donors’ commitments play a fundamental role in creating the pre-
conditions for long-lasting stable and diversified economic growth. Second, they advance current
knowledge regarding the impact of investments in energy infrastructures in fragile developing coun-
tries.
The paper develops as follows. First, I describe the impact of conflicts on the economies of
affected countries. Second, I discuss the role that foreign aid and energy infrastructures play in post-
conflict countries and formalize my hypothesis. Then, I present methods, results and conclusion.
Appendix concludes the chapter.
7.3 War and peace: the impact of conflicts on the economy
Notwithstanding conflicts may be a very lucrative business for some, unsurprisingly they generally
devastate the economies of affected countries75. Conflicts disrupt the exchange of information and
make entry into the activity more difficult (Collier, 2000). Additionally, they increase transaction
costs, reduce public expenditure’s efficiency diverting it from output-enhancing activities, decrease
savings and reduce human, social, financial and physical capital (Collier, 1999). Moreover, because
of the nature and the location of fights, civil wars tend to weaken the state, reduce the growth rate
of resources, and divert labour from normal productive activities to conflict ones (Collier, 1995;
1999; Maxwell and Reuveny, 2000).
Yet, the impact of conflict varies across different economic sectors. Notably, while the decline
75Collier (1999) estimates that civil wars reduce the economy as a whole by around 2.2% per year respect
to its path and Teodosijevic (2003) reports that agricultural production falls by about 1.5% per year in
periods of conflict. Recalling Brauer (2000), Mitchell and Thies (2012; pp.224-225) remind that “the use
of war machinery, such as heavy tanks, ammunition, and mines, also damages the soil, leading to erosion,
compaction, loss of forage and shrubs”.
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of socio-political stability is likely to severely damage the manufacturing sector, the resource sector
is likely to suffer less from conflict because of its limited linkages with the rest of the economy and
inability to relocate (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Mitchell and Thies, 2012). In this sense,
the Syrian case is exemplar. Notwithstanding the disastrous war that paralyzed the economic
activities of the country, Syrian oil extraction proceeded, albeit at lower rates, under the control of
the government, the ISIS and the Kurds insurgents (Almohamad and Dittmann, 2016). Similarly,
the Second Congo War did not stop coltan and diamond mining activities carried by the government,
the Rwandese Patriotic Army, and the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (Asiimwe, 2004). In turn,
labour-intensive, institutional/transaction-intensive and export-dependent activities as cropping or
manufacturing are among the most negatively affected (Stewart et al., 1997; Chauvin and Rohner,
2009). This is because conflicts wreck institutions and reduce time-horizons, the supply of skilled
workers and access to foreign markets. As a result, complex contracting, investments, and access
to specific productive factors become impossible so that despite some firms may adapt to the war
economy and survive, their productive capacity is significantly reduced (McDougal, 2010; Collier
and Duponchel, 2013).
Additionally, there is the risk that natural resource dependence may become a chronic disease
in the post-conflict setting further depressing the manufacturing sector. If the peace onset is not
followed by a sense of security and low-intensity fights persists, the social capital might not recover
and the depreciation rate of capital might not return to pre-war levels thus disincentivising agents
from bringing back assets (Collier, 1995). This is likely to discourage investments exactly in those
sectors that are not as linked to the territory as natural resources extraction e.g the manufacturing
sector.
Further, the economy may recover only gradually from some of the effects of the disruption
caused by the conflict and public expenditure on productive activities may not return to its pre-
war levels (Collier, 1999). This is because the financial effort required by the conflict limits post-war
spending while post-conflict governments’ reluctance to drop military expenditure keeps diverting
public resources toward the military sector (Collier, 1999). In this scenario, the government is
unlikely to be able – or willing - to provide an adequate environment for firms that might thus
face higher production costs and lower productivity than during the pre-conflict period. In these
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conditions, it is difficult to expect the sectors that the conflict depressed the most to recover.
In turn, in post-conflict settings, the extraction of natural resources is likely to rise. If the war
left a country with a torn society and an unstable leader, the faction in power has the incentive
to increase the extraction of natural resources as much as possible to convert such wealth in assets
under its control (Collier, 2010). Likewise, to reduce the risk of a new conflict outbreak, leaders can
increase the extraction of resources to buy off potential opponents (Fjelde, 2009). In particular, if
post-conflict rulers face a short time-horizon - as in the case of transitional cabinets for example
- they have the incentive to over-extract natural resources since they value the future stock of
resources only if they can retain the office (Robinson et al. 2006). These considerations matter
as increasing the extraction of natural resources might trigger the so-called Dutch disease and
further push deindustrialization in the post-conflict period (Corden and Neary,1982; Neary and
Van Wijnbergen, 1986; Javaid and Riazuddin 2009).
7.4 What then must we do? The role of energy infrastructural
post-conflict aid
Despite conflicts may deal a heavy blow to the manufacturing sector, I argue that donors’ com-
mitment to restore and enhance energy infrastructures can revamp the manufacturing sector of
post-conflict countries. This is because post-conflict aid differs from more conventional develop-
mental finance and investments in energy infrastructures are particularly effective in supporting
the manufacturing sector.
Post-conflict aid differs from conventional developmental aid because of the specificity of the
environment where it is allocated. While the purpose of the latter is to supplement domestic sav-
ings and reduce poverty, the former aims to protect displaced people and reconstruct the country
(Demekas, 2002). Notably, because in post-conflict environments the need to restore infrastruc-
tures is combined with the collapse of domestic revenues, reconstruction aid is likely to be more
productive than conventional aid (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Finally, as post-conflict aid eases
supply and supports the tradable sector productivity, it does not increase the real exchange rate
(Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 2007). This means that post-conflict aid is less likely to trigger the so-called
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Dutch disease and hinder the manufacturing sector of recipient countries as Michaely (1981), Van
Wijnbergen (1986), Rajan and Subramanian (2011) suggest.
At the same time, under the assumption that production factors are gross complements, im-
proving energy infrastructures raises the productivity of labour and the stock of private capital.
Moreover, it decreases the depreciation rate of capital as electrical equipment last longer, enfran-
chises firms from onerous energy back-up systems and reduces adjustment and entry costs that may
prevent firms from responding to shocks. In doing so, energy infrastructures raise the expected rate
of return on capital in the private sector which is a determinant factor of growth especially for small
firms (Kessides, 1993; Hulten et al., 2006; Agénor and Blanca, 2006; Cook 2011; Kassem, 2018).
Not surprisingly, Escribano et al. (2010) underline that in developing countries poor electric-
ity provision has a major negative effect on the total factor productivity. For example, in 1998
Nigeria where electric power accounted for 4.5% of the manufacturing sector’s variable costs, power
outages cost firms an average of 792 working hours while in Pakistan the direct costs of energy
load shedding resulted in a 4.2% reduction in the volume of manufactured exports (Lee and Anas,
1992; Adenikinju, 2005). Conversely, there are several examples from countries where electrifica-
tion increased the profitability of the manufacturing sector. In the canton of San Carlos in Costa
Rica energy infrastructures supported the growth of food manufacturing firms, in China promoted
manufacturing and repair capability into the countryside, while in Norway triggered the indus-
trialization process in the first decades of the twentieth century (Timmer, 1976; Goddard, 1982;
Venneslan, 2009). Likewise, the reduction of the cost of energy in India increased the productivity
of the manufacturing sector lowering the cost of materials and inputs (Elhance and Lakshamanan,
1988; Goel, 2003) while in Java electrification rose the output and the turnover of firms (Kassem,
2018).
Finally, it is important to recall two final notions that explain why donors’ commitments to
restore energy infrastructures is expected to have a determinant positive impact on the manufac-
turing sector of post-conflict countries. First, assuming decreasing marginal returns of investments
in infrastructures, we can presume the positive impact of donor’s commitment to be terrifically sub-
stantial where power plants and power grids are absent or damaged as in post-conflict scenarios.
Second, donors’ support may be the only way to restore and enhance energy infrastructures in the
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aftermath of conflicts. Indeed, after the peace onset, neither the local private sector nor the public
one may have the willingness and the capacity to invest in energy infrastructures. These infras-
tructures are generally unattractive for the private sector as the owner may not internalize in the
pricing structure the externalities that the infrastructure generates. At the same time, post-conflict
governments may not be able or willing to undertake time-consuming and costly investments in a
scenario where unexploded ordnance represent a serious hazard, the government’s budget is limited
and country leaders have incentives to keep diverting public resources toward the military sector
(Collier, 1999; MacDonald, 2005; Anand, 2009). In fact, despite private investments in the genera-
tion of electricity and its distribution start to emerge about three years after the conflict, they are
virtually absent for five years after the pace onset (Schwartz and Bannon, 2004; Schwartz, 2006).
In sum, I expect donors’ commitment to restore and enhance energy infrastructures in post-
conflict countries to support the recovery of the manufacturing sector. This is because, post-conflict
aid targeting energy infrastructures is unlikely to trigger the appreciation of the real exchange
rate while it is expected to increase productivity, profits and the return on investments in the
manufacturing sector. In this sense, aid targeting energy infrastructures encourages investments in
the manufacturing sector supporting its growth. Notably, the relevance of donors’ commitments lies
in the fact that they may be the only source of investments in energy infrastructures in post-conflict
scenarios where such investments are most needed and productive.
More formally:
Hypothesis 5: Post-conflict commitments to restore energy infrastructures increase the value
added of the manufacturing sector as a percentage of the GDP.
7.5 Methods
To test the hypothesis, I have compiled a dataset covering 46 countries that experienced at least
one episode of internal conflict between 1970 and 201376. The country-year is the unit of analysis.
Following the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz, 2010), I consider a conflict year as
one where at least 25 battle-related deaths occurred. By this definition, my dataset includes both
76The limitation to 2013 is due to data coverage on donors’ commitments.
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periods following civil wars and shorter conflict episodes as coups. Yet, this does not affect my
analysis as both events – despite with different intensity – contribute to depressing the manufac-
turing sector via the discussed mechanisms. The post-conflict period starts the year following a
peace onset as coded in the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset and ends in case of same conflict
recurrence or new conflict outbreak. As a country may have experienced more than one conflict,
it follows that the dataset includes both post-conflict periods. In case a country experienced more
than one conflict simultaneously, the post-conflict period starts when the last of the simultaneous
conflicts ended. Table 11A and Table 12A in the appendix present the descriptive statistics of the
sample used for the main analysis and the list of included countries with the respective number of
observations.
A limitation of this approach consists in the fact that the panel of post-conflict countries in-
cludes developed and/or large countries that experienced the end of sporadic, peripheric and/or
geographically limited episodes of violence. Some examples are the United Kingdom in the after-
math of the Good Friday Agreement or China in the aftermath of the suppression of the 2008
Tibetan unrest. To address this issue, as a robustness check, I run my analysis one more time
excluding observations from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. Results
are not significantly different from the main analysis and Table 13A in the appendix fully presents
them.
There is not a unique definition that states for how long a society should be considered a post-
conflict one. Indeed, some processes show their results only in the long term, and it could take
generations for a country to recover from a severe conflict (Brown et al., 2011). For this reason, I
test the model using seven different timeframes between 4 and 10 years. For the sake of brevity,
I discuss the results relative only to the 7-year timeframe. Tables 14A and 15A in the appendix
fully present the results relative to the other timeframes.
To test the relation between donors’ commitments to rebuild and enhance energy infrastructures
and the manufacturing sector value added I resort to a two stages least squares time-series cross-
section multivariate analysis. The following equation describes the second-stage equation:
ManuV At+1,j = β0 + β1Aidt,j + +β2Xt,j + β3θj + εt,j (5)
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My dependent variable ManuVA measures the value added from the manufacturing sector as
a percentage of the GDP. The data source is the World Bank Open Dataset77 according to which
“ manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Value added is the net
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of
natural resources”78. My independent variable is the total amount of commitments targeting energy
production and supply per capita. To create this variable, I rely on the AidData Core Release
dataset and coding scheme (Tierney et al., 2011) for donors’ commitments and to the V-Dem
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2019) for population estimates. Following the AidData coding scheme, I
include as commitments’ targeting energy infrastructures those allocated to energy generation and
supply; energy policy and administrative management; power generation; electrical transmission;
gas distribution; petroleum distribution and storage; and energy education.
Data on commitments are likely to be lumpy and the records of donors’ commitments in recipient
countries’ national budget may not reflect the progress of disbursements. To address these issues,
I code the variable Aid as a moving average. In each post-conflict year t Aid assumes the average
value of donors’ commitments in the previous four years except that in the first, second and third
year. In these years, the value of Aid corresponds to the average value of donors’ commitments in
previous post-conflict years excluding conflict years preceding the peace onset. In other words, in
the first post-conflict year, the value of Aid is the amount of aid committed in that year. In the
second post-conflict year, the value of Aid is the average amount of commitments in the first two
post-conflict years. Eventually, in the third year, the value of the variable Aid is the average of












4 p > 3
(6)
Where p = p-th year since the peace onset.
Yet, it may take years for donors’ commitments targeting energy infrastructures to benefit the
manufacturing sector. This is because, first, donors must commit funds, then disburse them, sub-
sequently, projects have to be implemented and eventually firms have to adapt to them. Moreover,
restoration and enhancement of the energy infrastructures of post-conflict countries is likely to
have long-lasting effects. To consider these additional temporal dimensions, I forward my depen-
dent variable of one period. As an additional robustness check, I run my main model four more
times forwarding my dependent variable of two, three, four and five periods. Table 16A in the
appendix presents the results from these four additional models.
As control variables, I include the number of years of conflict the country experienced before
the peace onset; the number of years since the peace onset along with its squared and cubic term;
three dummy variables accounting for the conflict outcome79; the log of the GDP growth and the
value of the GDP per capita; the log of the population; the net inflow of foreign direct investments
as a percentage of the GDP; the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of the
GDP; two dummy variables indicating if the country is under a democratic or military regime; a
dummy variable assuming value 1 if the year is before 1991; and the difference between the value of
the variable ManuVA at the conflict onset and at the peace onset. I include country fixed effects.
For the GDP and population values, the data source is the V-Dem dataset. For the level of
trade and of foreign direct investments the data source is the World Bank Open Dataset. The first
dummy variable accounting for the regime type assumes value 1 if in the given year the country’s
79As conflict outcomes, following the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, I include low activity, victory
or ceasefire. Peace agreement is dropped from the analysis as it is the baseline.
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polity2 index score is equal or greater than 5 and 0 otherwise. The source for the polity2 index
is the PoiltyIV project database (Marshall and Jaggers 2015). The index measures the political
regime authority and approximates the level of democratization ranging from -10 (full autocracy)
to +10 (full democracy). The second dummy variable accounting for the polity assumes value 1
if in a given year the regime type is coded as “indirect military”, “military”, “military-personal”,
“party-military” or “party-military-personal” in the V-Dem dataset.
The difference between the value of the variable ManuVA at the conflict onset and the peace
onset, the number of years of conflict the country experienced before the peace onset, and the
number of years since the peace onset with its squared and cubic term capture the impact of the
conflict on the economy, peace dividends and phoenix effect. The conflict outcome dummies account
for post-conflict dynamics as low-intensity fights or more stable scenarios. The GDP growth and
the GDP per capita control for the capacity of more developed countries’ firms to access advanced
technology and to operate in a safe environment, while the size of the population for the presence of
economies of scale and other effects of country size. The level of foreign direct investments and the
level of trade proxy for the capacity of firms to access foreign capitals and markets. The two dummy
variables accounting for the country’s polity control for the quality of the institutional framework
firms operate in. The dummy variable assuming value 1 if the year is before 1991 controls for time
trends in donors’ aid allocations, strategies and practices.
To corroborate my results I run the model one more time with a less parsimonious specification
including as additional control variables the level of natural resources extracted as a percentage of
the GDP, a dummy variable assuming value 1 if in the given year the country’s polity2 index score
is equal or smaller than -5, a variable accounting for the level of instability80, the total amount of
commitments per capita allocated and the level of inflation. For these variables, the data sources
are respectively the World Bank Open Dataset, the PolityIV project dataset, the Cross-Section
Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 1997), the AidData dataset and the V-Dem dataset. Table 17A
in the appendix fully present results from this more conservative specification.
Endogeneity of aid is a potentially critical issue. Donors may commit more aid targeting energy
80The variable accounts for the presence of assassinations, purging of governmental officials, guerrilla
activity, protests, riots, and strikes as coded by Banks (Banks, 1997)
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infrastructures exactly to those countries where the manufacturing sector is more underdeveloped.
For this reason, I resort to a two stages least squares analysis to account for the bias introduced
by the endogenous placement of aid. As excluded instrument for the endogenous regressor Aid, I
use the pre-conflict infant mortality rate. To code this variable, I resort to data from the V-Dem
dataset. As this variable considers values that precede the shock of the conflict, it is likely to satisfy
the exclusion restriction and to do not suffer any reverse effect of the dependent variable. At the
same time, with the other included instruments, it proxies for donors’ priorities in post-conflict
settings. Indeed, we can expect donors to be more prone to allocate more infrastructural aid in
contexts where humanitarian needs are less urgent. As last robustness check, I test my model using
as excluded instrument the pre-conflict level of urbanization. This variable captures the share of
people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. To code this variable, I resort
to data from the World Bank Open Dataset. Assuming that donors intend at least to restore the
development level that post-conflict countries enjoyed before the conflict outbreak and that energy
infrastructures are a backbone of developed economies, it is fair to expect donors to commit more
aid targeting these infrastructures to those countries that had high urbanization rates before the
conflict. Results from this additional control are in line with those from the main analysis and fully
presented in Table 18A in the appendix.
7.6 Results
Table 11 presents estimates from the first and the second stage of the two stages least squares
analysis. It is worth to recall that in IV analysis R2 has no natural interpretation as SSR for
IV can be larger than SST (Wooldridge, 2006). Looking at the first stage equation, the excluded
instrument is statistically significant at 1% level and has the expected negative sign. This supports
the intuition that donors commit more energy infrastructural aid to countries where humanitarian
needs are less urgent. With regard the included instruments, only the size of the population,
the level of trade, the GDP per capita, the amount of foreign direct investments and the length
of the conflict are significant. The sign of these coefficients presents a coherent picture where
poor small countries with open economies but low levels of foreign direct investments that suffered
protracted conflicts tend to receive more aid targeting energy infrastructures than other post-
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conflict countries. Turing at the results from the second stage, the variable Aid has a positive sign
and is statistically significant at 5% level. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficient, results from
the second stage suggest that, keeping all the variable constant at their means, an increase of one
standard deviation of the variable Aid rises the share of the manufacturing sector value added of
4 percentage points. Likewise, and in other words, per each additional 10 US dollars per capita
targeting energy infrastructures allocated to post-conflict countries, the share of the manufacturing
sector value added increases of ≈ 4.8 percentage points. With regard to the controls, only the
level of foreign direct investments is significant at 5% level and has an intuitive positive sign. It is
worth noting that the values of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and of the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F statistic indicate that the instruments are relevant and not weak (Baum et al., 2007;
Staiger and Stock, 1997). Results do not statistically differ when I exclude from the analysis 37
observations from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom as the coefficient of
the variable Aid is equal to ≈ 0.46. Notably, the values of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
and of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic increase respectively from 14.077 to 14.323 and
from 14.068 to 14.222 suggesting that the instruments perform better in predicting the amount
of donors’ commitments targeting energy infrastructures when I run the model using the reduced
sample. At the same time, adding as additional controls the level of instability, natural resources
dependency, inflation, the dummy variable accounting for the country being under an autocratic
regime and the total amount of aid per capita that donors commit does not affect the results. As
Table 17A in the appendix shows, the magnitude of the coefficient of the variable Aid is in line with
previous results. When I include the additional controls, the coefficient of the variable Aid is ≈
0.45. This value rises to ≈ 0.52 when I include the additional controls and I drop observations from
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. In both cases, the level of significance
of the variable Aid rises from 5% to 1% but the values of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and
of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic slightly decrease.
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Table 11: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing
sector
First stage Second stage
VARIABLES Aid Manu VAt+1














Cease Fire 2.428 -1.979*
(1.818) (1.121)






GDP growth -4.017 0.719
(3.990) (2.376)




War Length 0.445*** -0.022
(0.121) (0.056)
∆ Manu VA 0.201 -0.280
(0.222) (0.171)





Number of ID 45 45
Country FE YES YES
Robust SE YES YES
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – continued from previous page
First stage Second stage
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic , 14.077
Adjusted R-squared -1.291
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 14.068
,
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As aforementioned, I test my model using different timeframes. Figure 1 plots the coefficients
of the variable Aid for each timeframe. Each dot represents the value of the coefficient of the
variable Aid for a given timeframe, the vertical lines represent the 95% confidence interval and
the dashed horizontal line is set on 0. Interestingly, the length of the post-conflict period does
not affect the sign of the coefficient and the variable Aid is always significant at 5% level except
that in the 5-years timeframe where it is significant at 1% level. Yet, despite the magnitude of
the estimated coefficients slightly increases with the length of the post-conflict period, none of the
coefficients is statistically different from the others. As Table 14A and Table 15A in the appendix
report, the longer is the post-conflict timeframe used to test the model, the lower are the values of
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. This implies
that the set of instruments perform best in predicting values of the variable Aid temporally closer
to the peace onset. This intuitively suggests that in the immediate post-war years, reconstruction,
humanitarian and economic needs play a greater role as drivers of donors’ commitments than in
later phases of the post-conflict period.
Figure 3 plots the coefficients of the variable Aid considering the additional forwards. Dots
report the value of the coefficient of the variable Aid corresponding to a specific forward of the
dependent variable. As before, vertical lines on each dot represent the 95% confidence interval and
the dashed horizontal line is set on 0. Results show that when I forward the dependent variable of
2 and 3 periods - rather than 1 as in the main specification - the coefficient of the variable Aid is
still positive and significantly different from 0 at 5% level. Notably, its magnitude is in line with
previous findings. Yet, when I forward the dependent variable of 4 and 5 periods the coefficient
is no longer significantly different from 0 and its magnitude drops from ≈ 0.5 to ≈ 0.16. These
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Figure 16: coefficient of Aid over different post-conflict timeframes. Vertical lines repre-
senting the 95% confidence interval and dashed horizontal line set on 0.
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results suggest that the positive impact of donors’ commitments to restore and enhance energy
infrastructures last in the medium term but tend to vanish in the long-term.
Figure 17: coefficient of Aid over different forwards of ManuVA. Vertical lines representing
the 95% confidence interval and dashed horizontal line set on 0.
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Eventually, as a final robustness check, I run my model using as alternative excluded instrument
the pre-conflict urbanization level. Table 18A in the appendix fully reports the results. Despite
the values of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
are lower than in the main model specification, they suggest that the new set of instruments is
relevant and not weak as well. Notably, despite in this specification the coefficient of the variable
Aid is ≈ .12 units smaller than the coefficient estimated in the main specification, the difference is
not statistically significant.
In conclusion, the hypothesis is not rejected. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the manufac-
turing sector of post-conflict countries benefits from donors’ commitments to restore and enhance
energy production and supply infrastructures. Notably, the effects of donors’ commitments tend to
last at least for three years since the allocation.
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7.7 Conclusions
So far, studies focused on aid as one of the main tools for post-conflict reconstruction. Scholars and
practitioners investigated and debated if and to what extent post-conflict aid promotes peace, its ef-
fects on the real exchange rate, economic growth, the labour market, foreign direct investments, the
determinants of projects’ success and the effectiveness of different development strategies (Demekas
et al. 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Collier et al., 2003; Suhrke et al., 2005; Schmidt-Hebbel,
2007; Greenberg and Zuckerman 2009; Barakat, 2009; Manning and Malbrough, 2010; Duponchel
et al. 2010; David et al. 2011; Garriga and Phillips, 2014; Nunnenkamp, 2016). Yet, we know little
regarding the impact of post-conflict aid on the different economic sectors of recipient countries.
I aim to partially fill this gap investigating the effect of post-conflict aid targeting energy infras-
tructures on the manufacturing sector of recipient countries. I argue that donors’ commitment
to restore and enhance post-conflict countries’ capacity to generate, store and distribute energy
decreases manufacturing firms’ costs and increase their productivity. As the expected return on
investments in the manufacturing sector rises, agents have the incentive to reinvest in the sector
thus leading to its growth.
To test my hypothesis, I resort to a cross-section time-series two stages least squares multivariate
analysis covering 46 post-conflict countries between 1970 and 2013. Results show that donors’
commitment to restore and enhance the energy infrastructures of recipient countries has a positive
impact on the manufacturing sector both on the short and the medium term. Notably, the analysis
suggests that allocating additional 10 US dollars per capita increases of ≈ 4.8 percentage points the
value added from the manufacturing sector as a percentage of the GDP. These results hold when
the post-conflict period is considered to last both only a few years after the peace onset and one
decade since the breakout of peace.
These findings shed more light both on the effects of aid allocation on the rebuilding of war-torn
societies and on the effects of energy infrastructures on fragile economies. In particular, they re-
mark the difference between the impact of developmental aid in conventional environments and of
reconstruction aid in post-conflict societies. In this sense, they suggest that unlike developmental
aid allocated in conventional settings, aid targeting energy infrastructures in post-conflict environ-
ments promotes the manufacturing sector of recipient countries. This latter consideration implies
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that donors targeting energy infrastructures with adequate policies, resources and strategies might
help post-conflict countries to differentiate their economy, avoid natural resource dependency and
thus decrease their vulnerability to external economic shocks. This is extremely relevant as natural
resource dependency leads to reduced economic growth, investments and political liberties (Gylfa-
son, 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2008; Mavrotas et al., 2011) while economic shocks and economic
grievances are associated to the risk of conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In
this sense, these findings point to donors and policymakers additional ways to promote and support




In the following pages, Table 11A and Table 12A report the descriptive statistics of the main sample
and the list of included countries with the respective number of observations. Table 13A shows
the results of my analysis when I drop observations from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the
United Kingdom. Table 14A, Table 15A and Table 16A present the results of my analysis when
I run the model using additional post-conflict timeframes and additional lags for the dependent
variable. Table 17A reports the first and the second stage results when I add as additional controls
a dummy variable indicating if in the country is ruling an autocracy, the relevance of natural
resources revenues on the GDP, the level of inflation, the level of instability and the total amount
of dollars per capita that donors commit. Notably, under Specification 1A I present results obtained
running my model including all countries from the panel while under Specification 2A I present
results obtained running the model excluding observations from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
and the United Kingdom. Lastly, Table 18A displays results obtained when as excluded instrument
I use the pre-conflict level of urbanization rather than the pre-conflict level of infant mortality.
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Table 11A: Summary statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Manu VA 13.41 6.74 0.26 34.13 365
Aid 5.89 8.44 0.00 41.54 365
Pre-conflict infant mortality 77.89 37.42 5.80 165.10 365
Pre-conflict urbanization 37.79 19.28 5.34 80.16 365
Duration 3.48 2.00 1.00 7.00 365
Duration2 16.08 15.51 1.00 49.00 365
Duration3 86.07 107.76 1.00 343.00 365
Population 16.76 1.29 14.70 21.03 365
Democracy 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 365
Military 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 365
Cease Fire 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 365
Low Intensity 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 365
Victory 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 365
Trade 60.74 30.11 6.32 156.86 365
GDP growth 0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.38 365
GDP per capita 5018.40 6117.92 615.00 37724.00 365
FDI 2.69 5.69 -5.39 55.08 365
War Length 3.72 4.47 1.00 18.00 365
∆ Manu VA -0.22 2.67 -6.18 10.12 365
Cold war 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 365
Autocracy 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 365
Instability 1402.60 2180.79 0.00 26187.00 318
Natural revenues 10.76 13.58 0.11 64.17 364
Total commitments per capita 71.44 68.93 0.00 650.57 365
Inflation 15.70 50.16 -8.53 626.73 299
147
Table 12A: Countries included in the main sample and respective number of observations
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Table 12A – continued from previous page















Table 13A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing
sector. Observations from China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and United Kingdom dropped.
First stage Second stage
VARIABLES Aid ManuVAt+1














Cease Fire 0.467 -1.327
(2.129) (1.054)






GDP growth -3.305 0.114
(4.169) (2.366)




War Length 0.472*** -0.022
(0.131) (0.057)
∆ Manu VA 0.255 -0.301*
(0.219) (0.171)





Number of ID 40 40
Country FE YES YES
Robust SE YES YES
Continued on next page
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Table 13A – continued from previous page
First stage Second stage
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic , 14.323
Adjusted R-squared -1.210
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 14.222
,
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing sector. Additional post-conflict
timeframes: 4-Years, 5-Years, 6-Years
(4-Year Timeframe) (5-Year Timeframe) (6-Year Timeframe)
VARIABLES ManuVAt+1 ManuVAt+1 ManuVAt+1
Aid 0.421** 0.404*** 0.453**
(0.175) (0.157) (0.179)
Duration -1.028 -2.126 -1.056
(3.355) (1.888) (1.273)
Duration2 0.193 0.699 0.252
(1.463) (0.695) (0.402)
Duration3 0.001 -0.069 -0.016
(0.193) (0.077) (0.038)
Population -0.087 -0.044 -0.025
(1.762) (1.488) (1.437)
Democracy 1.015 1.126* 0.981
(0.680) (0.645) (0.604)
Military 1.535 2.005** 1.793*
(1.130) (0.973) (0.971)
Cease Fire -1.934 -2.030* -2.032*
(1.371) (1.153) (1.111)
Low Intensity -1.305 -1.112 -0.842
(1.221) (1.018) (0.952)
Victory 1.179 1.696 1.873*
(1.309) (1.134) (1.116)
Trade -0.083** -0.070** -0.061*
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
GDP growth -1.160 -0.519 -0.609
(2.517) (2.332) (2.363)
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continued on next page
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Table 14A – continued from previous page
4-Year Timeframe 5-Year Timeframe 6-Year Timeframe
FDI 0.099 0.128** 0.130**
(0.074) (0.061) (0.060)
War Length -0.049 -0.036 -0.029
(0.069) (0.063) (0.061)
∆ Manu VA -0.359** -0.345** -0.346**
(0.177) (0.162) (0.169)
Cold War -0.505 -0.257 0.017
(1.019) (0.832) (0.803)
Observations 244 290 330
Number of ID 44 45 45
Adjusted R-squared -0.960 -0.778 -1.001
Country FE YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 12.317 15.104 13.935
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 12.709 14.408 13.940
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing sector. Additional post-conflict
timeframes: 8-Years, 9-Years, 10-Years
(8-Year Timeframe) (9-Year Timeframe) (10-Year Timeframe)
VARIABLES ManuVAt+1 ManuVAt+1 ManuVAt+1
Aid 0.511** 0.571** 0.565**
(0.228) (0.277) (0.286)
Duration -1.090 -0.838 -1.303
(0.929) (0.875) (0.855)
Duration2 0.236 0.144 0.267
(0.241) (0.211) (0.188)
Duration3 -0.013 -0.005 -0.014
(0.018) (0.015) (0.012)
Population 0.610 0.607 0.594
(1.352) (1.408) (1.369)
Democracy 0.821 0.885 0.716
(0.654) (0.725) (0.690)
Military 0.961 0.371 0.079
(0.951) (1.155) (1.205)
Cease Fire -1.896* -2.004 -2.037
(1.123) (1.278) (1.262)
Low Intensity -0.519 -0.400 -0.602
(0.886) (0.955) (0.955)
Victory 2.134* 2.116 2.088
(1.221) (1.363) (1.392)
Trade -0.059* -0.056 -0.039
(0.036) (0.041) (0.038)
GDP growth 0.440 0.052 -0.708
(2.298) (2.484) (2.397)
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Continued on next page
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Table 15A – continued from previous page
8-Year Timeframe 9-Year Timeframe 10-Year Timeframe
FDI 0.111 0.101 0.077
(0.070) (0.076) (0.067)
War Length -0.030 -0.026 -0.017
(0.056) (0.060) (0.059)
∆ Manu VA -0.234 -0.176 -0.136
(0.175) (0.184) (0.178)
Cold War 0.046 0.042 -0.235
(0.796) (0.868) (0.819)
Observations 393 423 453
Number of ID 45 46 47
Adjusted R-squared -1.642 -2.669 -3.000
Country FE YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 12.070 9.640 9.298
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 11.671 8.987 8.528
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing sector. Additional dependent
variable forwards
VARIABLES ManuVAt+2 ManuVAt+3 ManuVAt+4 ManuVAt+5
Aid 0.488** 0.414** 0.156 -0.173
(0.197) (0.194) (0.107) (0.316)
Duration -0.665 -0.973 -0.770 0.406
(1.028) (0.944) (0.608) (1.140)
Duration2 0.111 0.191 0.191 -0.142
(0.290) (0.264) (0.177) (0.325)
Duration3 -0.002 -0.009 -0.013 0.014
(0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027)
Population -0.304 -0.359 -0.350 0.304
(1.180) (1.317) (1.088) (1.553)
Democracy 0.241 -0.130 -0.629* -0.126
(0.595) (0.521) (0.363) (0.767)
Military 1.369 1.231 0.336 1.799
(0.880) (0.773) (0.444) (1.275)
Cease Fire -2.236* -2.226** -0.797 -0.445
(1.178) (1.057) (0.573) (1.202)
Low Intensity -0.751 -0.675 0.526 0.260
(0.946) (0.917) (0.579) (1.515)
Victory 1.544 0.809 -0.733 -1.384
(1.235) (1.216) (0.658) (1.744)
Trade -0.054* -0.051* -0.031 -0.011
(0.029) (0.028) (0.021) (0.041)
GDP Growth 0.982 0.062 -2.423* -4.366**
(2.372) (2.102) (1.236) (2.109)
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI 0.100 0.077 0.002 -0.042
Continued on next page
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Table 16A – continued from previous page
(0.062) (0.059) (0.036) (0.085)
War Length -0.017 -0.002 0.010 -0.027
(0.060) (0.051) (0.040) (0.073)
∆ ManuVA -0.254 -0.148 0.077 0.103
(0.175) (0.165) (0.073) (0.131)
ColdWar 0.108 0.943* 1.237
(0.691) (0.532) (0.904)
Observations 371 370 367 347
Number of ID 46 46 46 43
Adjusted R-squared -1.361 -1.040 -0.088 -0.269
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 15.726 14.445 14.283 8.151
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 16.084 14.842 14.659 12.092
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing sector. Additional controls.
Specification 1A Specification 2A
(First stage) (Second stage) (First stage) (Second stage)
VARIABLES Aid ManuVAt+1 Aid ManuVAt+1




Duration 1.467 0.021 1.755 -0.359
(1.973) (1.030) (2.151) (1.216)
Duration2 -0.282 -0.106 -0.368 0.027
(0.548) (0.294) (0.598) (0.345)
Duration3 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.007
(0.046) (0.025) (0.050) (0.029)
Population -4.451 0.924 -3.511 0.264
(3.722) (1.632) (3.838) (1.777)
Democracy 0.130 1.059 0.033 1.322
(1.504) (0.864) (1.592) (0.984)
Military 1.868 0.351 1.816 0.373
(1.323) (0.961) (1.315) (1.004)
Cease Fire -3.586 0.286 -3.397 0.170
(2.751) (1.416) (2.781) (1.524)
Low Intensity -7.816*** 1.566 -8.011*** 2.443
(2.724) (1.747) (2.773) (1.975)
Victory -6.668** 4.346** -6.863** 5.034**
(2.981) (2.027) (3.008) (2.309)
Trade 0.140*** -0.054 0.148*** -0.073*
(0.044) (0.038) (0.045) (0.043)
GDP Growth -3.441 -1.148 -2.624 -1.709
(4.733) (2.358) (4.974) (2.579)
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
Continued on next page
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Table 17A – continued from previous page
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI -0.347*** 0.177** -0.366*** 0.222**
(0.081) (0.076) (0.081) (0.088)
War Length 0.398** -0.035 0.364** -0.025
(0.160) (0.070) (0.167) (0.077)
∆ ManuVA 0.655*** -0.490*** 0.668*** -0.551***
(0.211) (0.172) (0.209) (0.185)
Cold War -0.849 0.071 -1.133 0.558
(1.652) (0.846) (1.693) (0.983)
Autocracy 0.239 1.805** 0.359 1.773**
(1.581) (0.742) (1.663) (0.871)
Instability 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Natural Revenues -0.085 -0.037 -0.083 -0.039
(0.090) (0.055) (0.090) (0.058)
Total commitments per capita 0.014 -0.007 0.015 -0.009
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Inflation 0.014 -0.002 0.015* -0.004
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Observations 296 296 270 270
Number of ID 40 40 35 35
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Robust SE YES YES YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 7.478 6.295
Adjusted R-squared -1.262 -1.700
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 13.129 10.010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18A: The effect of Aid targeting energy production and supply on the manufacturing


















Cease Fire 2.382 -1.812*
(1.789) (0.930)






GDP Growth -2.355 0.474
(3.577) (2.168)




War Length 0.365*** -0.008
(0.130) (0.049)
∆ ManuVA 0.075 -0.263*
(0.251) (0.146)
Cold War -1.671 0.306
(1.128) (0.649)
Observations 379 379
Number of ID 47 47
Country FE YES YES
Robust SE YES YES
Continued on next page
161
Table 18A – continued from previous page
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 11.458
Adjusted R-squared -0.740
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 13.630
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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8 Conclusions
In this thesis, I discuss and explore if, how, and to what extent resource windfalls affect fragile and
post-conflict countries in order to advance our understanding of what determines state-building
processes in these contexts. Notably, I first focus on the impact of resource windfalls on civil-
military relations looking in detail at the nexus between discretionally allocable resources, coup
risk and the implementation of institutional coup-proofing strategies. Then I examine how power-
equilibria between former warring factions and non-combatant groups shape foreign reconstruction
aid allocations at the subnational level. Finally, I investigate the conditions under which foreign
aid can contribute to make recipient post-conflict economies less dependent on the extraction of
natural resource revenues.
Looking at the results along general lines, the answer to the investigated question - what is the
impact of resource windfalls in fragile countries? - is, not much surprisingly, indeed: it depends.
Notably, there are two dimensions that emerge as relevant to understand what affects the impact of
resource windfalls. The first dimension is the level of political and economic grievances present in
the country. The second is the type of resources that country leaders have access to. While it is true
that discretionally allocable resources might not have a positive impact on the development of fragile
countries, especially when coup risk is high, it is also true that specific types of donors’ interventions
might actually contribute to reduce the vulnerability of recipient economies to exogenous shocks.
Notably, it is important to remark how the empirical analyses discussed in the thesis shows that
these two dimensions do not only affect countries separately but jointly as well.
In more detail, in the first two chapters of the thesis, I resort to an opportunity-willingness
framework to investigate if and how access to discretionally allocable resources influences leaders’
decisions regarding the extent to which to undertake institutional coup-proofing as a strategy to face
coup risk. I show that leaders who enjoy revenues from natural resources or unearmarked foreign
aid are less likely than others to react to coup-risk undertaking institutional coup-proofing efforts.
I explain this finding by arguing that leaders who have access to discretionally allocable resources
prefer to allocate such revenues to fund coup-proofing strategies that are not openly against the
interests of the military - as institutional coup-proofing - to reduce the risk of a preventive coup.
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In the second part of the thesis, I focus on resource windfalls in post-conflict scenarios and
reconstruction settings. In particular, in the third chapter co-authored with dr. Steinwand, we
explore how fighting patterns and voting behavior affected the distribution of donors’ resources in
post-conflict Nepal. Notably, we show how the peace agreement that concluded the Nepalese civil
war in 2006 was unsuccessful in breaking spoil politics. In fact, we find that those segments of the
Nepalese society that did not take a side during the conflict, and therefore did not take part in
the peace negotiations, were systematically excluded from the allocation of foreign aid. A possible
causal mechanism is the under-representation of groups that did not support any of the former
fighting factions during peace negotiations and in post-conflict institutions.
Finally, in the last chapter of the thesis, I focus on the conditions under which post-conflict re-
construction aid contributes to strengthening the manufacturing sector of post-conflict economies.
In fact, in this chapter, I show how donors’ efforts in rebuilding facilities to produce and distribute
energy in post-conflict countries have a statistically significant and positive impact on manufac-
turing production. The underlying theory is that donors’ reconstruction aid targeting energy in-
frastructures is less likely than other types of aid to trigger the so-called Dutch disease, while, at
the same time, it increases the expected returns of investments in the manufacturing sector thus
boosting its recovery.
The findings presented and discussed in this thesis have several academic and policy implica-
tions. Notably, the first two chapters contribute to advance our understanding of civil-military
relations introducing in a new willingness-opportunity framework the role that discretionally al-
locable resources - as natural resource revenues and foreign aid - play in shaping coup-proofing
strategies. At the same time, these chapters shed more light on how the type and amount of
resources that leaders enjoy affects their strategies to increase their chances to hold office when
facing coup risk. In this sense, the first part of the thesis offers new insights into how state bud-
gets and donors’ policies contribute to leaders’ survival. Further, the findings discussed in the
first two chapters contribute to providing development-interested donors with more information to
design specific policies and conditionality to achieve their goals. Indeed, as results suggest that
unearmarked aid is likely to be diverted to funding coup-proofing strategies when coup risk rises,
it is natural to assume that those donors who want to promote development should reconsider
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the type of aid they allocate and, of course, the channels via which they allocate it. At the same
time, results suggests that further coordination between donors as well as the development and the
implementation of more accurate accounting system to manage the financial mechanisms funded
by multilateral donors could contribute to reduce the capacity of recipient leaders to divert aid
when they desire it. Finally, on the empirical side, the first two chapters of the thesis introduce a
two-step strategy and a set of historical, geographical, and meteorological instrumental variables to
capture the relation between coup risk and cup-proofing strategies controlling for the bidirectional
relationship between these dimensions.
At the same time, the findings in the second part of the thesis expand our knowledge about the
conditions under which reconstruction aid reaches potential beneficiaries in post-conflict countries
and contributes to restarting the productive sectors of the national economy. The importance
of the findings discussed in this section lies, first, in the fact that they show how post-conflict
reconstruction aid might fuel new grievances in post-conflict countries even in the aftermath of
conflicts settled via a peace agreement. Second, in the fact that they show how not all post-conflict
reconstruction aid has the same impact on the economy of recipient countries. In this sense, the
third and fourth chapters of the thesis provide policymakers with crucial information to design
specific aid-allocation strategies and design precise conditionality to prevent that spoil politics or
unintended effects of aid might jeopardize the achieved peace and post-conflict peace dividends.
Starting from these findings, there are several avenues for future research. Concerning the first
part of the thesis, future research might and should focus on the impact of discretionally allocable
resources on other types of coup-proofing strategies. At the same time, further research could
direct efforts to investigate to what extent the fragmentation of donors and the predictability of
future revenues influence leaders’ decisions to undertake institutional coup-proofing rather than
other coup-proofing strategies when coup risk rises.
Furthermore, future studies should take into consideration and explore more the effects of differ-
ent types of reconstruction aid in post-conflict countries. Notably, future studies might focus, first,
to investigate if and to what extent donors’ commitment to rebuild the economic infrastructure of
post-conflict countries has positive effects on the recipient country’s export differentiation. Indeed,
post-conflict economic infrastructural aid might contribute to reducing production and transport
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costs and thus spur the recipient country’s firms from depressed sectors to re-enter the national and
foreign markets. Second, to explore the spillover effects of post-conflict foreign aid. In fact, while,
on one hand, aid supporting post-conflict recovery may have strong positive spillover effects on
countries sharing trade-flows or borders with aid recipient countries, on the other, the allocation of
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de Ciencia Poĺıtica, 40:63–89, 2016.
[170] S Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates. Spatial–horizontal inequality and the maoist insurgency
178
in nepal. Review of development economics, 9(1):121–134, 2005.
[171] Hicham Bou Nassif. Wedded to mubarak: the second careers and financial rewards of egypt’s
military elite, 1981–2011. The Middle East Journal, 67(4):509–530, 2013.
[172] Nihar Nayak. The madhesi movement in nepal: Implications for india. Strategic Analysis,
35(4):640–660, 2011.
[173] J Peter Neary and Sweder Van Wijnbergen. Natural resources and the macroeconomy. 1986.
[174] Whitney K Newey. Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with endogenous
explanatory variables. Journal of econometrics, 36(3):231–250, 1987.
[175] Richard A Nielsen, Michael G Findley, Zachary S Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L Nielson.
Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict. American Journal of Political Science,
55(2):219–232, 2011.
[176] Suzanne C Nielsen. Civil-military relations theory and military effectiveness. Policy & Man-
agement Review, 2(2), 2002.
[177] Nathan Nunn and Diego Puga. Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in africa. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 94(1):20–36, 2012.
[178] Peter Nunnenkamp. Recent patterns of post-conflict aid: Did donors help sustain peace?
Technical report, Kiel Working Paper, 2016.
[179] Olusegun Obasanjo. My command: an account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, volume
249. Heinemann, 1980.
[180] OECD and World Trade Organization. Aid for trade at a glance 2019 economic diversification
and empowerment.
[181] Shehu Othman. Classes, crises and coup: the demise of shagari’s regime. African Affairs,
83(333):441–461, 1984.
[182] Gianmarco IP Ottaviano. Infrastructure and economic geography: An overview of theory
and evidence. EIB papers, 13(2):8–35, 2008.
[183] Howar Pack and Janet Rothenberg Pack. Foreign aid and the question of fungibility. The
Review of Economics and statistics, pages 258–265, 1993.
[184] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1977–1978. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
179
1977.
[185] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1980–1981. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
1980.
[186] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1981–1982. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
1981.
[187] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1983–1984. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
1983.
[188] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1989–1990. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
1989.
[189] John Paxton. The Statesman’s Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States
of the World for the Year 1990–1991. The Statesman’s Yearbook. Palgrave Macmillan UK,
1990.
[190] Sam Perlo-Freeman and Jennifer Brauner. Natural resources and military expenditure: The
case of algeria. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 7(1), 2012.
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